










Sulaiman Amro Al amro 
 
 
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements  




Software Technology Research Laboratory 
Faculty of Technology 
De Montfort University 
 
May 2013  
 I | P a g e  
 
DEDICATION  
To my beloved parents 
This thesis is dedicated to my Father who has been my supportive, motivated, inspired 
guide throughout my life, and who has spent every minute of his life teaching and 
guiding me and my brothers and sisters how to live and be successful. 
To my Mother for her support and endless love, daily prayers, and for her 
encouragement and everything she has sacrificed for us. 
To my Sisters and Brothers for their support, prayers and encouragements throughout 
my entire life.  
To my beloved Family, My Wife for her support and patience throughout my PhD, and 
my little boy Amro who has changed my life and relieves my tiredness and stress every 
single day. 
 II | P a g e  
 
  ABSTRACT 
Every day, the growing number of viruses causes major damage to computer 
systems, which many antivirus products have been developed to protect. Regrettably, 
existing antivirus products do not provide a full solution to the problems associated 
with viruses. One of the main reasons for this is that these products typically use 
signature-based detection, so that the rapid growth in the number of viruses means 
that many signatures have to be added to their signature databases each day. These 
signatures then have to be stored in the computer system, where they consume 
increasing memory space. Moreover, the large database will also affect the speed of 
searching for signatures, and, hence, affect the performance of the system. As the 
number of viruses continues to grow, ever more space will be needed in the future. 
There is thus an urgent need for a novel and robust detection technique. One of the 
most encouraging recent developments in virus research is the use of formulae, which 
provides alternatives to classic virus detection methods. The proposed research uses 
temporal logic and behaviour-based detection to detect viruses. Interval Temporal 
Logic (ITL) will be used to generate virus specifications, properties and formulae based 
on the analysis of the behaviour of computer viruses, in order to detect them. 
Tempura, which is the executable subset of ITL, will be used to check whether a good 
or bad behaviour occurs with the help of ITL description and system traces. The 
process will also use AnaTempura, an integrated workbench tool for ITL that supports 
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our system specifications. AnaTempura will offer validation and verification of the ITL 
specifications and provide runtime testing of these specifications. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Objectives: 
 Provide an overview of the motivations and research problems. 
 Highlight the research hypotheses and success criteria. 
 Identify the scope of research. 
 Describe the research methodology. 
 Present the thesis structure. 
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1.1 Preface 
The rapid growth of technology and the speed of communication that the internet 
provides make research into computer viruses detection essential, in order to protect 
computers and network systems from any malevolent attack. It is highly recommended 
that virus researchers should be aware of new trends, which virus writers will exploit 
whenever they have the opportunity. The success that attackers enjoy demonstrates 
that there needs to be a novel and robust detection system to prevent attacks. Since 
they first appeared, computer viruses have caused disruption to private and public 
organisations, governments and computer users, as they attempt to remove, modify or 
steal sensitive data. Therefore, a robust system is needed in order to minimise these 
disturbances and to defeat the new techniques used by skilful attackers. 
Traditional antivirus (AV) products provide a good detection technique which 
relies on signatures that have been collected from previous known viruses and then 
added to an AV database. Prior to the arriving of a virus to the system, its signature will 
be compared with those stored in the database and if there is a match, the virus will be 
detected; otherwise, the system will run normally [1]. Thus, newly released viruses will 
not be detected by signature-based detection unless the antivirus company receives 
this new virus and stores its signature in its own database. The other disadvantage of 
this approach is that it needs a large database in order to store the signatures. As the 
number of viruses increases every day, ever larger databases are needed to store all 
their signatures, so that more storage space will be needed in the near future [2, 3]. 
The large database will also affect the speed of searching for signatures, and, thus, 
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affect the performance of the system. These disadvantages mean that the signature-
based detection technique will soon be inadequate to protect computer systems. 
Another and more promising approach which has been applied recently is 
called behaviour-based virus detection. As their name suggests, such techniques do 
not rely on a database of signatures, but instead concentrate on the behaviour of the 
system. Behaviour-based virus detection has come to light in order to overcome the 
problems associated with traditional signature-based detection. The principle behind 
this approach is first to observe the normal behaviour of the system, after which any 
deviation from it will be classified as an intrusion [4]. The second arm of behaviour-
based detection is to predefine virus behaviour, so that any process which resembles 
virus activity can be identified as a potential virus. However, there are difficulties 
associated with behaviour-based detection, the greatest of which is how to define the 
behaviours that will represent known and novel viruses without confusing them with 
normal processes running in the system (known as false positives) [5]. In addition, 
some existing virus behaviour detection techniques rely on detecting subclasses of 
viruses. In general, behaviour-based detection techniques rely on identifying virus 
characteristics in order to detect these viruses and other viruses sharing the same 
characteristics in the future. One of the objectives of this research is to look deeply 
into the characteristics of computer viruses in order to deduce properties, and 
specifications that will be used in this research. 
The problem of the ever growing number of computer viruses leads virus 
researchers to seek alternative solutions. The representation of virus behaviour using 
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formulae is one of the most promising techniques used to detect computer attacks 
nowadays [6]. The present research proposes to build a detection technique using 
temporal logic specifications that have been inferred from the analysis of virus 
behaviour. We believe that using such logical specifications and formulae will minimise 
the problem of the rapidly growing database of traditional AV products. The goal of 
the detection technique to be used in this research is to detect viruses with a low 
consumption of memory space, so that the system will run at an acceptable speed 
even if many novel computer viruses are released. A logic called Interval Temporal 
Logic (ITL) has been chosen to be used in this research because this logic is very 
suitable to describe system traces, i.e., it can be used to describe bad and good 
behaviours. The Tempura tool will be used to check whether a good or bad behaviour 
occurs with help of ITL description and system traces.  
1.2 Motivation 
One of the greatest challenges facing computer researchers today is the rapidly 
growing number of computer viruses, which obliges signature databases to become 
ever larger. According to Kaspersky [7], more than 36,000 new viruses appear every 
day, and these all need to be analysed in order for their signatures to be added to the 
signature database. This is a lengthy process and requires a large amount of storage 
space. Furthermore, Norton [8], states that computers are always threatened by 
malwares due to the thousands of new viruses, worms and Trojans which are created 
every day. As new viruses arrive, AV databases are becoming ever larger, making 
systems run increasingly slowly as available space is reduced [9]. This concern led to 
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the decision to examine a selected antivirus product (Kaspersky) in order to discover 
exactly how much system memory space these signatures require. On 14th March 2011 
it was observed that there were 5495548 signatures in the Kaspersky AV database, as 
shown in Figure 1.1. According to Song [10], the average length of a virus signature is 
67 bytes. Therefore, the following calculation shows that the size of the database in 
question would be over 350 MB:  
5495548 (signatures) * 67 bytes = 368201716 bytes ≈ 351.2 megabytes 
This is means that to store these signatures, the system would need a large 
memory; and as the number of viruses grows every day, increasing space would be 
needed for the AV database. Ten days after the above observation, i.e., on 24th March 
2011, the number of signatures in the same AV database was observed to have 
increased from 5495548 to 5557346. This set of observations demonstrates that it is 
essential to deal with the daily growth in the number of viruses. 
 
Figure ‎1.1: The number of signatures in a selected antivirus product. 
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1.3 Research Problems 
Research reports [2, 3, 9] argue that signature-based virus detection will not be 
sufficient in the near future because of the continual increase in virus numbers, the 
increased memory space required and the consequent reduction in performance and 
speed of the systems concerned. In addition, the large database will also affect the 
speed of searching for signatures, and, thus, affect the performance of the system. 
Other studies [6, 11] argue that there is a growing need for formulae to be used in 
detecting attacks, providing a robust and manageable detection technique. This 
debate in the field of computer security raises a number of questions and problems 
that will be addressed by the proposed research. The central research problem is to 
find ways of detecting computer viruses by their behaviours without consuming 
large memory space. A formal mechanism will be adopted in order to investigate this 
problem. Currently, there is little research into behaviour-based detection techniques 
which use logical formulae to detect viruses in the real world. The second problem 
addressed by this research is to assess the effectiveness of behaviour-based virus 
detection using logical formulae, its main purpose being to minimise the use of 
memory space with respect to the number of false positives and false negatives. 
1.4 Research Hypotheses 
Research hypotheses are very important in the preparation and development of 
research due to the fact that they can be used as a guide for the research process. In 
addition, they can help with determining the types of data that are needed to 
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investigate this research. “A hypothesis is a logical supposition, a reasonable guess, an 
educated conjecture. It provides a tentative explanation for a phenomenon under 
investigation” [12]. According to Burns [13], normally the process of supporting or 
rejecting the hypothesis itself is not tested but in fact the so-called null hypothesis, 
which is the opposite or negation of the hypothesis, is the aspect which is tested. As a 
result, if the null hypothesis is inadmissible then the original hypothesis is admissible. 
In addition, the original hypothesis can be called the alternative hypothesis, that is the 
alternative to the null hypothesis. As a result, two hypotheses are expressed namely, 
the alternative hypothesis that is represented by the symbol H1 and which is the 
original one and the null hypothesis that is represented by the symbol H10 which needs 
to be rejected. 
The research hypotheses, which include the alternative and null hypotheses, 
will be formulated according to the research problems aforementioned. Therefore, 
two hypotheses will be formulated and the following is the alternative hypothesis and 
its null hypothesis of the first problem:  
The first hypothesis: 
H1: Detecting computer viruses by their behaviours can obtain results without consuming 
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The first null hypothesis: 
H10: Detecting computer viruses by their behaviours can NOT obtain results without 
consuming large hard drive space. 
 
The alternative hypothesis and its null hypothesis of the second problem will 
also be formulated as follows: 
The second hypothesis: 
H2: The number of false positives and false negatives when detecting known and unknown 
computer viruses by their behaviours using AnaTempura is the same as or lower than the 
number when detecting known and unknown computer viruses by their signatures. 
 
The second null hypothesis: 
H20: The number of false positives and false negatives when detecting known and unknown 
computer viruses by their behaviours using AnaTempura is higher than the number when 
detecting known and unknown computer viruses by their signatures. 
1.4.1 Hypothesis Testing 
To test (answer) the research hypothesis, statistics are normally used. According to 
Mark and Ronald [14], statistics are usually classified as either descriptive or 
inferential: 
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 Descriptive statistics are used to describe, show or summarize data in a 
meaningful way. It can provide information about a group of data. Descriptive 
statistics might include graphical and/or numerical techniques for showing 
concise summaries of data [13]. Therefore, descriptive statistics cannot reach 
conclusions regarding any hypotheses that have been made. 
 Inferential statistics use samples to make generalisations about the populations 
from which the samples were drawn, based on information obtained from that 
sample. That is to say, Inferential statistics can be used to provide a valid 
conclusion about the population using the descriptive statistics. As a result, 
inferential statistics are used to answer our research hypotheses [13]. 
1.5 Success Criteria 
The following points indicate the success criteria of this research. These success 
criteria have been formulated In order to measure the success of this research. 
 Detecting known and unknown viruses (viruses that have not been analysed 
before). 
 False positive production. 
 Running with an acceptable system performance.  
 The ability for users to interact with the operating system while the prototype 
is running. 
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1.6 Scope of Research 
There are many different kinds of malicious software (malware) which infect the 
system in different ways, and thus cannot be detected by a single detection system [1, 
15, 16]. As the title of this thesis suggests, this approach will only concentrate on 
detecting one specific kind of malware which is computer viruses. The reason why this 
approach is only targeting one type of malware is because we believe that it is better 
to concentrate on a single detection system first and then improve it in the future to 
target other types of malware. Hence, the scope of this research includes in particular: 
 Computer Virus Attachment 
Due to the fact that a malware must attach itself to another file or another executable 
program in order to be called a computer virus [17], this research will only concentrate 
on those which infect other files or programs. Therefore, any virus that follows the 
theory of attachment and infect another file within the operating system, such 
malware would be targeted and detected by the present approach. The infection time 
of a virus should not be large (that is, a few seconds or minutes maximum) in order to 
be detected by our prototype. In addition, we assume that AnaTempura is not infected 
during the runtime testing. 
 Window 32 Applications 
According to Boyce [18], Windows 32 applications (including normal processes and 
computer viruses) can run in both 32-bit and 64-bit operating system, however, a 64-
bit application will only run on a 64-bit operating system. As a result, this research will 
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only concentrate on, analyse and examine 32-bit normal processes and computer 
viruses. 
1.7 Research Methodology 
The scientific research is the research method that is used in the present approach 
[19]. The constructive research approach has been chosen and is followed by the 
adopted research. Contribution to knowledge with the constructive method means 
that a new solution will be developed for the identified problem [19]. In this research, 
a new framework has been developed for known problems which are consuming 
system memory space and detecting unknown viruses.  
The scientific research methodology in this research is conducted by the following 
work packages. Firstly, research background and literature review. The second work 
package deals with the suggested framework on which this research is based with. The 
third work package explains in detail the implementation of the proposed framework. 
The final one evaluates the research findings and results. 
 Research Background 
The research study starts by reviewing the literature in the area of computer 
viruses. Firstly, the differences between computer viruses and other types of 
malware are defined. Then, traditional and behaviour-based virus detection 
techniques are distinguished. Finally, a critical review of published works in the 
area of behaviour-based virus detection using various techniques are provided. 
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In addition, a comprehensive study of previous work, comparing it with the 
proposed framework, assists us in identifying its drawbacks and limitations. 
 Architecture 
The design of the framework is concentrated in the architecture work page. All 
the components of the proposed framework are specified in this work package. 
The interaction between these components in achieving the research aims are 
identified in this work package. The process involved in the work package is 
divided into two tasks: 
1. Virus Analysis. 
2. Virus detection. 
 Prototype Implementation 
In this work package, the design and implementation of the prototype are 
described. The prototype of this study implements the detection architecture 
that leads to a runtime monitoring system for computer viruses. In this work 
package, a real implementation which interacts with different Microsoft 
Windows operating systems has been built. The information which comes from 
these operating systems is delivered to Tempura (The executable subset of ITL) 
which examines them for any interesting behaviour. 
 Evaluation 
The capability of the framework and its components will be evaluated in this 
work package. The research hypotheses are tested in this work package to 
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examine the effectiveness of the proposed research. Whether the proposed 
research has successfully detected known and unknown computer viruses 
without memory consumption will also be examined in this work package. 
1.8 Ethical Principles 
When dealing with viruses in a network, they might go through this network and cause 
damage across the entire organisation. Alternatively, a virus might be received by a 
person inexpert in security, who might panic for several reasons. Therefore, a secure 
environment is needed in order to conduct research into computer viruses. According 
to Zeltser [20], in order to build a malicious software (malware) analysis environment, 
the first two steps are to use a virtual machine for the laboratory analysis, so that no 
actual machine is harmed, and to isolate this strongly from the production 
environment in order that the viruses cannot spread. 
 According to the European Institute for Computer Antivirus Research (EICAR) 
[21], computer viruses and malware codes are considered to pose a threat to 
computer users, developers and virus researchers alike. The code of conduct of which 
EICAR requires its members to be aware has three elements: 
3. Total abstinence from activities or publications which could cause or foster 
panic, i.e., no "trading on people's fears".  
4. Abstaining from unwarranted superlatives and factually untenable statements 
in advertising, e.g. "All known and unknown viruses will be recognised".  
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5. Information which may assist the development of viruses or other malicious 
program code will not be published or given to a third party, with the exception 
of the exchange of such information with institutions, companies and persons 
responsibly researching in this sector or active in combating malware. 
The EICAR code of conduct binds its members, most of whom are AV researchers. The 
present researcher will therefore follow the code in order not to cause concern to 
other people. Specifically, I make the following declaration: 
1. I will not intentionally cause harm to live data and will not change any data 
unless authorised to do so. 
2. I will not pass or exchange any viruses or malicious codes to other people 
who are not involved in my research. 
3. I will follow at all times the code of conduct which EICAR imposes on its 
members and will behave accordingly. 
1.9  Thesis Outline 
Including this chapter, this thesis is organised in eight chapters. The following briefly 
summarises each one: 
Chapter Two: Literature review 
This chapter provides an introduction to the principles of computer viruses. It explains 
the various types of virus detection systems. It then concentrates more on behaviour-
based detection and the published works related to the present research. The system 
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service that is found as the best to extract virus behaviours, which is Application 
Programming Interface (API) call, is also addressed in this chapter. 
Chapter Three: Preliminaries 
This chapter provides a brief explanation of the proposed framework. The syntax and 
semantics of Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) which is the base language of Tempura are 
detailed. The reasons for the choice of ITL are addressed in this chapter. In addition, 
related works which use similar tools will be discussed and then criticised. 
Chapter Four: Framework for Behavioural Detection of Viruses 
This chapter proposes the main framework, which is the base of the two architectures, 
with which this research will work. These two architectures are namely, virus analysis 
architecture and virus detection architecture. 
Chapter Five: AnaTempura Integration and Implementation 
This chapter will present the prototype of the research, using Tempura, including the 
kernel rootkit and Deviare API tools which help to deliver the Native and Win32 API 
information to Tempura that is used to examine them. 
Chapter Six: Case Studies 
This chapter outlines the number of investigations which are carried out to examine 
the theory validation of this research. 
Chapter Seven: Results: Analysis and Evaluation 
The test results chapter provides the results for both the virus analysis and the 
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prototype. It also evaluates the proposed research and discusses its limitations. 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion and Future work 
This chapter summarises the research and recommends a new direction for future 
work. It provides the thesis summary, contributions, revisited success criteria, 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
Objectives: 
 Provide a background about computer malware, specifically, 
computer viruses. 
 Provide a background about computer virus detection techniques. 
 Discuss in detail the behaviour-based virus detection. 
 Highlight the system service that is used to detect virus behaviour. 
 Identify the gaps of the related research. 
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2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of computer viruses. It starts with a background 
about computer viruses that tries to answer a number of important questions which 
should be asked about computer viruses, such as what they are, how they are able to 
spread and harm individual computers, who writes them, what they wish to 
accomplish and what techniques have been used to defend our systems from viruses. 
Then, definitions of some terms that will be significant in this research will be 
provided. After that, more details about computer viruses and the famous types of 
computer viruses will be discussed. Section 2.5 will discuss different techniques used 
to detect computer viruses besides their advantages and drawbacks. Moreover, 
Section 2.6 will concentrate on behaviour based virus detection which is the technique 
used in this research. Subsequently, Application Programming Interface (API) that is 
known to be one of the best system services to trace virus behaviour [22, 23] will be 
introduced in this chapter. At last, motivations and related works to our research will 
be discussed and criticised. 
2.2 Background 
Since the late 1980s, when the first serious computer virus appeared, a war has been 
waged between virus generators and the antivirus community [5]. This struggle 
continues to this day, thanks to the daily discovery of new techniques for generating 
viruses and defending systems against them. In April 2006, Kaspersky [24] reported 
that every month, there were over 10 thousand updates to a particular antivirus (AV) 
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program in response to the discovery of new viruses. Early in the same year, the FBI 
calculated the cost of computer crime for several companies and reported that 
computer viruses caused the greatest losses (67% of overall losses) [25]. Indeed, it is 
apparent that computer viruses have a high cost for both individuals and 
organisations. Therefore, dealing with them is an essential, never-ending task and 
research in the antivirus field is required in order to minimise the associated threats 
and losses. 
2.3  Taxonomy of Malicious Software  
According to Davis [5], there are a number of terms in the field of computer viruses 
which might be confused, such as Trojan horse, backdoor, worm and malicious 
software. The following paragraphs offer definitions of these types of malware and 
explanations of the terminology [5, 26]. 
Malware is an abbreviation of the phrase ‘malicious software’, which can be defined as 
a computer program which attempts to harm the system without the knowledge of 
the computer user. There are several categories of malware, including worms, viruses, 
Trojan horses, backdoors, bombs and rootkits [1]. 
A Trojan horse is a program that appears to be legal and which once executed gives 
the attacker unauthorised remote access to a system or can be extended to download 
more malicious software. 
A virus is a code that recursively replicates a possibly evolved a copy of itself. In other 
words, it is a computer program that attaches itself to other files or processes. 
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A worm is a program that is designed to infect host machines by individually 
replicating itself across networks. 
Rootkits are special tools used by an attacker after breaking into a computer system, 
in order to obtain root-level access.  
A backdoor is a program that attempts to bypass the defence system in order to gain 
unauthorised access to a computer. 
In addition to these definitions there is another classification of malware which 
includes programs like adware and spyware that are not dangerous in themselves but 
still harm the system by reducing its performance, exposing new vulnerabilities and 
weakening it in ways that might affect its usability. This malware is called grayware [5].  
Identification is not always accurate, so the performance of a computer 
security system should be considered in terms of the extent of false positives and false 
negatives. False positives occur when normal (benign) programs are identified by a 
defender as malicious, while false negatives are when malicious programs are not 
detected but rather classified as normal. 
There are many subcategories of malware other than the five most common 
ones, which have been defined here. In order to give a clear definition and to 
distinguish them clearly from other malicious software, the next subsection offers a 
comprehensive examination of computer viruses. 
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2.4 Computer Viruses 
Since their emergence in the 1980s, a large number of definitions have been put 
forward by many researchers as to what constitutes a computer virus. Fred Cohen, 
who invented the technique of defence against computer viruses, defined a virus as a 
program that can ‘infect’ other programs by modifying them to include a (possibly 
evolved) version of itself [16]. Later, in 2005, Peter Szor claimed that the former 
definition is incomplete because it does not incorporate all viruses. He defines a 
computer virus as “A program that recursively and explicitly copies a possibly evolved 
version of itself” [1]. 
A virus must attach itself to other programs because it is unable to be executed 
by itself and that is one of its main characteristics [27]. Computer viruses have 
succeeded in satisfying the desires of their writers, especially in spreading, causing 
damage and bypassing detection. Nowadays, because computers have become very 
important to individuals, governments and organisations, computer viruses constitute 
a major problem of daily life and it is one of the fundamental aspects of computing 
that people should be aware of [1, 4]. 
One of the earliest papers on computer viruses was written by Cohen and 
Adleman [15, 28]. Cohen was the first to use the term ‘virus’ and using Turing 
machines, he also proposed the first formal definition of computer viruses [15]. Cohen 
states that the only way to be fully protected against viruses is by isolating the system, 
but notes that this cannot be practically implemented. He concludes that for a system 
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to be secured against viruses, it must be protected from interference with both 
outgoing and incoming information flows. 
Adleman built upon Cohen’s work by inventing more formal definitions and 
classifications of computer viruses. His conclusion was that any program which has 
been infected will cause one of the three following types of damage [28]: first, 
impairment of the system by doing an injury to it; second, harm to the system by 
replicating itself in other programs; finally, producing an imitation of itself when it 
cannot find a file to infect. 
Computer viruses have been classified as simple and complex [5]. Simple 
viruses have been the backbone of malicious software for the last 25 years and can be 
divided into three types: file viruses, boot sector viruses and macro viruses. Within 
these groups, a wide range of strategies are used by virus writers in order to infect files 
[1, 4]. 
Overwriting viruses: In this method, the target code will be removed by the virus and 
an infected file is replaced with it. 
 
 
Figure ‎2.1: Overwriting virus. 
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Parasitic viruses: Here, a virus code will be inserted into the existing file to gain control 
of it. Parasitic viruses include appending and prepending types. 
 
 
Figure ‎2.2: Appending virus. 
 
Figure ‎2.3: Prepending virus. 
Companion viruses: The target file will be duplicated by a companion giving a copy of 
the original file that contains the virus in it. 
Link viruses: A link to the virus file will be incorporated into the target file. 
Application source code viruses: An active virus can be included in the source code of 
some applications during their installation. 
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Cavity viruses: These are viruses that do not increase the size of the infected file, but 
instead overwrite part of it by including the virus code. 
 
 
Figure ‎2.4: Cavity virus. 
Compressing viruses: As their name suggests, these viruses compress the content of 
the host program. The purpose of this technique is to hide the increase in the file’s size 
after an infection has occurred. 
 
Figure ‎2.5: Compressing virus. 
The master boot record, which is a type of boot sector, is normally infected 
with what is called a boot sector virus. The final simple virus type is the macro virus or 
shortcut virus, which normally repeats itself. Despite the fact that the use of these 
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macros can be very helpful, they can also cause great damage to the system [5]. 
Macros can be loaded automatically when Microsoft Office applications are loaded. 
Therefore, the virus have an excellent opportunity to launch without notifying the 
user. For example, a user might receive an email contacting an attached Microsoft 
Word document. When the attached file is opened, the Word document launches and 
the macro virus is loaded on the target system. 
On the other hand, there are the complex or advanced viruses which have been 
invented by virus writers in order to evade detection techniques [1, 5]. With the 
evolution of defence techniques, virus writers are forced to invent viruses that are 
difficult for antivirus systems to detect. These can be classified into the following 
subcategories [1, 5]: 
Encrypted viruses are encrypted in order to avoid antivirus software. This type 
comprises the first attempt to generate a complex virus. It was a successful technique 
to avoid the old signature-based detection techniques (to be discussed in Section 
2.5.1.1). 
Oligomorphic viruses: This is the next decrypting technique which is normally detected 
by AV programs, where the decryption technique is randomly generated. It differs 
from basic encryption by having a set of decryptors rather than only one. 
Polymorphic viruses: This is the most common decrypting technique ever used. The 
idea is that it can change its decryptors, which can take an unlimited number of forms. 
Polymorphic viruses have proved to be the hardest type for antivirus programs to 
detect.  
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Metamorphic viruses differ from the others in not having a decryptor; rather, they 
have the ability to construct new generations that look different. The significant 
feature of metamorphic viruses is that they do not change the whole code, but only its 
functionality. 
Entry-point obscuring viruses: The idea of this technique is that a code is randomly 
written to a location within an existing program and appears to give an update to this 
program. The trick is that when the trusted program is executed, the system 
automatically executes the virus code. 
A virus can spread from program to program in the same system and can also 
be transferred from user to user via a network [16]. With the rapid evolution and 
improvement of the Internet, there have been various ways in which a virus can 
spread and infect systems [5], one of the best known being by email. This happens 
when a file is attached to a message in the mailbox; once a user clicks to open this 
attachment, the virus spreads. In addition to emails, downloads from the Internet, 
especially malicious websites, are important in spreading viruses. Removable media 
such as floppy disks, CDs and USBs can also cause great damage by carrying viruses in 
them. Users should be aware of these methods. 
Computer viruses can cause low to very high damage to a system, including the 
removal of all information on the hard drive [1, 16, 27]. A common type of virus 
damage is denial of service, where the computer’s resources are kept so busy that the 
system is unavailable to the user. Some viruses are constructed to damage certain 
hardware by removing all information from it (formatting), overwriting it or even 
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destroying it. Another risk is the stealing of data from a system. Some virus writers 
make money by accessing individual’s systems and stealing their credit card numbers 
and other important information in phishing attacks, using backdoor features, for 
example [1]. However, this research will only concentrate on those which infect other 
files or programs. Therefore, any virus that follows the theory of attachment and infect 
another file within the operating system, such malware would be targeted and 
detected by the present approach. 
2.5 Computer Virus Detection 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, writing antivirus software was not very hard because 
at that time many individuals could create one. Two papers [15, 28] opened a path for 
computer virus researchers to establish a number of studies in the field of virus 
detection. Despite this, antivirus techniques have been developed successfully in 
dealing with computer viruses during the last 25 years. Virus detection techniques can 
be defined according to how the presence of a virus can be identified in an object [29].  
 A great number of detection techniques have been discussed [30], with their 
advantages and disadvantages. However, there are two basic detection techniques 
which can be distinguished, namely manual (on-demand scanning) and on-access  
(real-time scanning) [1, 5]. 
 On-demand scanning is a simple virus detection technique where the user 
initiates the scan. This technique is not sufficient to deal with dynamic 
malwares such as macro viruses. In addition, it is an offline scan that cannot 
Chapter Two: Literature Review 
 
28 | P a g e  
 
detect a virus unless the user is aware of it and allows scanning; otherwise, the 
virus will infect the system. Most AV products use this type of detection as a 
secondary capability [5]. 
 The other type of scanning, which is called on-access, dynamic or real-time 
scanning, is a more powerful technique because of its ability to detect more 
complex viruses [4]. This type of detection normally happens without the 
knowledge of the user. The AV product scans the system memory and the hard 
disk looking for viruses, as the computer user browses email, opens an 
application or downloads cyber-content. In this technique, if a virus is detected 
the malicious activity will be halted, then the user will be notified and advised 
to take action. This type of detection is commonly used in the commercial 
market today.  
2.5.1 On-access Scanning 
There are two types of on-access scanning: signature-based detection and anomaly or 
heuristic-based detection [1, 5].  
2.5.1.1 Signature-based Detection 
Signature-based detection works by searching for particular sequences of bytes within 
an object in order to identify exceptionally a particular version of a virus [29]. Also 
known as string scanning, it is the simplest form of scanning, constructed upon 
databases which have virus signatures. When a new virus emerges, its binary form will 
be specifically and uniquely analysed by a virus researcher and its sequences of bytes 
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will be added to the virus database [29]. A virus is identified by its sequences of bytes 
and what is called a virus signature. In addition, a hash value is another type of 
signatures. A large amount of data is converted into a single value by a mathematical 
function or a procedure known as a hash function [31]. 
Most AV products around the world use the signature-based technique and are 
trying to develop it, despite the fact that it is not sufficient for most viruses (as will be 
discussed later). Indeed, it has certain limitations that make it not good enough to 
meet the evolution and acceleration of new technologies [5]. One of its greatest 
weaknesses is that it is based on signature databases, which need to be updated 
regularly. Therefore, two actions are required: a list of signatures must be produced by 
the vendor, then downloaded and installed by the consumer.  
Another important drawback of this approach is that it needs a large database 
in order to store the signatures. As the number of viruses increases every day, ever 
larger databases are needed to store all their signatures, so that large storage space 
will be needed in the near future. The large database will also affect the speed of 
searching for signatures, and, thus, affect the performance of the system. These 
disadvantages mean that the signature-based detection techniques will soon be 
inadequate to protect computer systems [32]. 
 In addition, many viruses today can mutate in various ways, including 
polymorphic and metamorphic viruses. Because signature-based detection can only 
identify and detect the signatures in its databases, these viruses will normally defeat 
the engine and bypass the defender. One of the important capabilities that signature-
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based detection lacks is the detection of unknown and novel viruses. For each new 
virus to be discovered and added to the consumer update list, antivirus software 
companies will take at least seven hours [33]. Meanwhile, any new virus which tries to 
harm the system will certainly do so without being detected. 
2.5.1.2 Heuristic-based Detection 
The second type of on-access scanning is heuristic-based detection, which was 
developed to overcome the limitations of signature-based detection. While new 
viruses are being discovered and analysed by the AV company, before it is able to 
release a signature, the user has a basic defence [5]. This type of detection monitors 
system behaviours and keystrokes, searching for abnormal activity, rather than 
searching for known signatures. Thus, some AV programs that use heuristic analysis 
can be used and run without updating; no action is required of either the vendor or 
the consumer [4].  
Heuristic-based detection can thus be utilised and applied without prior 
knowledge of computer viruses, but it has several shortcomings, one of the most 
annoying of which is the creation of many more false positives than signature-based 
systems [1]. This is less dangerous than a false negative, but nonetheless annoying to 
the end-user. Such systems also need more storage space and have more effect on the 
system performance. Their final disadvantage is that in order to perform the heuristic 
analysis, extra code is needed; besides a third-party component, such as protocol 
parsers, needs also to be included. As a result, buggier code and increase 
vulnerabilities [5]. While heuristic-based detection can be applied without prior 
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knowledge of computer viruses, it still needs previous knowledge of the vulnerability 
[34]. 
2.5.1.3 Other Types of Detections 
Among the many different techniques that have been used to solve the problem of 
computer virus detection, most have failed, have offered no advantages over existing 
ones or cannot be used in the real world due to their impracticability, such as file 
integrity checking [4]. Such unsuccessful techniques have not been discussed in this 
chapter. 
2.6 Behaviour-based Virus Detection 
In behaviour-based detection, a program can be identified as a virus or not by 
inspecting its execution behaviour [1, 35]. Unlike traditional detection techniques 
which rely on signatures, in behaviour-based detection, normal and abnormal 
measures are used in order to determine whether or not the behaviour of a running 
process marks it as a virus [36]. When unusual behaviour is observed, the execution of 
the program will be terminated. Morales et al. [23] state that despite its drawbacks, 
including false positives, behaviour-based detection is still the most encouraging 
technique, especially in dealing with novel and anonymous viruses. Therefore, 
behaviour-based detection has been chosen as the topic of this research. 
Ellis et al. [37] used behavioural signatures in order to improve the automatic 
detection of worms. Signature-based detection searches for fixed regular expressions 
in payloads. Instead, and at a higher level of abstraction, behavioural techniques 
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detect patterns of executional behaviour. Ellis et al. [37] define behavioural signatures 
as the description of aspects of any specific behaviour of worms which are common 
across the manifestations of a particular worm in which its node is spanned in a 
temporal order. Even if a worm has not been released previously, a behavioural 
signature can be used to detect common implementations and the design of a worm. 
In general, three characteristic patterns in a network identify worm behaviour. The 
first is when similar data are sent between two machines, the second is when tree-like 
structures are observed to proliferate and the third is when a server changes into a 
client. Ellis et al. [37] used the notion of network application architecture (NAA), which 
affects the sensitivity of behavioural signatures, as an approach to distribute network 
applications. 
It is much more challenging if an attacker wants to evade the behavioural 
signature, because a fundamental change in behaviour is needed, rather than only in 
its network footprint, which is a way of knowing the system’s vulnerabilities and trying 
to find a method to intrude into the system. In order to detect worms, [37] placed 
constraints on network traffic which are violated by worm traffic patterns; these 
violations have proven to be straightforward to detect. They used the Abstract 
Communication Network (ACN) model, which is a network theoretical approach to 
computer networks and related data flows. The NAAs, behavioural signatures and 
worm propagation network are all performed within the framework of the ACN. Then, 
in order to identify the spreading of worms across a network, the propagation of a 
worm is built. The result of worm spread is the capture of a communication pattern, 
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which is identified by the offspring relation between nodes in the spanning trees of 
worm propagation. Two things were improved by this paper: first, the detection of 
worms can now be done without previous knowledge of worms; second, the work has 
shown an improvement in worm detection sensitivity.  
Even if [37] can be considered as behaviour-based malware detection, its 
approach failed in the detection of unknown malware as stated by [38, 39] due to the 
fact that its approach relies on signatures to detect malware. Therefore, it can be said 
that the main purpose of behaviour-based virus detection is to detect anonymous 
malware which is missing in [37] approach. The other limitation is that large amounts 
of state information about network host behaviours need to be maintained by the 
behavioural techniques. This could be quite expensive in practice [40]. 
Later, Morales et al. [23] argue that detecting viruses in terms of their 
behaviour does not need any subsequent training analysis of known viruses and this 
means that less database will be needed; therefore, less storage space will be used. 
Their approach relies on detecting the behaviour of file viruses by their attempts to 
replicate. They apply runtime detection by monitoring executing processes that 
attempt to replicate. The behaviour of the virus is characterised by a property called 
self-replication, which happens when a process (virus) refers to itself (known as a 
transitive relation) during its attempt to replicate in read and write operation. Morales 
et al. use this property to distinguish between non-malignant processes and viruses. 
 Implementation is done by a runtime monitoring prototype called SRRAT, 
focusing on the tracking of Kernel mode system services and system user mode Win32 
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API calls. Despite the fact that the approach used in [23] has been shown to be good at 
detecting known and novel viruses without the need for prior knowledge of previous 
viruses, this detection technique may be bypassed by various viruses which replicate 
outside, across other directories within the same operating system. Furthermore, it 
can be argued that the definition of self-replication in Morales et al.’s approach is not 
complete due to the fact that their results have shown that there are a huge number 
of viruses in their analysis which did not follow their theory [41]. In addition, [23] 
approach lacks parallel detection in which they have two separate detections, one at 
the user level and the other at the kernel level, leaving the system too busy as claimed 
by [42]. The present research has the advantage of being able to observe both user 
level’s API calls and kernel level’s Native API calls at the same time. Moreover, the 
comprehensive attempt of a computer virus to attach itself to another file will be 
analysed in this research as discussed in Chapter 4. 
2.6.1 Behaviour-based Vs. Heuristic-based detection 
It has been argued that heuristic-based detection is similar to behaviour-based 
detection, the technique used in the present research. In fact, there is a grey area 
between the two detection techniques, but they differ substantially in their 
functionalities and ways of detecting viruses. Heuristic products check the code itself, 
trying to match it with known malware in order to detect new variants, whereas 
behaviour-based detection looks for the actions carried out by a program, intervening 
when it observes malevolent behaviour [35]. 
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The present research can be used to solve the problems associated with the 
heuristic-based virus detection by tracking the lists of API calls that conducted in this 
research. By providing a precise definition of virus behaviours, the problem of false 
positives can be solved as will be explained in Section 7.3.1. In addition, behaviour-
based detection used in this research does not require more space, as will be 
explained in Section 7.4. As a result, less space is needed and therefore, less effect on 
the system performance.  Furthermore, due to the fact that behaviour-based virus 
detection used in this approach does not require a third party component, there is no 
need to the extra code. Therefore, the vulnerability problem associated with heuristic-
based detection can be solved.  
2.7 Related Research 
2.7.1 Motivation 
The study of computer viruses and their potential for infecting a computer system is 
active research, especially in the area of detecting anonymous viruses. Efficient 
implementation techniques have been submitted by many recent works to enhance 
their performance. Despite the fact that some of the submitted new ideas might 
enhance the detection of computer viruses based on their signature, at the same time 
their inability to detect novel and unknown viruses make them inappropriate for 
dealing with daily and new threats [32]. Even if the signature-based approaches try to 
deal rapidly with the unknown viruses by analysing them and updating their database, 
this solution is not perfect due to very expensive damage that can happen to the 
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system during the update, and hence, the system has already been inflicted by the 
virus [43]. Altaher et al. [44] state that “The inability of traditional signature- based 
malware detection approaches to catch polymorphic and new, previously unseen 
malwares has shifted the focus of malware detection research to find more 
generalised and scalable features that can identify malicious behaviour as a process 
instead of a single static signature” [44]. On the other hand, heuristic-based detection 
techniques have not provided a good solutions due to the fact that they produce many 
more false positives than signature-based systems. Besides, they need more storage 
space and have more effect on the system performance. Hence, detecting computer 
viruses in terms of their behaviour will help with understanding their actions, resulting 
in detecting unknown and newly released viruses that are a threat to computer 
systems every day with a better system performance. 
Various frameworks have been proposed by researchers to prove that beha 
viour-based virus detection can deal with unknown viruses [22, 45, 46, 47], but these 
are still hard to understand and have some disadvantages. Moreover, some of the 
proposed frameworks use more than one database that is updated when a new virus is 
received, and thus the same problem associated with traditional antivirus software 
aforementioned is still unsolved. However, some of these approaches concentrate on 
only either the user or the kernel level of Windows operating system and this single 
concentration might result in infecting the system as will be explained in the next 
subsection. 
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2.7.2 API Related Work 
Skormin et al. [45] designed an approach that intercepts API calls while a program is 
running. They detect any attempt by a malware to self-replicate at run-time. Their 
methodology was to trace the behaviour of normal processes and analyse API calls 
issued by each of them along with their input, outputs argument and the execution 
result. The replication of a process was modelled by the Gene of Self-Replication (GSR) 
based upon building blocks. Each block in the GSR is considered as a portion of the self 
-replication process which includes seeking files and directories, writing to files, 
reading from files, and closing and opening a file. This approach might detect several 
viruses from different classes, but on the other hand, they intercepted Native API calls 
in the kernel. As observed by [48, 49] Native APIs are not fully documented and that 
means that some viruses exist which might use some of these undocumented APIs and 
attack the system. In addition, Skormin [41] states that “while the number of malicious 
computer programs that could be written is infinite, the number of ways to implement 
self-replication is very limited". 
Later, Alazab et al. [22] used a static analysis in order to track API calls. They 
analysed malware to classify executable programs as normal or malicious. They 
plugged in the disassembler, IDA Pro [50] in their own Python program to 
automatically extract API calls. They examined groups of virus steps such as search, 
copy, delete, read and write. They found that read and write files were mostly API calls 
used by malwares to infect the program. However, Zwanger and Freiling [51] stated 
that due to the fact that Alazab et al. [22] based their approach on IDA Pro in their 
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detection, they can only deal with user level’s PE files [51]. Therefore, there are some 
viruses that might not be detected by [22] because they directly call the kernel by 
using Native API calls as mentioned by [49] and in their approach they only intercept 
user API calls. 
Recently, Veeramani and Rai [46] used statistical analysis for Windows API calls 
to describe the behaviour of programs. They used an automated framework for 
analysing and categorising executables that rely on their relevant API calls. They tried 
to increase the detection rate by using a Document Class wise Frequency feature 
selection (DCFS) measure by getting the information related to malware from the 
extracted API calls. They categorised malware into groups and the relevant APIs were 
extracted from these categories. DCFS based feature selection measure is used to 
classify the executable as malicious or benign. In the [46] approach, they used a static 
technique to analyse malware however, as stated by Bayer [52], due to the nature of 
computer viruses, they can be designed to obfuscate the static analyser. Therefore, it 
can be said that there might be something missing during their analysis. In addition, 
their analysis and detection have been done at the user level leaving the system liable 
to viruses that can directly contact the kernel [49]. 
That means that [22, 45, 46] approaches might have a number of false positives 
and negatives because they rely on either kernel or user level [48, 49]. This problem 
can be solved by combining and tracking the Native and Win32 API calls coming from 
the user and kernel level that will be used in this research and explained in detail in 
Chapter 4. 
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Latterly, Ravi and Manoharan [47] proposed a system which utilised Windows 
API call sequence. They used a statistical model called 3rd order Markov chain to 
model API calls. Their system comprises 3 stages: Offline, Online and Iterative learning 
stages. The Offline stage subsequently comprises dataset, API call tracer, API index 
database, signature database, rule generator and rule database. In addition, the online 
stage respectively comprises the target process, API call tracer, API index database and 
the classifier. Finally, in the iterative learning phase, after each classification, the API 
call sequence and the classification label of the target process is repetitively added to 
the signature database to enhance the training model. It can be shown that [47] used 
two different databases in their approach, namely, database signature and the API 
index database. The API calls are represented using integer IDs and then stored in the 
API index database. In addition, the signature database stores both the API call integer 
sequence and the corresponding label of all the samples in the dataset.  
They claim that their detection accuracy is better than several related 
approaches to their work. However, they used more than one database to store their 
information to catch malware. This may be acceptable as long as the detection rate is 
high. On the other hand, they have two main drawbacks as mentioned earlier. Firstly, 
they lack the detection of novel and unknown viruses which is why the behaviour-
based virus detection was introduced [1, 53]. Secondly, they just intercept Windows 
API calls at the user level and never monitor the kernel level Native API calls, leaving 
their system liable to malware that directly contact the low level of Windows operating 
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system [48]. These shortages mean that their system has no advantages over the 
traditional signature-based virus detection. 
2.8 Summary 
Behaviour-based virus detection is a very topical subject area. It has been developed to 
overcome the problems associated with traditional signature-based virus detection. In 
this chapter a comprehensive description of computer viruses with the differences 
between them and other types of malicious software have been presented. The well-
known signature-based virus detection was detailed with its pros and cons. In addition 
other techniques of virus detection with their positive and negative effects in 
computer systems have been provided. This chapter has concentrated more on 
behaviour-based virus detection as it is the main topic of this research. Different works 
which have used this technique to detect computer viruses have been discussed in this 
chapter. In addition, the system service, known as API, which will be used to analyse 
and trace computer viruses in this research has been discussed. Finally, related work to 
our research which has used this system service has been described and criticised. 
The next chapter will be the preliminaries chapter. It will provide an overview 
of the language that will be used in our research known as Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) 
alongside its syntax, informal semantics with its executable subset Tempura and its 
semi-automatic tool AnaTempura. Moreover, related work that has used similar formal 
languages will be explained in the next chapter with a comparison between their and 
our approach. 
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Chapter 3  
Preliminaries 
Objectives: 
 Provide a background about temporal logics. 
 Discuss Interval Temporal Logic, its executable subset Tempura and 
AnaTempura. 
 Provide the reasons for choosing ITL. 
 Discuss and criticise related approaches. 
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3.1 Introduction 
As previously mentioned, a computer virus will go through several steps in 
order to infect an operating system. The steps that represent virus behaviour need to 
be classified and expressed. Interval Temporal Logic (ITL) can be used to formulate all 
desired behavioural properties (i.e., steps of virus behaviour in our model). Therefore, 
ITL has been chosen to be the formal language that will be used in the present 
research to express the steps of virus behaviour. The existence of Tempura which is 
the executable subset of ITL makes it a very suitable language to be used in the 
present research. In addition, Tempura provides an executable framework for 
developing and experimenting with suitable ITL specifications. Therefore, Tempura will 
be used in this research to check whether a good or bad behaviour occurs with help of 
ITL description and system traces. 
This chapter provides a background about temporal logics and then explains 
different temporal logics. At the same time, a comparison between these temporal 
logics and ITL will be presented. Subsequently, the ITL with its syntax, informal 
semantics, the executable subset Tempura and its syntax, and the semi-automatic tool 
AnaTempura will be described in detail in Section 3.3. Then, the reasons for choosing 
ITL to be the description language of the present research among other types of 
temporal logics will also be provided. Finally, related approaches which use similar 
tools will be explained and then criticised in Section 3.4.  
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3.2 Temporal Logic Background 
Temporal logic is a term used to describe any system rules and symbolism. In terms of 
time, a temporal logic is used for representing, and reasoning about, qualified 
propositions [54]. Statements of time can be represented in a temporal logic, such as 
“She is always thirsty” “She will eventually be thirsty”, or “She will be thirsty until she 
drinks something”. Latterly, computer scientists and engineers have found that 
temporal logic is very suitable to state the expected properties of software and 
hardware systems [55]. For example, one may wish to state that an access is 
eventually given, whenever a request is made, but it is never given to two requests at 
the same time. These kinds of statements can appropriately be expressed by a 
temporal logic [56]. Computation Tree Logic (CTL) and Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) are 
two successful temporal logics which have been extensively used in industrial 
applications [57]. Therefore, these two temporal logics will be described in the 
following subsections and later will be compared with our chosen one which is ITL. 
3.2.1 Linear Temporal Logic  
Linear-time temporal logic or linear temporal logic (LTL) is a temporal logic that models 
time as a sequence of states [58]. A computation path or just a path is simply 
representing this sequence of states. Several paths which represent different futures 
are considered due to the fact that the future is generally undetermined in LTL. Hence, 
one of these different paths will be the actual path. Formulae about the future of 
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paths can be encoded in LTL. For example, a condition will eventually be false, or until 
another event becomes false, a condition will be true. 
The syntax of LTL is built upon three categories, namely, temporal model 
operators, a finite set of propositional variables (PA), and logical connectives or 
operators such as,   and .  In addition, LTL uses a fixed set atoms of atomic formulae 
such as (r, q, p, … or P1, P2,…). The atoms can represent atomic descriptions about a 
particular system. For instance, ‘Process 1108 is suspended, ‘or ‘Printer P6 is busy’.  
Based on a particular interest in a system, these atomic descriptions can be chosen 
[58]. 
 The figure below gives the informal semantics of the temporal operators which 
can only be represented by LTL as a sequence of state [59].  means (always),  
represents (sometimes), U intends (until), and ⃝ symbolises (next): 




- - - p
p p p p




q….. ….. - -
…..
Figure ‎3.1: Semantics of LTL.  
3.2.2 Computation Tree Logic 
Computation tree logic’s (CTL) model of time is a tree-like structure (branching-time 
logic). Similar to LTL, the future is also undetermined in CTL and this means that 
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several paths which represent different futures are built and one of these different 
paths will be the actual path. CTL can be used in both software and hardware tools as a 
formal verification. In software applications, it can be used as a model checker to 
check for the system safety and liveness properties. 
An (A) operator in CTL means that starting from the current state, the  hold on 
all paths, whereas (E) operator means that starting from the current state, exists at 
least one path, where the  holds. However, there are similarities between LTL and 
CTL in that most properties expressible in LTL can also be expressed in CTL but both of 





S3 S2S1 S3 S1
 
Figure ‎3.2: CTL Example. 
3.3 Interval Temporal Logic  
As noted in Chapter 1, ITL will be used in this research and our choice of this logic is 
inspired by the existence of Tempura, an executable subset of ITL that is a 
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programming language based on ITL [60]. In addition, ITL is very suitable to describe 
system traces, i.e., it can be used to describe bad and good behaviours. 
ITL is a temporal logic whose key feature is its intervals, each of which must be 
a non-empty, finite sequence of states σ0σ1… σn. Any ITL model has two sets, namely, a 
set of variables Var and a set of values Val. A state is a mapping from Var to Val 
denoted as State: Var to Val. ITL is known as a linear-time temporal logic for finite 
intervals with a discrete model of time. An interval has a finite number of states which 
starts from σ0 and the length |σ| of an interval is the number of these states minus 
one. For example, if an interval has states σ0σ1σ2, the length of this interval is given by 
|σ|= (3 states - 1) = 2; therefore, |σ|= 2. However, a one-state interval, which is 
known as an empty interval, has the length zero. The sequences of states from a given 
system can be represented as the behaviour of this system. All the possible behaviours 
of a system denote the specification of this system and can be represented by ITL 
formulae, as explained in the next subsections [61]. 
3.3.1 ITL Syntax 
The syntax of ITL is described in Table 3.1, in which z is an integer value, a is a static 
variable that does not change within an interval, A is a state variable that can change 
within an interval,  is a static or state variable, g is a function symbol and h is a 
predicate symbol. 
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Table ‎3.1: The Syntax of ITL. 
Expressions 
exp ::= z | a | A | g (exp1,……,expn) | ⃝ A | fin A 
Formulae 
f ::= h(exp1,……,expn) |  f | f1   f2 |  . f | skip | f1;   f2 | f * 
The constant z is a function without a parameter which has a fixed value, such 
as true, false, 1, 5. A static variable is one whose value remains unchanged in all states 
within an interval. On the other hand, a state variable is one that can change within an 
interval. A function symbol can be one of several operators such as, +, -, and * 
(multiplication), etc. An expression of the form fin A is called a temporal expression 
[62].  ⃝ A means the value of A in the next state. fin A means the value of A in the 
final state. 
 Relation symbols such as  and  are used to construct atomic formulae, which 
will then be composed with first order connectives such as ¬,  and  and with skip, 
chop, and chop-star, which are known as temporal modalities. 
3.3.2 ITL Operators 
As ITL is an extension of propositional and first order logic, it uses their connectives, 
such as ,  ,¬, , ,  and . It also uses the temporal operators: skip, “;“ (chop) and 
“*” (chop-star) and has additional derived temporal such as: “ “ (next) and ““ 
(always). 
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3.3.3 Informal Semantics 
Normally, expressions and formulae in ITL are evaluated over the whole interval. If 
there are no temporal operators in a formula, it is called a state formula. A state 
formula within an interval is required to hold at the initial state of that interval and it 
can also be expressed to hold in all intervals. For example, “  w ” where w is a state 
formula that holds in all states of the interval. The informal semantics of the most 
interesting temporal constructs are defined as follows [61]: 
 skip: is a unit interval that has a length equal to 1. 
 
skip:   σ0     σ1 
 
Here is a two-state Interval that has the length of 1. 
 The formula ƒ1; ƒ2 is known to be true over an interval if it can be decomposed 
(chopped) into two parts, a prefix and suffix interval, such that ƒ1 holds for the 
former and ƒ2 for the latter. 
ƒ1 ƒ1
 
Figure ‎3.3:  Chop Operator. 
 The formula f* which holds for an interval is true over this interval if it can be 
decomposed into a finite number of intervals and the subformula is true over 
each of these chopped intervals. 
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ƒ ƒ ƒ ƒ
 
Figure ‎3.4: Chop-star. 
3.3.4 Examples  
The following are some examples of formulae used in ITL: 
 The formula S = 1 for an interval means that the value of S in the initial state of 
this interval is equal to 1. 
 The formula skip; S = 6 for an interval means that the value of S in the second 
state of this interval is equal to 6. 
 The formula skip; S = 2; S = 3 for an interval means that the value of S in the 
second state is equal to 2 and the value of S is equal to 3 in any of the following 
states. 
 The formula ¬(true; S = 0) for an interval means that the value of S will never be 
equal to zero within this interval. Therefore, this formula is equivalent to the 
formula (S  0). 
 The formula (S = 2)  ⃝ (U = 4) for an interval means that the value of S is 
equal to 2 in the first state and the value of U is equal to 4 in the second state. 
3.3.5 Derived Constructs 
The following constructs will be used frequently. Non-temporal derived constructs are 
listed in Table 3.2 and temporal derived constructs in Table 3.3, while Table 3.4 lists 
some program like derived constructs.   
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Table ‎3.2: Non-temporal derived constructs. 
true  0 = 0 true value 
false  ¬true false value 
ƒ1  ƒ2  ¬ ( ¬ƒ1  ¬ ƒ2) or 
ƒ1  ƒ2  ¬ ƒ1  ƒ2 implies 
ƒ1  ƒ2  (ƒ1    ƒ2)  (ƒ2    ƒ1) is equivalent to 
   ƒ  ¬  ¬ƒ exists 
 
Table ‎3.3: Temporal derived constructs. 
⃝ ƒ  skip ; ƒ next 
more  ⃝ true non-empty interval 
empty  ¬more empty interval 
 ƒ  true ; ƒ sometimes 
 ƒ    ¬ ¬ƒ always 
ⓦ ƒ  ¬ ⃝ ¬ƒ weak next 
i  ƒ  ƒ ; true some initial subinterval 
i  ƒ  ¬( i ¬ƒ) all initial subinterval 
a  ƒ    true; ƒ ; true some subinterval 
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Table ‎3.4: Some concrete derived constructs. 
fin ƒ  ( empty  ƒ) ƒ holds in the final state 
halt ƒ  ( empty  ƒ) ƒ holds exactly in the final state 
keep ƒ  a ( skip  ƒ) ƒ holds for all unit subintervals 
Therefore, our system specifications which we inferred from the observed virus 
behaviours will be converted to ITL formulae which then will be compared with the 
system behaviours using AnaTempura (discussed in the next subsections) in order to 
identify any malicious behaviour observed in the system. 
3.3.6 Our Choice of ITL 
There are a number of reasons that support our choice of ITL over other temporal 
logics. These reasons make ITL a suitable language to express the behaviour of a virus.  
 An Interval represents a behaviour (trace) of a system. A set of intervals 
(behaviours) denotes all possible behaviours of that given system. Therefore, 
an interval will describe a virus behaviour and the set of these behaviours will 
be compared with the normal system behaviours to ensure that the system is 
safe.  
 Once ITL formulae are constructed, its executable subset Tempura makes them 
ready to be executed, i.e., ITL formulae can be refined into Tempura code and 
then can be programmed and executed. This leads to a rapid prototyping and 
debugging of the desired system. As a result, the advantage of the refinement 
of ITL formulae into Tempura code, make it possible to check for virus actions 
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 The order of virus actions (behaviour) is significant in this research. In fact, it 
will play a crucial role in distinguishing between benign and viral processes. 
Moreover, ITL offers syntactic constructs like chop to describe the order of API 
calls as described in the next chapter. Therefore, this advantage gives us the 
ability to ensure that the order of computer viruses’ actions is met and 
detected. 
These reasons make ITL a powerful language for describing viruses because 
distinguishing between normal and malicious behaviour can be highly accurate due to 
intervals representation. The following subsection will discuss our executable language 
Tempura. 
3.3.7 Tempura 
Tempura is a language which is the executable subset of ITL; that is, once a formula is 
given, Tempura generates a satisfying interval for that formula. In addition, an ITL 
formula can be executed by the interpreter of Tempura if it satisfies the three 
following conditions [60]: the formula is deterministic, the length of the interval is 
known and the values of the variables are known in all parts of this interval. Tempura 
has both state and static variables which can have primitive types such as booleans 
and integers, and derived types like lists. In addition, Tempura shares most of the 
features of other imperative programming languages; for example, it has lists that are 
similar to arrays and vectors in other languages. In addition, it has the regular 
operations over expressions, such as *, +, mod, =, and, or. It also has the ability to 
provide for the rapid development, testing and analysis of Tempura specifications. 
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Indeed, ITL has an advantage over other temporal logics when used with its subset 
Tempura, because it provides fast and convenient testing during execution [63]. The 
Tempura tool will be used to check whether a good or bad behaviour occurs with help 
of ITL description and system traces. 
3.3.8 Syntax of Tempura 
As aforementioned Tempura shares most of the features of other imperative 
programming languages and hence it can be considered as a programming language 
that based on temporal logic. In addition, each state in Tempura needs to be defined 
and taken into account. Moszkowski [60] reports that the syntax of Tempura is divided 
into three categories, namely, locations, expressions and statements [60]: 
3.3.8.1 Locations 
Values in Tempura are stored and examined in a location. For example, in Listing 3.1, 
the variables A and B are permissible locations. 
Listing ‎3.1: Tempura code. 
/* run */ define test() =  
{ exists A, B :  
  { 
  A=4 and B=1 and 
  halt(A=0) and (A gets A-1) and (B gets 2*B) and 
  always output(A) and always output(B) 
  } }. 
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The above code includes three statements, halt which means that the code will 
stop running when A equals to 0. Secondly, gets in the first formula means that A will 
be subtracted in each of the following states by 1, and in the second formula means 
that B will be multiplied by 2 in each of the next states. Finally, always means that the 
output of both A and B will be displayed in each state as shown in the execution below 
in Figure 3.5. 
 
Figure ‎3.5: Execution of Listing 3.1. 
3.3.8.2 Expressions 
In Tempura, expressions can be either an arithmetic expression or a boolean 
expression. For example, , , , , and mod can be considered arithmetic operations, 
when they are placed between arithmetic expressions such as (e1  e2 or e1 mod e2). 
On the other hand, boolean expressions can be constants such as true and false, and 
the temporal constructs such as more and empty can also be considered as boolean 
expressions. 
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3.3.8.3 Statements 
In Tempura, statements can be either simple or compound. Simple statements can be 
built from the construct shown below [60]. 
true (any-operation) 
false  (abort) 
l= e (simple assignment) 
empty   (terminate) 
more  (do not terminate) 
On the other side, compound statements can be expressed like parallel 
composition (˄), implication (), weak next (ⓦ), always (). 
3.3.8.4 The Operator Chop and Loops 
Loops in Tempura are similar to those in other related programming languages. For 
example, loops such as, for, repeat and while can be defined in Tempura in different 
ways as shown in Listing 3.2. In addition, Tempura has the loop ‘chopstar { ... }’ that is 
equal to ‘while true do { ... }’ as shown in the listing below. 
Listing ‎3.2: Loops in Tempura. 
while <condition> do { ... } 
repeat { ... } until <expression> 
for <variable> < <integer expression> do { ... } 
for <variable> in <list/string expression> do { ... } 
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for <integer expression> times do { ... } 
chopstar { ... } 
The chop “;” operator in Tempura, stand for sequential composition. Intuitively, 
the term “;” means “followed by”. The following Tempura codes and execution will 
illustrate how this operator can be used in Tempura. 
Listing ‎3.3: Chop in Tempura. 
/* run */ define test1() = { 
exists I: { 
{ 
 {len(3) and I=0 and I gets I+1} and always output(I) ; 
 {len(4) and I gets I+1} and always output(I)  
}}} 
Listing 3.3 shows how the “;” operator can be used in Tempura. The above 
Tempura code is equivalent to the one in Listing 3.4. In addition, they will provide the 
same execution output as shown in Figure 3.6. However, with the chop operator, the 
formula before the semicolon must define an interval length. For example, if the 
length in the formula before the semicolon in Listing 3.3 was not defined, it will not be 
executable, since it could satisfied by any number of behaviours. 
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Figure ‎3.6: Execution of Listing 3.2. 
For more information on Tempura and examples, we refer the reader to [60, 
61]. However, the tool that will be used in our system (AnaTempura) will be explained 
in the following subsection. 
Listing ‎3.4: Equivalent to Chop in Tempura. 
/* run */ define test2() = { 
exists I: { 
{ 
{len(7) and I=0 and I gets I+1} and always output(I) 
}}} 
3.3.9 AnaTempura 
AnaTempura is a semi-automatic tool that is used to perform runtime verification of a 
system. AnaTempura has the following features: 
 It offers specification support; and 
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 It provides validation and verification support in the form of simulation and 
runtime testing in conjunction with formal specification. 
AnaTempura is a development of C-Tempura which was introduced by Roger Hale and 
is now maintained by Antonio Cau and Ben Moszkwoski [61]. The runtime verification 
technique uses assertion points to check whether a system satisfies timing, safety or 
security properties expressed in ITL. The assertion points are inserted in the source 
code of the system and will generate a sequence of information (system states), like 
values of variables and timestamps of value change, while the system is running. [61]. 
 AnaTempura has an open architecture that is known to be pluggable tool, i.e., 
it allows new tool components to be plugged in. The general system architecture of 
AnaTempura that is used in our system is shown in Figure 3.8. Inputs to the system are 
the system behaviours and Tempura specification with the desired properties. The 
output will be a result that indicates whether the desired properties are satisfied by 
the system behaviours. The role of AnaTempura in our research is to examine the 
satisfaction of the system behaviours with the virus properties. If the system behaviour 
satisfies a virus property, then an infection has occurred and needs to be detected, 
otherwise, the system is uninfected. 
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Figure ‎3.8: The general system architecture of AnaTempura. 
A behaviour in this approach represents a sequence of states (i.e., an interval). 
A property is a set of behaviours. In addition, a system is also a set of behaviours that 
should satisfy a property (That is to say, for all behaviours  of the system,   Prop, 
where Prop represents a property). Figure 3.9 shows an overview of the system 
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analysis in AnaTempura. The first step is to formulate all desired behavioural 
properties (i.e., virus behaviours in our model) which are stored in Tempura files. The 
second is to observe the system behaviours. Finally, the process (AnaTempura) decides 





(Source Code + 
Assertion points)
 
Figure ‎3.9: The analysis process. 
3.4 ITL Related Work 
Ye [64] reports an anomaly detection technique to detect intrusions in network 
systems.  He used a Markov Chain model in order to create a temporal profile of 
normal behaviours in a network or computer system. Ye claims that the temporal 
behaviour profile, which is defined as the temporal profile of an action sequence, is 
significant in detecting intrusions, because intrusions consist of sequences of 
connected computer activities. He defines the Markov Chain model as a non-
continuous random process indicating how variables change randomly at different 
points in time. The normal profile can be identified by learning the normal behaviour 
of the system from historic data. In this model, the probability of intrusion is inferred 
by analysing the observed behaviours of the system, supported by the Markov Chain 
model. If a probability has low support, this suggests an anomalous behaviour which 
may result in intrusion.  
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The technique used in [64] was tested and implemented on the Solaris 
operating system, which has a security extension called the Basic Security Module 
(BSM) that records events by monitoring activities in a host. A number of event types 
were gathered by BSM and the normal and intrusion activities were inferred from 
these events. Ye built a long-term normal profile of temporal behaviour, then to detect 
a significant difference, the temporal behaviour in the recent past was compared with 
the long-term normal profile. This technique was found to have high sensitivity and 
specificity, in other words, low rates of both false negatives and false positives. In 
addition, temporal behaviour data can be taken from a large-scale domain such as a 
network or from a small one such as a file, user or special program. However, Chandola 
et al. [65] argue that there is a limitation with Markov Chain techniques in which they 
potentially require a huge amount of space in order to store all transition frequencies. 
Another approach is to identify binaries of worm and viruses by using a 
combination of reverse engineering and model checking [66]. This approach comprises 
three stages, beginning with the classification of worm and virus behaviour, by 
identifying five functions which describe their activity and then detecting malicious 
properties. The second step is the model checking process, described by [57] as an 
automated technique that produces a finite-state model of a system and a logical 
property, then systematically checks whether this property holds for a given initial 
state in that model. The final stage is to use linear temporal logic (LTL) in order to 
encode the malicious behaviour of worms and viruses. 
 In the approach of [66], a given worm program behaviour is characterised by a 
set of executions, then LTL formulae are used to encode this set of executions. Formal 
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specifications are used and the elements of computer virus programs are identified in 
order to characterise malicious behaviour in worms. The binary program is translated 
into a finite model representation and then given to a model checker for verification 
purpose. The authors claim that even if there are different virus source codes, they still 
have the same operational behaviour; thus the method used is beneficial, since it will 
succeed in capturing malicious behaviour. It can be argued that the approach of Singh 
and Lakhotia [66] will succeed as long as all worms and viruses have the same 
operational behaviours. On the other hand, the work of [1, 5] shows that there are 
complex viruses which can change their functional and operational behaviours. 
Therefore, there are several viruses which can evade the Singh and Lakhotia method of 
detection as described in [67]. The approach adopted here, using ITL, has the 
advantage of being able to define more complex temporal features [63] and 
simultaneously has an intuitive advantage over approaches based on LTL that has been 
used in attack detection. This intuitive advantage of ITL indicates that an interval 
clearly describes the sequential nature of system behaviours. 
Later, Holzer et al. [68] have used a verification technology in order to identify 
and discover malicious software. Their approach relies on formalising malicious 
behaviour using Computation Tree Predicate Logic (CTPL) that has been extended from 
the classic CTL. The CTPL is used because it has predicates that enable the malicious 
behaviour to be concisely formalised. A model checker called Mocca is used and this 
model checker expects an input to be a plain text assembly source code. At first, they 
make sure that the program is unpacked in which static analysis is used to do the 
unpacking. Then, a plain binary is the outcome of unpacking the program that will be 
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disassembled in order to construct the assembly source code which is used as an input 
to Mocca. Next, the assembly file will be parsed by Mocca in order to generate an 
abstract model of the executable.  
A structure called Kripke structure is derived in order to syntactically model the 
assembly code. Every instruction in the code is represented by a predicate and its 
parameters are considers as constants. In the code, each line is corresponded to a 
state that is only identified to a specific location. Finally, the model checker Mocca 
reports whether or not the assembly code satisfies their system specification. That is, 
whether the file is a malware or not. The paper of [68] has produced an optimised 
research in the use of formalism for the purpose of detecting computer malwares but 
unfortunately, there are too many translation steps which are not needed before 
checking whether it is a malware or not. It also uses the binary code prior to checking 
has been used. In addition, it also lacks the mechanism that can perform the runtime 
verification of the system. The runtime verification drawback of [68] work can be 
solved by our integrated workbench, AnaTempura. 
Naldurg et al. [69] propose a framework for intrusion detection using temporal 
logic. Their approach relies on runtime monitoring of temporal logic specifications, 
using a logic called EAGLE with three temporal operators: next time, previous time and 
concatenation. This logic supports finite trace monitoring and allows the pattern of 
security attacks to be formally specified. In order to determine whether the 
specification is violated or not in this technique, [69] used an online monitoring 
algorithm to automatically match the absence of an attack specification with traces of 
system execution, sounding an alarm whenever the specification is violated. The idea 
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behind this proposal is to produce temporal formulae which involve statistical 
predicates for the expected behaviour of security-critical programs, monitoring the 
system execution in order to check whether the formula is violated. If the formula is 
violated by the observed execution, then an intrusion has happened. Therefore, 
attacks can be detected even if they are previously unseen. A prototype called MONID 
was used, allowing the system to be implemented in an online or offline fashion and to 
detect intrusion.  
Munoz et al. [70] report that there is a drawback in [69] approach in which the 
distinction between an intrusion and normal behaviour is not clear [70]. In addition, 
ITL, which will be used in this research, differs from and has advantages over the logic 
used in [69] and other logics in that it has the sequential chop operator “;” that 
composes two phases together which can also be used to remember the order of virus 
actions. In addition, ITL has a tool called Tempura which allows our system 
specifications to be validated, prior to the real implementation, which is done through 
a simulation and animation. It also provides a fast prototyping and debugging for our 
system ITL specifications [60]. In addition, ITL is very suitable to describe system traces, 
i.e., it can be used to describe bad and good behaviours. The Tempura tool will be used 
to check whether a good or bad behaviour occurs with help of ITL description and 
system traces. 
3.5 Summary 
In order to infect a system, a virus will carry out different actions. These actions need 
to be traced and then expressed. This chapter presented the language which will be 
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used to express these virus actions (steps). First, a background about different types of 
temporal logics was discussed. Interval Temporal Logic was explained in detail 
alongside with its syntax, informal semantics, the executable subset Tempura and its 
syntax, and the semi-automatic tool AnaTempura. After that, the reasons which 
support our choice of ITL amongst other temporal logics were justified. Furthermore, 
related researches which utilised similar languages or tools to express virus behaviour 
were explained and compared with the present research. 
AnaTempura cannot be used on its own to detect computer viruses. In other 
words, an extension to AnaTempura is needed to handle virus detection. Therefore, 
there is a need for other tools to be integrated with AnaTempura. These tools should 
be able to deliver the sequences of API calls to AnaTempura. These tools will be 
explained in Chapter 5. 
The next chapter explains the methodology of this research. Two architectures 
will be used in this research namely, virus behaviour analysis and virus detection. Virus 
analysis includes tracking API calls of normal and malicious programs beside the steps 
that a virus carries out in order to attach it to another file. On the other hand, the virus 
detection architecture will be used to detect these viruses and to distinguish them 
from benign processes. 
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Chapter 4  
Framework for Behavioural Detection of 
Viruses 
Objectives: 
 Provide a general overview of the proposed framework. 
 Describe the virus behaviour analysis, including the tools which have 
been used to trace API calls. 
 Provide the virus detection architecture. 
 Describe the observed virus behaviour in ITL. 
 
 
Chapter Four: Framework for Behavioural Detection of Viruses 
67 | P a g e  
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains what has to be done in order to fulfil the requirements of this 
research. It begins with a brief account of the methods used to gather and analyse 
data on computer viruses, then sets out the framework used to achieve the desired 
detection. Next, it explains every component of the framework, how it was used in the 
present investigation and why it was chosen. The chapter ends with a list of API calls 
representing virus behaviour and how they can be detected using Interval Temporal 
Logic (ITL).  
4.2 Main Framework 
As this research investigates behaviour-based virus detection, selected types of virus 
were analysed in order to discover how they behave, i.e., what they do inside the 
system. Their behaviours were observed as a sequence of steps in order to track them. 
To infect a system, a virus will go through several steps, which together constitute its 
particular behaviour. From these steps we can infer specifications which constitute the 
virus behaviour description that matches our initial system requirements, as shown in 
Figure 4.1. From this specification, ITL formulae (to be discussed later) are derived. 
These formulae can be inferred from the virus behaviours that have been analysed.  
Once the ITL formulae have been derived, one of the inputs of our system will 
have been constructed. The other requirement of our system is that these formulae 
must match system behaviours. To ensure this we created a monitoring algorithm 
using AnaTempura (discussed later) to match input2 (system behaviours) with input1 
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(ITL formulae) in order to see whether input2 satisfies input1. If input2 satisfies input 
1, then an infection has occurred. This is the agreed main framework that was used in 















Figure ‎4.1: The main framework. 
4.3 Virus behaviour 
It is very important to understand application program interfaces (APIs) and their 
features as well as the portable executable (PE) file format, in order to trace the 
behaviour of programs and to understand hidden features of malicious codes. 
Therefore, an outline of PE and API calls is provided here in order to enhance 
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understanding of these important system services. An application programming 
interface (API) is a system service that has been built to help software components to 
communicate with each other and it acts as an interface between these components. 
APIs may operate for object classes, variables, data structure, and routines. Their 
specifications can take many forms, including an International Standard such as POSIX. 
They can also be vendor documentation such as the Microsoft Windows API, or the 
libraries of a programming language, e.g., Standard Template Library in C++ and Java. 
However, a PE file is divided into sections and each section supplies different 
information about the PE file, like, for example, the number of API calls imported, 
number of dlls, file headers etc [22]. 
4.3.1 Win32 Portable Executable Format 
Microsoft introduced the Win32 PE format as the standard executable format for all its 
Windows operating systems in all supported processors [35]. As the present research 
is concerned with extracting and understanding API calls, it is essential to have an 
understanding of the PE format.  
PE has its own structure, as shown in Table 4.1, which gives a good 
understanding of what a PE file looks like, involving the DOS headers and the PE 
headers. The signature of the PE file and file properties such as timestamp and the 
number of sections are the two types of data that the PE header starts with. The 
section table has four sections, beginning with the .text section, which is known as the 
code section. The .data section involves the original entry point (OEP), which points to 
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the beginning of the execution of a PE file. It also includes the writable global variables 
[2]. Finally, the .rdata section contains read-only data [35]. 
Table ‎4.1: Portable Executable Structure [22]. 
Section Table 
DOS Header 
COFF File Header 
Optional Header 
Standard Fields 
NT additional Fields 
Optional Header Data Directories 
       Export Table 
       Import Table 
       Resource Table 
       Exception Table 
       Certificate Table 
       Base Relocation Table 
       Debug 
       Architecture 
       Global Ptr 
       TLS Table 
       Load Config Table 
       Bound Import 
       Import Address Table (IAT) 
       Delay Import Descriptor 
       COM+ Runtime Header 
       Reserved 
Section Table 
       .text 
       .rdata 
       .data 
       .idata 
 
 The most important element of the PE structure for this research is the IAT 
section, which includes the addresses of all the functions imported by a file, including 
API calls, which are used in this research in order to determine how viruses behave. A 
more detailed explanation of how the IAT is used in this research will be given in the 
next chapters. 
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4.3.2 Windows Application Program Interface Calls 
In 1995, Microsoft released Windows 95 and at the same time introduced a set of 
system calls known as Win32 API, which represented a 32-bit application program 
interface [60, 69]. The new APIs had the advantage of higher system speeds because 
they provided a set of optimised system operations [57]. User applications in the 
Windows operating system (OS) based on these API function calls are stored in 
dynamic link libraries (dlls) such as User32.dll, Kernel32.dll, Advapi32.dll, and Gui32.dll, 
in order to gain access to system resources involving registry and network information, 
processes and files [35]. According to [71, 72], the functionality provided by the 
Windows API can be grouped into eight categories: 
Base Services 
Access to the fundamental resources available to a Windows system can be provided 
by the base services. The fundamental resources may be processes and threads, 
devices, file systems and error handling. These base services reside in kernel.exe, 
krnl286.exe or krnl386.exe files on 16-bit Windows, and in this approach target, known 
as 32-bit Windows, they reside in kernel32.dll. 
Advanced Services 
Access to functionality additional to the kernel is provided by advanced services. The 
additional functions to the kernel may be the shutdown/restart the system (or abort), 
Windows registry, manage user accounts and start/stop/create a Windows service. 
These advanced functions on 32-bit Windows reside in advapi32.dll. 
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User Interface 
The functionality to create and manage screen windows and the most basic controls, 
such as, receive mouse and keyboard input, buttons and scrollbars and other 
functionalities associated with the GUI part of Windows, are provided by the user 
interface APIs. On 16-bit Windows, these functions reside in user.exe, and on 32-bit 
Windows, they reside in user32.dll. The basic controls and the common controls 
(Common Control Library) reside in comctl32.dll on Windows XP versions. 
Graphics Device Interface 
The functionality for outputting graphical content to monitors, printers and other 
output devices is provided by the Graphic Device Interface. On 16-bit Windows, they 
reside in gdi.exe and on 32-bit Windows in user-mode, they reside in gdi32.dll. GDI for 
Kernel-mode is provided by win32k.sys which communicates directly with the graphics 
driver at kernel level.  
Common Dialog Box Library 
Applications for the standard dialog boxes for saving and opening files, choosing font 
and colour etc; is provided by Common Dialog Box Library. On 16-bit Windows, the 
library resides in a file called commdlg.dll, and on 32-bit Windows it resides in 
comdlg32.dll. It is grouped under the User Interface category of the API. 
Windows Shell 
Applications are allowed by the component of the Windows API to access the 
functionality provided by the operating system shell, as well as to enhance and alter it. 
On 16-bit Windows, the component resides in shell.dll, and on 32-bit Windows, it 
resides in shell32.dll. In both 16-bit and 32-bit, shlwapi.dll has the Shell Lightweight 
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Utility Functions. These functions are grouped under the User Interface category of the 
API. 
Network Services 
Access to the different networking capabilities of the operating system is given by 
network services. Its sub-components include Winsock, NetBIOS, RPC, NetDDE and 
many other sub-components. 
Common Control Library 
Access to some advanced controls provided by the operating system is given to 
applications by the Common Control Library. These may be progress bars, toolbars 
status bars and tabs. On 16-bit Windows, the library resides in a DLL file called 
commctrl.dll, and on 32-bit Windows, it resides in comctl32.dll. The library is grouped 
under the User Interface category of the API. 
Each Win32 API call has its own memory address place in the import address 
table (IAT) which every process in the system has and which each process will consult 
when it makes an API call, as shown in Table 4.1. A Win32 API call is normally called 
from a process running at the user level [22], then the called API will be handled by the 
system and converted to its equivalent function, known as a Native API call, which will 
be understood by the kernel of the OS. A service in the kernel will handle the 
requested operation and its outcome will return to the original user application that 
made the call [35]. 
The majority of systems services run at the kernel and need privileges in order 
to access it. Native API calls, which can be directly called by any process at the kernel 
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level, are dealt with in the dynamic link library (ntdll.dll) in order to have the kernel 
provide the requester service [35]. 
The complete list of kernel mode functions is stored with memory location 
addresses in the system service dispatch table (SSDT), which is accessed each time a 
Native API routine is called. The parameters are then passed to the memory location 
and the function continues with its execution [3, 9]. 
The following will give an example in order to have a better understanding 
what is the idea of system calls in the operating system and how it can be represented 
in the code. This C code has issued a CreateFile system call which will be redirected to 
its appropriate system kernel library in order to create the file as shown in Listing 4.1.  
It can be seen in the code this system call will create a text file called “myfile” which 
has the following characteristics. It is a general read file that can be shared as a read 
file with attributes set to normal as indicated by the code. 
Listing ‎4.1: CreateFile C code. 
 
hFile = CreateFile( 
                  TEXT ("myfile.txt"),   // Open myfile.txt 
                  GENERIC_READ,   // Open for reading 
                  FILE_SHARE_READ, 
                  NULL, // No security 
                  OPEN_EXISTING,            // Existing file only 
                  FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,  
                  NULL);    // No template file 
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4.3.3 Static and Dynamic Analysis 
There are two popular techniques to analyse computer viruses, namely, static and 
dynamic analysis. According to Bayer [52], static analysis is the process of analysing an 
executable code without practically executing it. To analyse a code using static analysis 
several steps need to be carried out. Firstly, a binary is generally disassembled, i.e., 
converting the binary code into its matching assembler instructions. Afterwards, 
conclusions about the functionality of the code can be drawn by the aid of both the 
control flow and data flow of the instructions. Many static binary analysis techniques 
[73, 74, 75] have been established to help the detection of various types of malware. 
There are a number of pros and cons for static analysis. One of the biggest advantages 
that static analysis provides is that it is able to examine the complete code even faster 
than its corresponding dynamic one. One of the shortcomings of static analysis is that 
many interesting questions can be asked about the code and its properties which 
unfortunately remain unanswered. Due to the fact that it is not easy to analyse 
malicious software, it can be designed to use binary obfuscation techniques that are 
used to prevent the static analysis approach from accurately analysing and dissembling 
program codes [52]. 
On the other hand, dynamic analysis techniques are the opposite of static 
analysis in which they analyse the code during the execution of the program. In the 
dynamic techniques, only the executed instructions by the code are analysed. Hence, 
dynamic analysis solves the obfuscation problem which thwarts static analysis 
techniques. The environment that is used to dynamically analyse the sample is always 
Chapter Four: Framework for Behavioural Detection of Viruses 
76 | P a g e  
 
questionable. Undoubtedly, running a malware in a physical computer that might be 
connected to the Internet might harm other machines as the malware has the ability 
to spread. In addition, running an isolated machine which needs to be re-installed 
every time a dynamic test is carried out would be insufficient due to the overhead that 
is involved. 
Using a virtual machine, i.e., a virtualised computer such as Oracle VM 
VirtualBox [76] is a popular choice. Therefore, the tested malware cannot influence the 
physical PC only the virtual one. The virtual machine allows the user to have a clean 
state of the operating system, known as a snapshot, the user has the ability to restore 
to this clean state each time a malware test is completed. This solution is known to be 
faster than using an isolated machine because it is easier to restore a virtual machine 
than install an operating system in a real PC. One main disadvantage of virtualisation is 
that the malware analysed might determine that it is executed on a virtual machine 
and harm the real one. There are a number of works [77, 78] that have demonstrated 
how a program can determine whether it is running in a virtual machine or not. This 
problem can be solved by installing different operating systems in the host machine as 
explained in Section 4.2.1. 
To achieve a better understanding of computer viruses, and due to the fact that 
our approach used behaviour-based virus detection, dynamic analysis has been 
considered to be the main analysis technique used in the present research. There has 
also been used static analysis to gain a first impression about what types of API calls a 
virus might issue when infecting a system and attaching itself to another file. 
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4.3.4 Virus Analysis  
This section explains the methodology used to extract API calls which are used to 
represent the behaviour of a virus. Figure 4.2 shows the mechanism used to analyse 
and extract API calls. In addition, these tools will be discussed in further detail in the 
following sections. Existing software was used to obtain information about the viruses 
through the following steps: 
Step one: Unpack the virus. 
Step two: Get the assembly code by disassembling the virus.  
Step three: Extract the sequence of API calls that represent the virus behaviour. 







API List Virus Behaviour
Blade API 
Monitor
Figure ‎4.2: API extraction mechanism. 
4.3.4.1 Build a Secure Environment 
In order to analyse computer viruses, a secure environment is needed to make sure 
that no virus can escape the system and infect other machines. In addition, some 
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viruses will use the Internet or a local area network (LAN) to spread their malicious 
effects, allowing them to spread very widely indeed. Therefore, a virtual machine (VM) 
(Oracle VM VirtualBox) [76] was used in this research in order to secure the system. 
The Linux Ubuntu operating system was used as host with Windows XP as a guest to 
ensure that no viruses leaked from the guest to the host, because as explained earlier, 
a virus that infects one OS will not run when a different OS platform is used. In some 
cases, viruses will use the Internet to connect to anonymous remote hosts. It is 
preferable not to connect to these unknown hosts, even if the virus is running on a 
virtual machine, so a way to prevent this is needed. However, the behaviour of viruses 
is the target and the Internet plays an important role in tracking these behaviours. 
Therefore, a fake Internet was used, allowing all the network activities in addition to 
allowing the tracking of virus behaviour in this research. This was achieved without 
causing any risk to the real Internet by installing NetKit [79], which provides a 
simulation of the entire Internet. NetKit was therefore installed on the host (Ubuntu) 
machine and then the virtual machine ran Windows XP using the fake internet.  
4.3.4.2 Unpacking the Virus 
Packers are known as “anti-anti-virus” programs and also can be called “anti-
reversing”, because they exist to fight against anti-virus software as well as reverse 
engineering techniques. Packers are mostly used to disguise and/or compress codes. 
According to Alazab [22], packers are just computer programs which have the ability to 
restore the original executable image of a file from its encrypted and compressed one 
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in a secondary memory location. Hence, the code might appear to do one thing, but it 
actually does something else, which is likely to confuse researchers. 
Nowadays, computer virus writers have the benefit of using these packers to 
make their viruses run faster, as well as avoiding detection systems [22]. Furthermore, 
the methods of packing make recognising and understanding viruses very complicated 
both for detection systems and analysts, because the authors can make small code 
modifications in order to change a signature and so avoid detection. Packing also 
makes analysis by researchers less easy, because to extract and understand unpacked 
code requires a third party tool, beside a deep and strong understanding of assembly 
language and the kernel, which leads to a better understanding of  low level 
programming [22]. 
However, a number of researchers have reported the construction of tools that 
automatically unpack viruses such as Eureka [80], Ether [81] and Renovo [82]. The 
present research uses PEiD [83] to unpack the virus samples examined. PEiD is an 
unpacking tool that detects most common packers, cryptors and compilers for PE files. 
The first step was to use an interactive disassembler, IDA Pro [50], to decide whether a 
virus was packed or not, after which PEiD was used to indicate which packer (e.g. UPX, 
Upack, Xpack or PEPack) had been used. As Figure 4.2 shows, OllyDbg was used to seek 
the entry point of the virus and to dump the unnecessary code. It would also save the 
newly unpacked virus in order to conduct a clear investigation of the malware. Figure 
4.3 shows that approximately 70% of the viruses analysed in this research had been 
packed and needed to be unpacked, using the process explained above, while the 
remaining 30% were directly observed. 
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Figure ‎4.3: Percentages of packed and unpacked viruses analysed. 
 
4.3.4.2.1 PEID 
PEiD is the tool that is used in this research to unpack the virus samples examined. The 
role of this tool is to indicate whether a process is packed or not and which packer was 
used to pack it. As shown in Figure 4.4, a selected virus was tested to see whether it is 
packed or not. The reason why PEiD is used in this research is, because a clean sample 
is needed to carry out the analysis and especially the static analysis.  
 
Figure ‎4.4: A snapshot of PEiD. 
30% 
70% 
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The snapshot above indicates that the “Watcher.exe” virus has been packed 
and the packer is “UPX”. To unpack this virus another tool (OllyDbg) is needed. 
Moreover, OllyDbg will be discussed in the following point to show how it can help 
with unpacking a selected process. 
4.3.4.2.2 OllyDbg 
OllyDbg is a tool that is utilised in the API extraction mechanism to search for the entry 
point (OEP) of the virus and to dump the unnecessary code. It would also save the 
newly unpacked virus in order to conduct a clear investigation of the malware. 
Therefore, a clean and unpacked sample can be saved and then run. As shown below 
in Figure 4.5, a selected virus was assembled by OllyDbg.  
 
Figure ‎4.5: A snapshot of OllyDbg. 
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The above snapshot shows that the assembly code of the Windows 32 
“gen.exe” was extracted by OllyDbg. Then, the unnecessary code will be removed and 
a clean executable virus will be saved. Afterwards, the unpacked virus can be run and 
tested as a normal PE file. The API calls of the clean virus will be statically analysed by 
IDA Pro Disassembler as discussed in the following point. 
4.3.4.3 Extracting the Assembly Code (Static API Extractio) 
IDA Pro can be used to extract the assembly code from both executable (such as PE, 
ELF, EXE, etc.) and non-executable files and is the most practical disassembly tool [22]. 
It runs a static analysis [50] and can detect whether a file is packed, as well as 
disassembling the code, thus providing more details and improving the understanding 
of the code.  
IDA Pro was selected as a part of the API extraction mechanism used in this 
research because it can statically and automatically extract API calls from a file, giving 
an initial image of what sort of API calls the file might make. Thus, using IDA Pro allows 
API calls to be statically extracted and gathered, offering an important method of 
identifying virus behaviour. In order to have more evidence about the API calls made 
by viruses, IDA Pro needs to be used with more than one tool that provides tracking of 
API calls at runtime. Both Blade [84] and API Monitor [85] were used to extract API 
calls during run time (dynamically), while the virus was being executed, to give us a 
fuller image of the API calls made by the virus. 
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4.3.4.3.1 IDA Pro Disassembler  
In this research, the IDA Pro Disassembler tool is used to extract the assembly code 
from the executable processes. As shown in the snapshot below, IDA Pro Disassembler 
helps us to carry out static analysis in which it allows us to gain a first impression about 
what types of API calls a virus might issue when infecting a system and attaching itself 
to another file. Figure 4.6 shows the assembly code of the normal process 
“iexplore.exe”. 
 
Figure ‎4.6: A snapshot of IDA Pro. 
From the above assembly code a static analysis of API calls can be obtained. 
Figure 4.7 shows the list of API calls of “iexplore.exe” normal process can be statically 
extracted by IDA Pro Disassembler from the process’s assembly code (Function calls 
graph). 
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Figure ‎4.7: List of API calls of iexplore.exe. 
4.3.4.4 Extracting API calls (Dynamic)  
As explained by [23], Windows API calls play an important role in exploiting the power 
of Windows, allowing virus writers to use API calls to gain more security privileges and 
perform malicious actions. Windows APIs issue calls to perform several actions, such as 
user interfaces, system services and network connections, which can be utilised for 
good or evil [22]. Because API calls will give a full and complete description of a 
particular program, the analysis of its API calls will lead directly to the understanding of 
its behaviour. 
 Viruses are just like normal programs and can be distinguished by tracking 
their API calls that lead to malicious actions. Therefore, this research concentrates on 
tracing API calls in order to understand virus behaviour. As shown in Figure 4.2, more 
than one tool [50, 84, 85] was utilised to trace API calls in static and runtime 
environments. Most researchers [22, 23] rely on just one tool, which runs either 
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statically or dynamically, but this research uses both in order to have a full 
understanding of what API calls have been made and when. Static analysis misses 
some API calls when comparing to dynamic analysis. In addition, there are some Win32 
and Native API that appear in [85] but not in [84] and vice versa. Thus, these three 
tools have been used in this research to track API calls. 
4.3.4.4.1 API Monitor 
In order to observe API and Native API calls at runtime while the virus was being 
executed, API Monitor is used in this research. The reason why dynamic analysis is 
used to extract Win32 and Native API call is because runtime analysis can help us to 
identify the different order of API calls that a virus normally carries out in order to 
attach itself to another file. Figure 4.8 shows a list of API calls that was observed at 
runtime by API Monitor. 
 
Figure ‎4.8: API and Native API calls at runtime. 
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A selected normal process “chrome.exe” was tested at runtime by API Monitor. 
It can be seen from the figure above that a list of API calls with their parameters can be 
observed while the process is running. In addition, this list can be saved anywhere in 
the operating system for future analysis. 
4.3.4.4.2 Blade API Monitor 
The Blade API Monitor is another dynamic API monitor that is used in this research 
because there are some Win32 and Native API calls that appear in API Monitor but not 
in Blade API Monitor and vice versa. Therefore, these two dynamic analysis tools have 
been used in this research to track API calls. Figure 4.9 and 4.10, shows how the Blade 
API Monitor can be used to observe API calls at runtime. Firstly, the DLL files which 
their functions will be monitored, need to be chosen. In our research, “kernel32.dll” 
and “ntdll.dll” need to be selected in order to observe both Win32 and Native API calls 
as shown below. 
 
Figure ‎4.9: Choosing which DLL file to monitor. 
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The following figure shows how Win32 and Native API calls can be monitored at 
runtime by the Blade API Monitor. 
 
Figure ‎4.10: Blade API Monitor. 
The present research considers API calls to provide a way to determine 
whether malicious actions have been performed or not, by analysing them to 
understand their behaviour and to indicate whether a file contains a malicious or 
benign program. To do this, 283 virus samples downloaded from [86, 87] and 50 
Windows (XP) normal processes, such as svchost.exe and iexplore.exe, were examined 
to discover what sort of API calls malicious programs use in order to perform their 
actions. 
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The research began with the assumption that a virus must read from and write 
to a file, as [22, 23, 45] explain, in order to infect a computer, to replicate itself, to 
infect other files and to spread throughout the world. More precisely, the following 
five steps are considered to represent virus steps in a behaviour: 
1) Find to infect 
2) Get information 
3) Read and/or copy 
4) Write and/or delete 
5) Set information. 
 Find to Infect 
In order to infect, a virus needs to find a file or to retrieve the contents of a directory in 
which to write its malicious code. This research has concentrated on three types of 
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computer virus, listed in Table 4.2: those which overwrite existing files, known as 
overwriting viruses, those which can be attached to existing files, known as parasitic 
viruses, and those which create a file resembling a known one, known as companion 
viruses. 
After analysing the API calls issued by a group of computer viruses related to 
the three types explained above, it has been considered that ‘find to infect’ as the first 
step in the behaviour, addressing its potential API function calls that relate a search to 
a particular file or directory. Table 4.3 groups the first category and its API call 
functions into a single list. These API calls were compared to see whether a virus had 
searched to infect a particular file or directory. 
Table ‎4.3: Virus descriptions. 
Virus type Description Behaviour 
Overwriting A virus (V) will replace its content with an 
existing file (F) by overwriting it. 
1. Read “V.exe” 
2. Open “F.exe” 
3. Write “V.exe” into “F.exe” 
4. Close ““V.exe”” 
Parasitic A virus (V) will attach itself to an existing 
file (F) by injecting its code into F and 
replace its entry points. 
1. Open “V.exe” 
2. Read “V.exe” code 
3. Open “F.exe” 
4. Inject code into “F.exe” 
5. Replace “F.exe” entry 
point 
Companion A virus (V) will change the name of an 
existing file (F) with its original name. 
1. Read “F.exe” 
2. Rename “F.exe” as “F.ex” 
3. Rename “V.exe” as “F.exe” 
 
Table ‎4.4: Find to infect API function Calls. 
Behaviour type API function calls 
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 Get Information 
The second category of steps in a virus behaviour observed in this research was to 
discover a file’s attributes, to retrieve specific information regarding a file, or to 
retrieve information on a directory, such as path name. A virus needs to have 
information about a particular file or directory to infect it and to read and write to it. 
Table 4.5 shows the API function calls a program can issue to get information about a 
particular file or directory. 
Table ‎4.5: Get information API function calls. 









 Read and/or Copy 
Read and write calls are the most important API calls issued by viruses, because they 
give it the ability to attach itself to other files and spread. As explained by [45], there is 
a very narrow difference between normal and malicious behaviour in the case of 
system calls. Indeed, although this research has given careful consideration to 
distinguishing between normal and abnormal activity, there exist some legitimate 
processes that may look like malicious software but would never be captured by the 
detector used here, because they will never act exactly the same as the malware, i.e., 
there is always a difference, however slight. Previous researches such as [23] and [45] 
have observed that normal processes will never issue system calls that have the same 
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order as computer viruses. This means that our concept of virus behaviour has to trace 
system calls from the beginning to the end, having a set of system calls which have to 
be made in a particular order, because normal processes are supposed never to follow 
the concept of replication completely.  
Therefore, read and write function calls must be made in a certain order, i.e., a 
virus will read a file first and then write to this or another file. In addition, other 
observed API calls of read and write categories may or may not be called, but when it 
comes to read and write API calls, they must be called by the file for it to be considered 
a virus. Table 4.6 shows the API function calls a program can issue to read from or copy 
a file. Copy API calls are considered to be malicious here, because some viruses will 
copy to or from files, or create new files when they infect a system [22]. The use of 
‘and/or’ in the category name means that a copy API call may or may not be issued by 
a virus. 
Table ‎4.6: Read and/or copy API function calls. 
Behaviour type API function calls 




 Write and/or Delete 
As mentioned in the previous subsection, a file must issue write API calls in order to be 
classified as a virus. Therefore, every read API call should be followed by a write API 
call, issued at any time by the same file, to be considered a virus and not to conflict 
with benign processes. Table 4.7 shows the list of API calls which a file will issue to 
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write to or delete a file. However, as with ‘copy’, the delete API call is considered 
malicious, because some viruses will delete some files when they infect a system, as 
reported by [22]. It will also be optional, as the phrase and/or appears in the category 
name; that is, the API delete call may or may not be issued by a virus. 
Table ‎4.7: Write and/or delete API function calls. 
Behaviour type API function calls 
Write and/or delete ["WriteFile", "WriteFileEx", "ReplaceFile"], ["DeleteFileW", 
"DeleteFileTransactedW","CloseHandle"]. 
 Set Information 
The last category of steps in a virus behaviour observed in the research is the setting of 
specific information regarding a file, which leads to a change in its attributes. It has 
been observed that after infecting a file, a virus will need to change some of the file 
information in order to deal with it in the future. Therefore, this category has been 
considered and Table 4.8 lists the API calls that a file needs to set and change the file 
information. 
 
Table ‎4.8: Set information API function calls. 
Behaviour type API function calls 
Set information "SetFileInformationByHandle", "SetFileValidData", "SetFileBandwidthReservation", 
"SetFileShortName", "SetFileAttributesTransacted", "SetFileApisToOEM", 
"SetFileAttributes", "SetFileApisToANSI","NtSetInformationFile". 
 
Therefore, five categories of steps in representative virus behaviours, 
reiterated in Table 4.9, were observed in this research and were compared with API 
calls to determine whether a virus was present. At least two of the eight API calls 
Chapter Four: Framework for Behavioural Detection of Viruses 
93 | P a g e  
 
presented in bold in the table and representing the third and fourth categories, 
namely, ReadFile, ReadFileEx, OpenFile, OpenFileByld, ReopenFile, WriteFile, 
WriteFileEx and ReplaceFile must be called in order to say that a file is a virus. That is, 
at least one of the five bolded API calls in the third category must be called by a file 
and one of the three bolded API calls in the fourth category must subsequently be 
called, for that file to be treated as a virus. 
Table ‎4.9: API function calls for categories steps. 
Behaviour type API Function Calls 
Find to infect "FindFirstStream","FindFirstFileTransacted","FindFirstStreamTransacted", 
"FindClose","FindNextFile","FindFirstFileName","FindNextFileName", 
"FindFirstFileNameTransacted","FindNextStream","FindFirstFileEx","FindFirstFile". 






Read and/or copy ["ReadFile", "ReadFileEx","OpenFile","OpenFileByld","ReOpenFile"], 
["CreateHardLinkTransacted","CreateHardLink","CreateSymbolicLinkTransacted","Cre
ateSymbolicLink","CreateFile","CopyFileEx","CopyFile","CopyFileTransacted"]. 
Write and/or delete ["WriteFile", "WriteFileEx", "ReplaceFile"], ["DeleteFileW", 
"DeleteFileTransactedW","CloseHandle"]. 
Set information  "SetFileInformationByHandle", "SetFileValidData", "SetFileBandwidthReservation", 
"SetFileShortName", "SetFileAttributesTransacted", "SetFileApisToOEM", 
"SetFileAttributes", 
"SetFileApisToANSI","NtSetInformationFile". 
The previous five categories were found to have used API calls that could be 
called by a file at the user level, known as Win32 APIs. However, there is an 
alternative, whereby Native API calls perform this function in order to provide the 
service requested by the kernel. Win32 APIs are converted to Native API calls by the 
ntdll.dll process [22, 45], in order to be understood by the kernel. For example, 
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consider that a user requests a list of files which belong to a particular directory. When 
a request is received form the user input, a Win32 API call is needed in order to 
complete this request. One of the most famous Win32 API to list files is FindFirstFile() 
and this API call is exported by kernel32.dll [88]. Firstly, FindFirstFile() will pass the 
directory name, and if the request succeed, a handle will be passed to FindNextFile() in 
order to list the remaining files in the directory [89]. Each time these functions are 
called, the operating system need to go through these steps, as shown in Figure 4.11. 
After that, FindFirstFile() will call NtQueryDirectory() Native API which is located in 
Ntdll.dll. The NtQueryDirectory() will be then sent by Ntdll.dll to the kernel-mode and 
executed like all other Native API calls. However, there exist some files that can call the 
kernel directly, avoiding the need for user level API calls [48]. These calls were 
observed in this research. 
Table 4.10 shows the Native API calls that can be issued by a file in order to be 
classified as a virus. However, these Native API calls are not fully documented, as 
Microsoft does not make them publicly available [49], so API call researchers are 
struggling to acquire more knowledge about them. Therefore, both Native and Win32 
API calls need to be observed and taken into account in order for the present research 
to achieve good results. Figure 4.12 shows the order of the five categories alongside 
with their description. 
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Figure ‎4.12: The Five Categories. 
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Table ‎4.10: Native API function calls for categories of steps. 
Behaviour type API function calls 
 
Find to infect "NtQueryDirectoryFile". 
Get information "NtQueryAttributesFile", "NtQueryInformationFile". 
Read and/or copy ["NtOpenFile"," NtReadFile"], "NtCreateFile"]. 
Write and/or delete ["NtWriteFile"], ["NtDeleteFile", "NtClose"]. 
Set information "NtSetInformationFile". 
4.3.5 Virus and Normal Process API Examples: 
As abovementioned, 283 virus samples and 50 normal processes that are running in 
Windows (XP) and Windows 7, were examined in this analysis in order to discover 
what sort of API calls normal and viral processes carry out and how to distinguish 
them. For example, when examining svchot.exe, we found that it never issues a read 
and write API calls which refer to itself. 
4.4 Virus Detection Architecture 
The observation of steps in a virus behaviour used in our system is based on the API 
hooking method at runtime. Hooking APIs provides the ability to intercept a set of API 
calls and redirect them to other functions [23, 48]. The benefit of doing so is to 
examine these calls in order to decide whether a virus is present or not. API hooking is 
done in either user or kernel mode. 
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Figure ‎4.13: Detection Architecture. 
4.4.1 User Mode API Hooking 
User mode API hooking, based on the technique of altering the IAT, redirects API calls 
to another place [29]. All API calls are hooked at runtime by an existing tool 
representing our second input (virus behaviours) in Figure 4.1. However, Tempura will 
receive the API calls in order to decide whether a virus is present, as shown in Figure 
4.13. If a virus is detected, the system will not allow it to continue making API calls and 
the file is terminated. 
 When a prototype was run in user mode only, the virus detection rate was low, 
because viruses are designed to evade the detection used at the user level [29]. 
Therefore, if no virus was detected, it was directed to the second approach and the 
kernel Native API calls were examined. 
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4.4.2 Kernel Mode API Hooking 
The majority of computer viruses try to run at the kernel level in order to gain more 
security levels and control of the system, which cannot be gained at the user level [29]. 
At the kernel level, Native API hooking does not differ from the user level, at which the 
SSDT can be overwritten and redefined. Therefore, Native API calls will be received at 
runtime by Tempura, where they are examined for a virus.  
If the user level fails to detect any suspicious API calls issued by a file, it is 
directed to the kernel level for further examination. If the Native API calls indicate that 
it is suspicious (i.e., a virus), it will be terminated, while if no suspicious behaviour is 
detected, both API and Native API calls are returned to their original file.  
Most approaches that use API calls to detect computer viruses operate at 
either user level (Win32 APIs) or kernel level (Native APIs). The problem with the 
former is that some applications can directly call the kernel and avoid using Win32 APIs 
[48], allowing them to remain undetected, i.e., this approach tends to give false 
negatives. 
 On the other hand, the drawback with using kernel level by itself is that unlike 
system calls, Native APIs are not completely documented like most Unix systems 
(system calls in most Unix systems are documented) and are almost entirely hidden 
from view, with only handful of their functions documented in generally accessible 
publications [49]. This drawback makes the use of Native APIs incomplete and liable to 
both false negatives and false positives, so that the system is not fully protected. 
Therefore, it can be hypothesised that the use of a combined user and kernel 
level approach provides a better detection system and minimises the rates of false 
Chapter Four: Framework for Behavioural Detection of Viruses 
99 | P a g e  
 
negatives and false positives. Such a system is able to examine API calls issued in the 
user mode and if a file is detected as a virus, no further examination is needed. If, 
however, it is not considered to be a virus, the detection system will examine it at the 
kernel level by observing its Native API calls. 
 In order to apply this approach, a parallel execution tool is needed to run user 
and kernel level detection simultaneously. ITL can do this, handling both sequential 
and parallel composition [90] and offering user and kernel level detection at the same 
time. We can also make the Native API calls used at the kernel level adaptable by using 
ITL formulae and this allows us to add more Native API calls in the future. 
Figure 4.13 shows how the system works. At the user level, API calls are 
extracted and then sent to AnaTempura, which examines them to see if they match 
the five categories of steps in a virus behaviour. 
However, if the five categories are not detected in the user level API calls, 
Tempura examines the Native API calls coming from the kernel level. This comparison 
is similar to the above, but concerns only those categories which have not been 
detected. For example, if three of the five are discovered in the first comparison, the 
second one considers only the undiscovered categories. Then, if kernel observation 
completes the set of five categories, Tempura decides that a virus has been detected 
and the file will not complete execution.  
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4.5 Virus Behavioural Specification in ITL 
We have declared Cat1, Cat2, Cat3, Cat4, and Cat5 which respectively represent the 
lists of all API function calls for Find to infect, Get Information, Read and/or Copy, 
Write and/or Delete, and Set Information, as listed in Table 4.9. 
We suppose that X represents all API and Native API calls which are received at 
runtime by Tempura. X will be received as a text representing all API calls issued by a 
certain PE file. Note that for a given set , the predicate ‘in(X)’ holds if X . 
 The ITL formulae for Category one will be as follow: 
 Ucat1(X)  
inUsermode (X)  inKernelmode (X)  inCat1(X)   
This formula indicates that if one or more API or Native API calls denoted by X 
issued by a file in the user or kernel level, is in the list of Cat1. 
The previous formula will be applicable for all the categories in the user level 
except Cat3 and Cat4 that represent the read and write categories respectively. 
 Therefore, The ITL formulae for Category two, and five will be as follow: 
 
 Uca2(X)  
inUsermode (X)  inKernelmode (X)  inCat2(X)   
 Ucat5(X)  
inUsermode (X)  inKernelmode (X)  inCat5(X)   
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However, several rules and conditions should be considered in this research. 
Firstly, in order to write to an existing or new file, a virus will read and write in order, 
i.e., will read first and then write to the infected file. Secondly, one of the API calls 
(ReadFile, ReadFileEx, OpenFile, OpenFileByld, and ReopenFile) must be called in the 
third category and one of the API calls (WriteFile, WriteFileEx and ReplaceFile) be 
called in the fourth category. 
 Therefore the formula of Category three will be as follow 
        Ucat3(X) 
inUsermode(X)  inKernelmode (X)   inCat3(X)   inRead(X). 
Where Read = (ReadFile, ReadFileW, OpenFile, OpenFileByld, ReopenFile). 
 The formula for Category four will be  
Ucat4(X)  
inUsermode(X)  inKernelmode (X)   inCat4(X)  inWrite(X) 
Where Write = (WriteFile, WriteFileEx and ReplaceFile). 
 Because the order of read and write is very important in this research, the next 
formula will be applicable: 
  Ucat3(X) ;  Ucat4(X)   
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It shows that the write calls must be issued sometimes () after a read call. 
However, if one or more categories are not detected at the user level, then their 
Native API calls coming from the kernel will be examined.  
 Therefore the next formula will be used: 
 (inUsermode(X)   inKernelmode (X)   
                                  
Ucat1(X)  Ucat2(X)     
 Ucat3(X)  Ucat4(X)    
                             Ucat5(X))                 
             )    
The previous formula indicates that if one or more categories have not been 
detected in the user level, they will have more examination at kernel level, in order to 
see if there is a call belongs to the undetected category that has been directly issued to 
the kernel. The same mechanism will be used to examine the Native API calls coming 
from the kernel. 
In addition, the order of these API calls is highly significant and indeed the main 
contribution in this research.  
 The following formulae represent the different order of API calls that a virus 
normally carries out in order to attach itself to another file. 
 Ucat1(X) ;  Ucat2(X) Ucat3(X) ;  Ucat4(X) ;  Ucat5(X)   
 Ucat1(X) ;  Ucat2(X) Ucat3(X) ;  Ucat5(X) ;  Ucat4(X)   
 Ucat2(X) ;  Ucat1(X) Ucat3(X) ;  Ucat4(X) ;  Ucat5(X)   
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 Ucat2(X) ;  Ucat1(X) Ucat3(X) ;  Ucat5(X) ;  Ucat4(X)   
Previous four formulae illustrate that in order to attach itself to another file, a virus 
will issue API or Native API calls from the five categories in four orders. Firstly, the 
normal order from category one to category five. Secondly, a virus will issue calls from 
category one to three and then five and finally from the fourth category. The third 
scenario is that a virus will firstly issue a call from category two then category one and 
subsequently issue calls from category three, four, and five respectively. The final 
scenario is that a virus initially issues a call from category two then category one and 
succeeding that category three, five, and four sequentially. Indeed, these orders need 
to be considered besides the rule associated with the read category (third category). 
Moreover, these different scenarios will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has set out and discussed the architectures of both virus behaviour and 
detection in order to identify how a virus can infect a system and how it can be 
detected. It has considered how to determine the behaviours of viruses, using a 
number of tools, and discussed the methods used to gather and analyse data on 
computer viruses. Examining API calls was found to be one of the best methods to 
determine the behaviour of viruses and to trace them. This research has identified five 
categories of steps that can occur in a virus behaviour as it infects a system, starting 
with finding a file or a directory to infect. Next, it acquires information such as its 
attributes and directory path, then reads and/or copies a file which has the virus in 
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order to write in the subsequent behaviour. The fifth and final category observed was 
that of setting information in a file in order to change its attributes for future use. User 
level API calls known as Win32 APIs were traced to determine whether a malicious 
action had occurred. To achieve a better result, this method was supplemented by 
observing kernel level API calls (Native APIs), which can be used to call the kernel 
directly, avoiding the Win32 APIs. 
The method used to detect the behaviour of computer viruses by tracing their 
API and Native API calls was discussed and its architecture drawn at both user and 
kernel level. If the five categories of behaviour discussed above are observed at the 
user level, then a virus has been detected; otherwise the kernel Native API calls are 
examined to determine whether any undetected categories can be found at that level. 
If all five categories are discovered at the user or kernel level or both, then a virus is 
present; otherwise, the file is considered benign. In addition, ITL formulae which 
represent virus behaviour were provided at the end of this chapter. 
ITL’s executable subset, Tempura will be examined in the next chapter in order 
to demonstrate its value to this research in detecting virus behaviour. Tempura and 
other tools that are plugged-in with it will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. In 
addition, the next chapter will discuss the implementation, how the architecture 
works, and how viruses are detected in detail. 
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Chapter 5  
AnaTempura Integration and 
Implementation 
Objectives: 
 Develop a prototype implementation of behaviour-based virus 
detection. 
 Discuss AnaTempura and the tools that are needed to be plugged-in 
with it. 
 Provide the functions that are used to detect computer viruses. 
 Describe the algorithm that is used by Tempura to detect computer 
viruses. 
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5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains how Tempura can be used to detect computer viruses by means 
of their API calls. It also explains which tools should be used to extract Win32 and 
Native API calls that represent the steps of virus behaviour at both user and kernel 
levels. 
Tempura will examine both Win32 and Native API calls at run time. As 
explained previously, five stages have been identified in which a virus operates in 
order to attach itself to another file or files. First, it finds a place to infect, which is 
normally the file system of a Windows operating system. Second, it obtains the 
information of the wanted file or directory. Next, it reads and/or copies the file in 
which it should first read itself before writing to another place. 
 Fourth, to attach itself to another file, a virus must write after it reads itself 
and it mostly writes to one of four places: a virus may replace its content with an 
existing file by overwriting it (Parasitic), it may attach itself to an existing file by 
injecting its code into this file and replacing its entry points (Overwriting), it may 
change the name of an existing file with its original name (Companion), or it may 
create a new file and write to this file. Finally, Set File Information category’s API calls 
will also be called to change the file attributes which can also be used in the future as a 
channel for the hacker to infect the system again, or to use the same file to read and 
write in the future.  
As mentioned previously, examining only Win32 API calls will not be enough 
because some viruses exist which directly contact the kernel ending with a false 
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positive and false negative. Therefore, both Win32 and Native API calls should be 
examined by Tempura. This means that both the kernel and user level calls should be 
examined at the same time. This chapter explains the implementation of our prototype 
at both kernel and user levels, besides the tools that help Tempura to detect computer 
viruses at both levels. 
5.2 What Is Needed 
At the user level, information of all wanted API calls should be monitored alongside its 
process ID (PID), the file which issues the call, and the parameters that are needed in 
order to complete the call. On the other hand, the kernel level is responsible for 
intercepting a number of selected Native API calls and then going all the way back to 
Tempura, telling it if one or more of these Native API calls has been issued. This is 
shown in Figure 5.1. 
 The reason why we choose to hook only the wanted API and Native API calls at 
both levels is related to the performance of the machine. Marhusin et al. [91] 
suggested minimising the number of hooks to achieve the hooking goal while 
preserving reasonable computer performance [91]. Therefore, by observing all the 
needed API calls at the user level and intercepting only the selected Native API calls at 
the kernel level, the performance of the system will be better than if all calls at both 
levels are observed. 
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Figure ‎5.1: General Integration with AnaTempura . 
Practically, it is better to start with the user level to see how the incoming 
Win32 API calls can be compared with the analysed categories and how many API calls 
a virus can issue during runtime at the user level. As a result, each call will be 
compared with each category and the outcome of this comparison will determine how 
many steps this particular file has carried out. 
5.3 User Level 
Figure 5.1 shows that, a tool which works at the user level is needed to monitor 
selected API calls, and provide the parameters associated with these calls, in order to 
fulfil the requirements of this research. This tool should be able to be plugged-in with 
Tempura that is a plug-in tool by its nature. This tool should provide its output to 
Tempura in order to complete the detection mechanism. Deviare API [92] has been 
found as the most practical tool to deal with API calls at the user level as explained in 
the next section. 
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5.3.1 Deviare API 
The prototype of this research has integrated a tool called Nektra's Deviare API [92] for 
intercepting Windows API calls on the fly. Deviare API provides hook libraries to 
intercept any Windows API calls at runtime. It is an API hook engine that was designed 
to create end-user products. 
Intercepting API calls is not an easy task which can take place in many different 
scenarios. Our choice of Deviare API is due to the fact that the developers of this tool 
have tested all the different scenarios to avoid unpleasant crashes that might cause 
damage to the system. Most popular hook engines do not address these issues [92]. 
Although they work in many situations, a truly professional hook engine that works in 
all situations is needed to fulfil the objective of this research.  
As well as this, Deviare API is a generic API interception engine. Its main 
difference from other hook engines is that it allows us to intercept different functions 
with a single handler and decide which functions to hook at runtime. To intercept APIs 
with any other product, a specific handler that runs in the target process context has 
to be written. In contrast, one of the advantages that the Deviare API provides a 
generic handler which has the ability to receive all API calls by each process. 
Deviare API provides a COM interface supported by most programming 
languages such as C++, Delphi, VB, VB.SCRIPT, VB.NET, C-Sharp (C#) and Python. API 
hooking can be used in different fields such as learning about the internal behaviour of 
the Windows operating system and the behaviour of the external applications, without 
access to their source code, malware analysis, tracing and debugging an application's 
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code execution, showing its API calls and parameters. The latter advantage of API 
hooking is the one that can be provided by Deviare API which will help us with 
identifying a set of API calls with their parameters in order to precisely examine a 
process. 
As shown in Figure 5.2, Deviare API provides the ability to receive the API call as 
well as the process that issues the call, the Process ID and the parameters associated 
with this API call. Therefore, by receiving all this information at the user level from 
Deviare API, AnaTempura will be able to examine and compare them with the five 
categories observed previously in Section 4.3. 
 
Figure ‎5.2: Deviare API commercial edition. 
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Not all API calls’ parameters are needed. As observed by this research, some 
API calls are obvious and there is no need to examine their parameters. API calls such 
as those which belong to the read category are in fact essential to see what the file has 
read. In addition, parameters associated with the API call that creates a file might also 
be needed for classification to see where the file has been created and whether it 
creates a new file or overwrites an existing one. 




Creates a new file, always. 
If the specified file exists and is writable, the function 
overwrites the file, the function succeeds, and the last-error 
code is set to ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS (183). 
If the specified file does not exist and is a valid path, a new 
file is created, the function succeeds, and the last-error 
code is set to zero. 
CREATE_NEW 
1 
Creates a new file, only if it does not already exist. 
If the specified file exists, the function fails and the last-
error code is set to ERROR_FILE_EXISTS (80). 
If the specified file does not exist and is a valid path to a 
writable location, a new file is created. 
OPEN_ALWAYS 
4 
Opens a file, always. 
If the specified file exists, the function succeeds and the 
last-error code is set to ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS (183). 
If the specified file does not exist and is a valid path to a 
writable location, the function creates a file and the last-
error code is set to zero. 
OPEN_EXISTING 
3 
Opens a file or device, only if it exists. 
If the specified file or device does not exist, the function 
fails and the last-error code is set to 
ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND (2). 
TRUNCATE_EXISTING Opens a file and truncates it so that its size is zero bytes, 
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5 only if it exists. 
If the specified file does not exist, the function fails and the 
last-error code is set to ERROR_FILE_NOT_FOUND (2). 
The calling process must open the file with the 
GENERIC_WRITE bit set as part of the dwDesiredAccess 
parameter. 
For example, the parameter ‘dwCreationDisposition’ of CreateFile, as 
mentioned by [93], is an action to take on a file or device that exists or does not exist. 
This parameter must be one of the following values, which cannot be combined, as 
shown in Table 5.1. Therefore, by receiving and observing this parameter, we can 
classify the virus after is has been caught if it is writing to a new place or to an existing 
one. 
As shown in Table 5.2, there are also significant parameters in the read 
ReadFile API call. The most significant is a handle to the file which has been read and 
this parameter cannot be neglected because it helps to determine whether a file is a 
virus or not in order to see whether a file has read itself or not. 
Table ‎5.2: ReadFile and CreateFile Prototype. 
API call parameters 
ReadFile 
 
BOOL WINAPI ReadFile( 
  __in         HANDLE hFile, 
  __out        LPVOID lpBuffer, 
  __in         DWORD nNumberOfBytesToRead, 
  __out_opt    LPDWORD lpNumberOfBytesRead, 
  __inout_opt  LPOVERLAPPED lpOverlapped 
); 
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HANDLE WINAPI CreateFile( 
  __in      LPCTSTR lpFileName, 
  __in      DWORD dwDesiredAccess, 
  __in      DWORD dwShareMode, 
  __in_opt  LPSECURITY_ATTRIBUTES 
lpSecurityAttributes, 
  __in      DWORD dwCreationDisposition, 
  __in      DWORD dwFlagsAndAttributes, 
  __in_opt  HANDLE hTemplateFile 
); 
5.3.2 API Calls Intercepting and Parameters 
To start a new Windows Application project using C# that works simultaneously with 
Deviare API, a number of library references need to be added to the project in order to 
complete the experiment. For example, those which are responsible for getting the API 
call’s parameters are in fact significant for examining these parameters associated with 
each call. Thus, all Deviare library references have been added to this project. 
In order to use Deviare API, its namespace as shown in the code below needs to 
be included. By including this name space, all its intercepting features can be used and 
it can also enable the project to deal directly with the API calls. 
Listing ‎5.1: Deviare API namespace. 
    
 using Nektra.Deviare2; 
 
When the OnFunctionCalled event is received, three objects will be received as 
parameters as shown in Listing 5.2. First, an INktHook indicating which hook fired the 
event. Second, an INktProcess object where the process Id and name using the "Id" 
and "Path/Name" properties can be extracted. Third, an INktHookCallInfo object that 
provides specific information about the call. One of them is the "Params" method 
which in turn will return a collection of parameters. With that collection each 
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INktParam object can be used to access the type of the parameters, inspect and/or 
change its value, etc. 
Listing ‎5.2: OnFunctionCalled Function. 
    
private void OnFunctionCalled(NktHook hook, NktProcess process, 
NktHookCallInfo hookCallInfo) 
 
The following code shows how CreateFileW1 system calls can be intercepted. 
This API call has been randomly chosen due to the fact that explaining one API call is 
the same as explaining other API call intercepting. In addition, it has more parameters 
that are significant for classifying the virus.  
Listing ‎5.3: CreateFile Intercept. 
    
 NktHook hook = _spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!CreateFileW",      
(int)(eNktHookFlags.flgRestrictAutoHookToSameExecutable &   
eNktHookFlags.flgOnlyPreCall)); 
    hook.Hook(true); 
    hook.Attach(_process, true); 
The subsequent snippet shows how the parameters of an API call can be 
intercepted. Note, the CreateFile API call prototype has been shown in Table 5.2. 
Listing ‎5.4: Call Information. 
    
 INktParamsEnum paramsEnum = hookCallInfo.Params(); 
 
The codes below show how the seven parameters of the CreateFile API call 
which are shown in Table 5.2, can be observed using the Deviare API tool. Since the 
type of each parameter is previously known, it can be easier to obtain these 
                                                          
1
 CreateFileA is for ANSI format and CreateFileW is for Unicode format. Therefore, it is up to the system 
in which if the Unicode format is used, the CreateFileW will be called and vice versa. 
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parameters. These parameters can also be formatted in a way that Tempura can 
handle them. 
Listing ‎5.5: lpFileName parameter. 
    
//lpFileName 
    INktParam param = paramsEnum.First(); 
    strCreateFile += param.ReadString() + "\", "; 
 
Every parameter can be interpreted and translated into a symbolic constant. 
For example, the following piece of code shows how the created file can be accessed. 
Listing ‎5.6: dwDesiredAccess parameter. 
//dwDesiredAccess 
    param = paramsEnum.Next(); 
       if ((param.LongVal & 0x80000000) == 0x80000000) 
        strCreateFile += "GENERIC_READ "; 
         else if ((param.LongVal & 0x40000000) == 0x40000000) 
         strCreateFile += "GENERIC_WRITE "; 
          else if ((param.LongVal & 0x20000000) == 0x20000000) 
           strCreateFile += "GENERIC_EXECUTE "; 
            else if ((param.LongVal & 0x10000000) == 0x10000000) 
             strCreateFile += "GENERIC_ALL "; 
               else 
                strCreateFile += "0"; 
                 strCreateFile += ", "; 
The subsequent code shows the share mode of the Created file API. It can be 
seen that a normal file can be in read, write or delete share mode by changing its 
attributes. 
Listing ‎5.7: dwShareMode and lpSecurityAttributes parameters. 
/dwShareMode 
   param = paramsEnum.Next(); 
     if ((param.LongVal & 0x00000001) == 0x00000001) 
      strCreateFile += "FILE_SHARE_READ "; 
        else if ((param.LongVal & 0x00000002) == 0x00000002) 
         strCreateFile += "FILE_SHARE_WRITE "; 
          else if ((param.LongVal & 0x00000004) == 0x00000004) 
           strCreateFile += "FILE_SHARE_DELETE "; 
            else 
                strCreateFile += "0"; 
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              strCreateFile += ", "; 
 
//lpSecurityAttributes 
            param = paramsEnum.Next(); 
            if (param.PointerVal != IntPtr.Zero) 
            { 
                strCreateFile += "SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES("; 
 
                INktParamsEnum paramsEnumStruct = 
param.Evaluate().Fields(); 
                INktParam paramStruct = paramsEnumStruct.First(); 
 
                strCreateFile += paramStruct.LongVal.ToString(); 
                strCreateFile += ", "; 
 
                paramStruct = paramsEnumStruct.Next(); 
                strCreateFile += paramStruct.PointerVal.ToString(); 
                strCreateFile += ", "; 
 
                paramStruct = paramsEnumStruct.Next(); 
                strCreateFile += paramStruct.LongVal.ToString(); 
                strCreateFile += ")"; 
            } 
            else 
                strCreateFile += "0"; 
            strCreateFile += ", "; 
As shown in Table 5.1, the dwCreationDisposition parameter can help with 
classifying the virus if a new file has been created or not. Listing 5.8 shows how 
dwCreationDisposition parameters can be one of the variety of options which were 
explained in Table 5.2. 
Listing ‎5.8: dwCreationDisposition, dwFlagsAndAttributes and hTemplateFile parameters. 
//dwCreationDisposition 
            param = paramsEnum.Next(); 
            if (param.LongVal == 1) 
                strCreateFile += "CREATE_NEW "; 
            else if (param.LongVal == 2) 
                strCreateFile += "CREATE_ALWAYS "; 
            else if (param.LongVal == 3) 
                strCreateFile += "OPEN_EXISTING "; 
            else if (param.LongVal == 4) 
                strCreateFile += "OPEN_ALWAYS "; 
            else if (param.LongVal == 5) 
                strCreateFile += "TRUNCATE_EXISTING "; 
            else 
                strCreateFile += "0"; 
            strCreateFile += ", "; 
//dwFlagsAndAttributes 
            strCreateFile += param.LongVal; 
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            strCreateFile += ", "; 
//hTemplateFile 
            strCreateFile += param.LongLongVal; 
            strCreateFile += ");\r\n"; 
Note that the attributes associated with the CreateFile API call were tested in 
this research for classifying purpose. In other words, some computer viruses were 
tested to observe whether they attach themselves to new or existing files in order to 
show our prototype’s ability in classifying these viruses. However, the classification is 
not part of the final prototype due to the fact that the prototype’s main role is only to 
detect computer viruses and distinguish between them and benign processes. 
Therefore, the CreateFile API’s parameters were tested in this research to show that 
more information about computer viruses can be acquired from API calls. 
Owing to the fact that the process ID and process name are considered as 
significant factors in this research, they have to be specified with each system call, i.e., 
all the information about each API call should be given with the process that issues the 
call and its identifier. The code below shows how the process name and the process ID 
can be obtained. 
Listing ‎5.9: Process Name and ID. 
//ProcessId 
 
              process.Id.ToString() 
//Process Name 
 
              process.Name 
This means that, the snippets above show that Deviare API with C# are able to 
provide three main parameters, namely: The API call that is running, parameters 
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associated with this call, the process ID that issues the call. The fourth parameter is the 
file name that is read by the process and this can be acquired as shown in Listing 5.10. 
Listing ‎5.10: Filename parameter. 
 
if (hook.FunctionName == "kernel32.dll!ReadFile" || hook.FunctionName 
== "kernel32.dll!ReadFileEx" 
                    || hook.FunctionName == "ntdll.dll!NtReadFile") 
                { 
                    IntPtr h = paramsEnum.GetAt(0).SSizeTVal; 
                    string s = ""; 
                    if (h != IntPtr.Zero) 
                    { 
                        try 
                        { 
                            s = _tool.GetFileNameFromHandle(h, 
process); 
                        } 
                        catch (Exception e) 
                        { 
                            throw (e);  
                        } 
                    } 
 
                    int i = s.LastIndexOf('\\'); 
                    s = s.Substring(i + 1); 
 
                    strCreateFile += s; 
                    strCreateFilea += s; 
                } 
 
5.3.3 Deviare API Output 
The output of Deviare API will be read by Tempura using assertion points (explained in 
detail in Appendix B) in the C# program as shown in Listing 5.11.  




Name:{0}:Id:{1}:Call:{2}:Inputs:{3}:!", P_name, P_ID, Call, hfile); 
 
} 
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However, the C# program will be wrapped in a Java program to enable us to make the 
output readable by Tempura. In other words, the Java program acts as a pipe between 
Tempura and the C# program. As a result, the output of the combination between C# 
and Deviare API will appear as follows: 
Listing ‎5.12: C# Output which are read by Tempura. 
!PROG: assert Name:Eyeveg.exe:Id:2331:Call:CreateFileW:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert 
Name:Eyeveg.exe:Id:2331:Call:NtQueryDirectoryFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:chrome.exe:Id:6092:Call:NtClose:Inputs::! 









!PROG: assert Name: firefox.exe:Id:4284:Call:NtClose:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name: firefox.exe:Id:4284:Call:CloseHandle:Inputs::! 
5.3.4 Deviare API & Tempura 
As abovementioned, Deviare API can be plugged in with most programming languages. 
Therefore, in this implementation, the C# programming language has been used to 
retrieve the API calls from the Deviare API engine with the process which issues the 
calls, its process ID and the parameters associated with this call. Subsequently, 
Tempura will be able to receive all the data from Deviare API and then examine them. 
Therefore, the final implementation of Deviare API, C#, and Tempura at the user level 
will appear as shown in Figure 5.3. 
Tempura has the ability to be plugged-in with most programming languages 
such as Java, C, etc. Therefore, the Java program will give the information from the C# 
program to Tempura. 
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Tempura will receive the four parameters explained previously from Deviare 
API as separate lists. Each list should be provided as a string list in order to be captured 
by Tempura. Each time the Deviare API runs, it will directly give all the information to 
 the Java program that acts as a pipe and will be read at the same time by 
Tempura as shown in the figure below. Then, Tempura will deal with these lists that 
come from the user level and provide a result if the five categories have met with the 
conditions associated with these categories. The following subsections will explain the 


















Figure ‎5.3: Deviare API, C# and Tempura. 
5.3.5 User Level Tempura Functions 
Several functions at the user level have been defined in Tempura to check whether the 
observed file is a virus or not. Firstly, seven lists: Cat1, Cat2, Cat3, Cat3A, Cat4, Cat4A 
and Cat5 have been declared. They represent finding a place to infect, getting the 
Chapter five: AnTempura Integration and Implementation 
121 | P a g e  
 
information, reading and/or copying, writing and/or deleting, and setting file 
information categories respectively. These functions are responsible for examining the 
API calls at the user Level and are detailed in the following bullet points. 
 Process ID 
There are a huge number of API calls that can be monitored at run-time. They can be 
issued by different concurrent running processes at the same time. Virtually, every 
process running in a system, issues system calls, however they are not mixed and can 
easily be differentiated for every process [45]. Therefore, every call is associated with a 
unique process identifier (PID) in order that calls coming from different processes do 
not mix. For example, if an API call belongs to category one with PID 1674, it will not 
mix or be linked with an API call from category two which is associated with 1624 PID. 
However, the Process ID can help with identifying the process name which will be 
explained in the next bullet point. 
 Process Name 
As shown in Figure 5.4, the process name can be inferred from its associated process 
ID. This figure has been captured to displays the process name and ID, and other 
information such as, local port, protocol and local port name [94]. 
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Figure ‎5.4: Process name and ID. 
The process name is particularly important in order to be used as a comparison 
when a file is read, as explained previously. The process name will be compared in case 
a read call has been issued to see if the read file matches with the process that is 
reading this file. This means that, if the file has read itself, then it can be considered to 
be a possible virus if it satisfies all the mentioned conditions. 
 Inputs (API Parameters) 
Each API call carries with it a number of inputs or parameters that are required to 
complete the execution of the call. These parameters can be a handle to read a file, as 
shown in the code below, to set security privileges, and other inputs that are essential 
to finish the call.  
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Listing ‎5.13: ReadFile API call Code. 
BOOL WINAPI ReadFile( 
  __in         HANDLE hFile, 
  __out        LPVOID lpBuffer, 
  __in         DWORD nNumberOfBytesToRead, 
  __out_opt    LPDWORD lpNumberOfBytesRead, 
  __inout_opt  LPOVERLAPPED lpOverlapped 
); 
 The ReadFile windows API call is present here as an example because it will be 
one of the most important Win32 API call, the parameter of which will be investigated 
in depth. As mentioned previously, in order to attach itself to another file and to be 
distinguished from other normal processes, a virus must read itself. Therefore, the 
name of the file that is read by the ReadFile will be examined each time this API call is 
issued.  
Then, the name of the process that issues the ReadFile API will be compared with 
the read file to see if there is a match. Other API calls’ parameters that belong to the 
read category will also be important in order to see the read file, such as, OpenFile and 
ReopenFile as shown below in Listing 5.14. The prototypes of the latter API calls are 
shown in the code below. 
Listing ‎5.14: OpenFile and ReOpenFile API call Prototypes. 
HFILE WINAPI OpenFile( 
  _In_   LPCSTR lpFileName, 
  _Out_  LPOFSTRUCT lpReOpenBuff, 
  _In_   UINT uStyle 
); 
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HANDLE WINAPI ReOpenFile( 
  _In_  HANDLE hOriginalFile, 
  _In_  DWORD dwDesiredAccess, 
  _In_  DWORD dwShareMode, 
  _In_  DWORD dwFlags 
); 
 Check for API Calls 
The CheckApICalls function is the main function that will be used to check for API calls 
that come from both the user Level (Win32 APIs) and kernel level (discussed later). It 
should deal with four inputs: the Win32 API call(s), the process ID, the process name 
and the parameters coming with the call. When a call is issued by a particular process 
at the user level, it will be examined by Tempura to test whether it belongs to one of 
the five categories explained above.  As shown below in Listing 5.15, CheckApICalls 
receives five significant parameters. They are S, the process name, the process ID, the 
call, and the inputs or parameters. 
Listing ‎5.15: CheckApiCalls function. 
Define    CheckApiCalls(N,S,ProcessName, ProcessId, Call,Inputs) 
If a call belongs to category one or two then S will be assigned to 1 (category one) 
or 7 (category two) as shown in Figure 5.5. If these first two categories have been 
issued then, the remaining categories can be examined; otherwise, S will be reassigned 
to 0 or remain as it is. Therefore, if a process issues a call that belongs to category 
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three, then the CheckApICalls function will firstly look in S if it is equals to 3 or 9 as 
shown below in Figure 5.5.  
Category three has been split into two lists, one for read which must be issued by a 
virus and what is called the copy list is not significant, i.e., the copy list will be optional 
for a virus to issue. The reason why this category has been divided into two lists is 
because calls such as copy and create are not considered to be malicious calls, 
however they can assist with classifying the virus in the future. In other words, if a file 
has issued calls that belong to all the categories and satisfies all the rules considered in 
this research, then this file can be considered to be a virus and, in addition, it can be 
classified. For example, if the CreateFile API call has been issued from a file that is 
considered to be a virus, it can be known that this virus is going to write itself to a new 
file by examining its parameters.  
However, read and/or copy is the most important category that distinguishes 
between normal and malicious action in the system. The process name and the inputs 
will play a consequential role in investigating a process. This means that, if a call 
belongs to the read category, then the process name and the input arguments that this 
call requires will be examined. Thus, if the process name matches the file which has 
been read, then it can be considered to be a candidate virus and this is the idea behind 
attachment [45]. In this case, the S variable will be assigned to 3 or 9 indicating that 
this file can be considered as a candidate virus if calls have been issued from the 
former categories (Category one & two). 
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Therefore, if a file is considered to be a candidate virus, its attributes have been 
changed and this file has issued a number of calls that belong to the five categories 
and satisfies the rules, then a decision can be made. 
As the order of the last two categories is not significant in determining whether a 
malicious action has occurred, they can be issued at any time after a read call has been 
issued. As a result, if a call belongs to the fourth category, write and/or delete, the 
CheckApICalls will check whether it is a candidate virus and it will also check if a call 
has been issued from the last category as shown in Figure 5.5.  
The write category is also divided into two lists in order to classify the virus if it 
happens in the future. The first list is the write list which must be issued and the other 
is the delete list that is optional and they do not play a great role in determining a 
virus. As a result, if a file is considered to be a virus and it is found that it issued calls 
that belong to the delete list then it can be considered to be a destructive virus. 
The last category is set information or the changing attributes category which is 
essential for the virus to spread that gives itself the ability to write by enabling the 
write privilege of the file. In this category, the CheckApICalls will also check whether 
there is a call that belongs to the previous category (Category four) and it will also 
check whether the file is a candidate virus. If it is, then the CheckApICalls function can 
decide that there is a sequence of calls that can be considered to be a malicious action 
and that a virus is detected. 
Furthermore, the following formulae represent the different order of API calls that 
a virus normally carries out in order to attach itself to another file. These formulae 
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were discussed in Chapter 4 and present here to discuss the different order of API calls 
in further details. 
 Ucat1(X) ;  Ucat2(X) Ucat3(X) ;  Ucat4(X) ;  Ucat5(X)   
 Ucat1(X) ;  Ucat2(X) Ucat3(X) ;  Ucat5(X) ;  Ucat4(X)   
 Ucat2(X) ;  Ucat1(X) Ucat3(X) ;  Ucat4(X) ;  Ucat5(X)   
 Ucat2(X) ;  Ucat1(X) Ucat3(X) ;  Ucat5(X) ;  Ucat4(X)   
These four formulae illustrate that in order to attach itself to another file, a virus 
will issue API or Native API calls from the five categories in four orders, as shown in 
Figure 5.5. Firstly, the normal order from category one to category five (S1, S2, S3, S4, 
and S5). Secondly, a virus will issue calls from category one to three and then five and 
finally from the fourth category (S1, S2, S3, S6, and S5). The third scenario is that a 
virus will firstly issue a call from category two then category one and subsequently 
issue calls from category three, four, and five respectively (S7, S8, S9, S10, and S11). 
The final scenario is that a virus initially issues a call from category two then category 
one and succeeding that category three, five, and four sequentially (S7, S8, S9, S12, 
and S11), as shown in Figure 5.5. In fact, these orders need to be considered besides 
the rules associated with the read category (third category). Therefore, whenever a file 
issue calls from the five categories with their rules, one of their orders (that is, S 
reaches 5 or 11), this file will be detected and considers to be a computer virus. 
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Figure ‎5.5: Sequences of Virus API calls. 
 Candidate Virus 
A file is considered to be a possible virus if it carries out several steps. Firstly, if calls 
match the first two categories (S=1 & S=2 or S=7 & S=8) as shown in Listing 5.16. Then, 
if it requests (a) call(s) that belong/s to the third category and it also obey/s the rules 
associated with this category (S=3 or S=9). Category 3 will only be significant if API calls 
issued belong to the previous and subsequent categories. 
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Listing ‎5.16: Category one & two (S=1 & S=2). 
if S=0 and (exists i<|cat1|: 
   cat1[i]=Call) 
     then {   
   S:=1 and  
               format(" PID:%s issued a call in cat1 \n", ProcessId)  
    } 
if S=1 and (exists i<|cat2|: 
   cat2[i]=Call) 
     then {    
   S:=2  and 
                 format(" PID:%s issued a call in cat2 \n", ProcessId)  
 } 
Therefore, if the file is considered to be a candidate virus, then it will be ready to 
be called from the following steps: namely, the write and set information categories. In 
other words, the last categories can be examined if a file considered as a candidate 
virus to see if the file has issued a sequence of API calls that belong to each category 
with the rules associated with each category. 
Listing ‎5.17: Candidate Virus. 
if S=2 and (exists i<|cat3|:  
   cat3[i]=Call) 
     then { 
if (ProcessName=Inputs) 
  then { 
   S:=3  and  
                    format(" The file ( (%s) ) issued calls in the previous two categories 
\n",   ProcessName) and 
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   format(" And a call issued in cat3 \n")  
   and 
                    format("_____Then_______(it's a candidate virus)__________ \n\n")  
           } 
 Categories Sequences 
In order to infect other files, a virus will issue a sequence of API calls that can be from 
different orders as explained previously in Section 4.5. Firstly, a virus will issue a call 
from either category one (S=1) or category two (S=7). Subsequently, S can be assigned 
to 2 or 8 depending on the previous calls as shown in Figure 5.5. If the first two 
categories were issued, then Tempura would decide whether a file is a possible virus 
(S=3 or S=9) or not. 
For example, when a write (S=4 or S=10) or set information API call (S=6 or 
S=12) has been issued, the process will be checked whether it is a candidate virus or 
not (S=3 or S=9). Indeed, if the process is a candidate virus, then the previous 
categories one and two also were issued. 
Finally, the file can be considered as a computer virus if it issues API calls from 
the five categories and follow one of the four order explained previously. As a result, if 
a file obey one of these orders and S reaches 5 or 11, then the file will be considered as 
a computer virus as shown in Listing 5.18. 
Listing ‎5.18: The file is a computer virus (S=5 or S=11). 
if (S=5) 
 then { 
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         S:=5 and 
                     format(" The file ( (%s) ) is a COMPUTER VIRUS \n", ProcessName) 
           } 
 if (S=11) 
 then {   
  S:=11 and 
                     format(" The file ( (%s) ) is a COMPUTER VIRUS \n", ProcessName) 
  } 
 Category Determination 
Five main lists were defined in Tempura to see which call belongs to which category. 
Existential quantification is denoted in Tempura by the ‘exists’ operator. As shown in 
the Tempura code below, the ‘exists’ operator needs two arguments in order to 
complete the checking. They are as follows: the category that needs to be checked if 
the call belongs to this category, and the call itself. 
Listing ‎5.19: ‘exists’ operator. 
(exists i<|cat1|: cat1[i]=Call) /* Find to infect category  */ 
(exists i<|cat2|: cat2[i]=Call) /* Get information category  */ 
(exists i<|cat3|: cat3[i]=Call) /* Read category  */ 
(exists i<|cat4|: cat4[i]=Call) /*  Write category */ 
(exists i<|cat5|: cat5[i]=Call) /*  Set Information category */ 
As shown in the listing above, the ‘exists’ operator is used to help our program 
by checking for the call of the process. This means that, each time a call is issued, it will 
be checked with other previous calls. Therefore, this operator will help the program to 
find out whether a sequence of API calls belongs to the same process. In addition, this 
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operator will be used to check for API and Native API calls in the five categories as 
shown in Listing 5.19. 
 Sequence Remember 
Due to the fact that Tempura is organised as a sequence of states, variables and lists 
that might be used in every state, Tempura forgets the value of the variables unless it 
is specified that they remain stable. In fact, S is a helping variable that gives us the 
ability to keep the sequence of the five categories in order for them to be used in the 
future. 
For example, if a file is considered to be a candidate virus, it needs to be 
remembered until a write or set information call is issued, otherwise, the S variable 
will be assigned to zero. Therefore, the S will help us by assign it to 9 as shown in 
Listing 5.20. 
Listing ‎5.20: Remember category three (S=9). 
{ 
S:=9  and  
format(" The file ( (%s) ) issued calls in the previous two categories \n", 
ProcessName) and 
format(" And a call issued in cat3 \n")  and 
format("_____Then_______(it's a candidate virus)__________ \n\n")  
  }  
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5.4 Kernel Level 
At the kernel Level, selected Native API calls will be intercepted to tell Tempura 
whether a process has issued some calls that might complete the five categories 
observed previously at the user level and then be considered to be a virus. By doing 
that, this approach will prevent any attempt by a virus to directly contact the kernel 
level.  
As shown in Figure 5.1, a combination of the information coming from both the 
user and kernel level is essential in order to obtain a proper result and a precise final 
judgment. A rootkit at the kernel level is the one which is needed to redirect the 
wanted Native APIs to Tempura at the user level. 
5.4.1 Rootkit 
Due to the fact that this approach is based on a Windows operating system, the kernel 
level cannot be easily accessed by normal programs [88]. That means that a rootkit is 
needed to enable some prohibited privileged access to this OS. Once installed, a 
rootkit provides our approach with the ability to maintain the privileged access for a 
long time. However, the kernel mode rootkit used in this research can be called a 
“good rootkit” because it has been built to benefit the system security that is used to 
detect a virus. Therefore, it can be developed in the future as a device driver to be part 
of the OS [95]. 
 The rootkit should intercept any Native API calls which were mentioned 
previously in Table 4.10. These Native API calls are the ones that belong to different 
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categories. The role of our rootkit is to hand the information of these calls to Tempura 
at the user level. As [45] detailed, a Native API call can be traced from the kernel to the 
user level to check its parameters and the process which issues this call. Therefore, API 
will be tracked back to its origin getting its process ID, name and other parameters 
[45].  
As illustrated in Figure 5.6, the user level has also played a significant role by 
adding the information needed by Tempura to the Native API calls in order to specify 
which process issued the selected Native API and their parameters. As a result, by 
identifying each PID after tracing back each Native API, these calls will not be mixed 














Figure ‎5.6: Kernel Level and Tempura . 
By getting all the needed Native API calls observed by our rootkit and the 
parameters obtained from the user level, Tempura can ascertain if a direct call has 
been issued by the same process to the kernel level hence bypassing the user level. 
Thus, any chance of calling a Native API directly to the kernel will be caught by the 
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kernel rootkit and then sent to Tempura for further observation. The functions that 
help Tempura to examine the Native API calls and their attached information coming 
from the kernel level will be explained in the following section. 
5.4.2 Kernel Level Tempura Functions 
Tempura kernel level functions that help to examine the incoming Native API calls will 
be playing their role alongside with the user level functions. Kernel functions should be 
able to see whether the call made to the kernel has not been done in the user mode. If 
the call matches an API call at the user level, then this call will be ignored because it is 
already examined by the user level functions explained previously. These functions will 
be similar to those which are responsible for the user level API calls. The differences 
between API and Native API calls’ functions are detailed in the following bullet points: 
 Process ID and Name 
The process ID needs to be known by Tempura in order to classify the call, i.e., which 
process is calling this Native API. Therefore, all Native API calls will not be mixed and 
can be easily examined. In addition, the process name can be obtained from its PID 
and it is also important in some API calls such as NtReadFile and NtOpenFile in order to 
tell if the file is reading itself or not.  
The Native API calls from a process ID will be matched with their corresponding 
API calls which have the same PID. As a result, a final judgement will be given by 
Tempura if these calls coming from the kernel and the user levels satisfy the five 
categories and their conditions. 
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 Inputs (Native API Parameters) 
As explained earlier, not all the parameters are actually needed. There are some clear 
Native API calls which do not require more examination. In this approach, there are 
selected Native API calls, three of them need further examination by Tempura at the 
kernel, namely: NtOpenFile, NtReadFile and NtCreateFile. These calls require more 
observation because they can lead to ascertaining whether a file has read itself or not 
(NtOpenFile, NtReadFile) and, also, the file can be classified as to whether it creates a 
new file or is an existing one (NtCreateFile). 
 Check for Native API Calls 
This function will actually be responsible for getting the Native API calls with their 
parameters, PID and the file name. The role of this function is to examine whether 
there is a match between a Native API and an API call. For example, if a Process ID has 
issued a WriteFile and, after a while, Tempura has received that the PID has issued a 
call to the kernel with NtWriteFile, the second call will be ignored by this function and 
thus, will not provide any action. 
 The idea behind this function is to check every category to see if a previous call 
has been issued that belongs to this category with the same PID. If so, this call will be 
ignored and thrown away. Otherwise, and if the call does not belong to any category, a 
flag will put in the category which it belongs to for future examination. 
 As mentioned previously, inputs associated with some calls play a significant 
part in this approach because without them a file cannot be clearly classified. 
Consequently, this function will also consider these inputs if a selected Native API call 
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has been issued. For instance, if a Native API call has been issued by a file, this call has 
not matched with an API call at the user level and it is one of the Native API calls 
whose parameters are significant such as NtReadFile this file will be examined and 
compared with the read file by this call. 
 Category Determination 
Similar to API calls, Native API calls need also to be examined, i.e., determining which 
category a Native API call belongs to. Therefore, each time a Native API call is received, 
it needs to be checked for consistency.  
As a result of checking the S variable, it can be checked if the coming Native API 
call has its corresponding API call. This variable will also continue its role by checking 
for all categories as shown in the code below. For example, if a call has been issued at 
the user level and a corresponding call has been received from the kernel, no action 
will be taken (S variable will remain as it is) as illustrated in Listing 5.21. On the other 
hand, if there are no calls that belong to a particular category, this category will be 
flagged whether the incoming call received is from the user or the kernel (the S 
variable will be assigned another number). 
Listing ‎5.21 : Duplicated calls. 
 if S=1 and (exists i<|cat1|: 
  cat1[i]=Call) 
 then {   
  S:=1  
          } 
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The above snippet indicates that if S=1 (which means a call from category one 
was previously issued by a process), and another call is issued from the same category 
(category one), S will remain as it is and Tempura will be waiting for a call from the 
second category, otherwise S will still 1 or return to zero. 
5.4.3 Java Pipe 
The Java pipe is used in this research to read the information from Deviare API and 
then transfer them to Tempura. As shown in Listing 5.22, the only role of this code is to 
run the TestHook.exe which work at the same time with Deviare API to intercept calls 
and delivers them to Tempura that is used simultaneously to examine these calls and 
decide whether or not an infection has been done. Indeed, this implementation 
provides only a prototype that is used to demonstrate that API calls can be monitored 
at runtime with an acceptable performance. 




public class Main1 { 
    public static BufferedReader inp; 
    public static BufferedWriter out; 
 
    public static void print(String s) { 
    System.out.println(s); 
    } 
    public static String pipe(String msg) { 
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    String ret; 
    try { 
        ret = inp.readLine(); 
        return ret; 
    } 
    catch (Exception err) { 
 
    } 
    return "really?"; 
    } 
    public static void main(String[] args) { 
    String s; 
    String cmd = "/Users/Sulaiman/Documents/New version/tempura-
2.19/Examples/csharp/TestHook.exe"; 
    Console c = System.console(); 
    String in ; 
        try { 
        Process p = Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd); 
 
        inp = new BufferedReader( new InputStreamReader(p.getInputStream()) ); 
        out = new BufferedWriter( new OutputStreamWriter(p.getOutputStream()) ); 
 
  while(inp != null) 
  { 
         
        print( inp.readLine()); 
                
        }; 
   
        inp.close(); 
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        out.close(); 
     } 
 
        catch (Exception err) { 
        err.printStackTrace(); 
    } 
    } 
} 
5.5 Full Approach 
The output of both Deviare API and the Kernel rootkit should be combined and 
examined in Tempura. The full approach of the implementation of this research should 
be as follows. Two tools are needed at both kernel and user levels, namely the kernel 
rootkit and Nektra's Deviare API. These two should provide information needed by 
Tempura to provide comprehensive information about a file. Indeed, it is not easy to 
program the low level of a Windows operating system because it is not an open source 
environment. The kernel rootkit should give Tempura the Native API calls alongside 
their information. However, Deviare API will play the role of a rootkit because it can 
provide the Native API information coming from the kernel level after the call is 
accepted. Therefore, the implementation of this research will be as shown in Figure 
5.7. At the user level, Tempura will receive a list of API calls with their inputs and 
process ID and the file which issues this call by means of the Deviare API tool. 
However, the information coming from the Deviare API at the user level will not be 
enough and an unreliable result might be given by Tempura. 
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In order to fill this deficiency, the kernel information has been provided to 
Tempura to make sure that the decision is as reliable as possible. Deviare API will play 
the role of the kernel rootkit and deliver this information to Tempura. This means that 
Tempura will receive the information coming from the user level with that which is 
delivered from the kernel level and provide a final judgement. It often happens that, 
with the large amount of information we have here, interference might occur. 
However, by assigning each call to a unique process these calls will not be mixed even 



















Figure ‎5.7: Full Approach, and Tempura. 
Due to the fact that using both levels to trace API and Native API calls will 
provide a better result to detect computer viruses, user and kernel levels’ information 
is merged. The combination of both levels has shown that the problem, discussed 
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formerly in Chapter 4 which is the lack of detection when only one level is used, can be 
solved. The pseudo code that represents the implementation of Figure 5.5 is shown 
below in Algorithm 5.1. This pseudo code ensures that the one of the API call orders 
which computer viruses normally carry out is met.  
Algorithm ‎5.1: Pseudo code of implementation of Figure 5.1. 
    if Pid = i then  
  
S=0  if S=0 and Call=Cat1   then S≔1 and 
  if S=0 and Call=Cat2   then S≔7 and 
S=1  if S=1 and Call=Cat1   then S≔1 and 
  if S=1 and Call=Cat2  then S≔2  and 
S=2  if S=2 and Call=Cat2   then S≔2 and 
  if S=2 and Call=Cat3   then S≔3  and 
S=3  if S=3 and Call=Cat4  then S≔4 and 
S=4  if S=4 and Call=Cat4   then S≔4  and 
  if S=4 and Call=Cat5  then S≔5 and 
S=3  if S=3 and Call=Cat5  then S≔6 and 
S=6  if S=4 and Call=Cat5   then S≔6  and 
  if S=4 and Call=Cat4  then S≔5 and 
S=5  if S=5    then This file is a virus.] 
 
S=7  if S=7 and Call=Cat2   then S≔7 and 
  if S=7 and Call=Cat1   then S≔8 and 
S=8  if S=8 and Call=Cat1   then S≔8  and 
  if S=8 and Call=Cat3   then S≔9 and  
S=9  if S=9 and Call=Cat4  then S≔10 and 
S=10  if S=10 and Call=Cat4   then S≔10 and 
  if S=10 and Call=Cat5  then S≔11 and 
S=9  if S=9 and Call=Cat5  then S≔12 and 
S=12  if S=10 and Call=Cat5   then S≔12 and 
  if S=10 and Call=Cat4  then S≔11 and 
S=11  if S=11    then This file a virus.]   
It has been shown by some researches [88, 91] that the performance of the 
system might be overloaded when both levels are used. However, practical researches 
[91, 94] show that the performance of the system can be managed if not all API and 
Native API calls are intercepted. In other words, problems associated with the system 
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performance can be avoided by intercepting only the wanted calls at both levels. 
Therefore, Deviare API and the Kernel rootkit should be used to intercept only the 
selected calls in order to avoid the performance problem. 
5.6 Summary 
In summary, the implementation of this approach that requires information from two 
different levels has been explained in this chapter, namely: the user and kernel level. 
Tempura, known as the main tool of this approach, has been used to combine the 
information coming from both levels. However, when only one of the levels is used, 
whether it is the user or the kernel level, it has its own drawbacks and provides 
incomplete knowledge to Tempura. Consequently, merging the two levels by Tempura 
will close the gap. 
Each level has been explained separately and a full explanation of its functions 
and tools, inputs, etc. has been shown. Firstly, at the user level a tool called Nektra's 
Deviare API has been used to serve the needs of Tempura. This tool provides each API 
call with its parameters, process ID, and the file which issues the call. Tempura will 
receive the information from this tool and examine it. Only wanted API calls will be 
intercepted by Deviare API and only interested parameters will be examined by 
Tempura. 
At the kernel level, Deviare API will play the role of the kernel rootkit and has 
been used to provide some information in case a direct call has been issued to the 
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kernel. The role of the kernel rootkit is to intercept some selected Native API calls with 
their inputs and deliver them to Tempura. On the other hand, it has been shown that 
some researches claim that choosing just one level to trace system calls to detect 
computer viruses might lead to the release of some of these viruses making them 
bypass the system. Thus, Tempura will join the information coming from both sides to 
get a better result making sure that there is no direct call to the kernel without 
knowledge of this detection system. 
The performance of the system has been taken into account because previous 
research has shown that overload in the system may occur when both levels have 
been used to trace API and Native API calls. This problem has been addressed in this 
chapter and it has shown by other researches that the problem can be solved by not 
intercepting all the calls at both levels. However, research analysis and experiments 
that used to evaluate of this research, including the performance of the system, will be 
detailed in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6  
Case Studies 
Objectives: 
 Highlight the experiments we conducted to test the prototype 
implementation presented in Chapter 5. 
 Discuss the theory validation of this research and how it can be met. 
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6.1 Introduction 
A number of investigations have been carried out to examine the theory of this 
research. The comprehensive attempt of a number of computer viruses to attach 
themselves to other files has been analysed, as presented in Chapter 4. It has been 
shown that a virus, in order to attach itself to another file will go through five distinct 
steps. Moreover, some steps have their own rules that need to be satisfied in order to 
complete the whole attempt of attachment. 
 A number of 339 virus and normal samples have been examined in this 
research. All the virus samples have been scanned through Kaspersky Antivirus 
software [96] to confirm their names and authenticity. In addition, the usability of the 
system while these samples are being tested will also be considered. Therefore, three 
different factors will be examined in this experiment namely, false positives, false 
negatives and system performance and usability. 
The test for computer viruses was carried out on a virtual machine software 
running Microsoft Windows XP. The test for normal processes was carried out on two 
separate desktops, one of them running Microsoft Windows XP and the other running 
Windows 7. The reason for running these two different Windows Operating Systems 
was to examine the reliability of our prototype on both operating systems. In addition, 
the performance and usability of the system was tested on both operating systems to 
examine how they perform while the samples are tested. 
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6.2 Validation of Research Theory 
To validate the theory of this research the five steps, which were described in the 
previous chapter and which represent the whole attachment of a computer virus to 
another file, need to be tested through different virus classification. More significantly, 
it is essential to show that these five steps with their rules do not occur with normal 
processes. However, these two tests will indicate whether or not the five categories 
can be used to distinguish between normal processes and computer viruses. 
 Several viruses, commonly used applications and operating system processes 
were tested to validate the theory of this research. Both Native and win32 API calls 
with their parameters were analysed and recorded as explained previously. As shown 
in Figure 4.2, several tools were used to extract these system calls. As a result, the five 
steps that a virus carries out to attach itself to a new or existing file will be examined in 
both viruses and benign processes.  
6.2.1 Normal Processes Experiment 
A collection of 50 normal process samples have been tested in this theory validation to 
show that these normal processes have not carried out the same steps of virus 
behaviour which lead to false positives. These processes are listed below in Table 6.1, 
and they were chosen because they are the active processes on Windows operating 
systems. 
Two desktops with two different Microsoft Windows’s operating systems have 
been used to examine these normal processes. Both computers have full access to the 
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Internet with the popular up-to-date desktop and Internet applications. The reason for 
using all these applications when testing the normal processes is also to test the 
usability as a real time monitor and detector. In addition, Antivirus software was 
running on both desktops during testing in order to test the usability of the system if 
both detectors are running. 
The processes that are active when the computer is running have been chosen 
for testing. In addition, the processes that are known by practice and by previous 
research [45] to issue API calls similar to the ones that are issued by computer viruses 
have also been chosen for testing such as, svchost.exe. When testing, more than one 
process can be analysed by this approach’s prototype at the same time. 
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Cipher.exe compact.exe 
6.2.2 Computer Viruses Experiment 
A collection of 289 virus samples has been collected from different malware 
repositories [86, 87]. The collection of viruses has been chosen from various categories 
of computer viruses, namely: Windows 32 Viruses, Peer to Peer Worms, Network 
Worms, Email Worms and Instant Messaging Worms. Therefore, as long as the 
malware attach itself to another file and follows the steps of behaviour which have 
been previously explained then the aim is that it would be detected by our approach.  
There were two experiments carried out for computer viruses, namely, virus 
analysis which was explained earlier in Chapter 4 and virus detection, the results of 
which will be explained in more detail in the next chapter. The former experiment was 
carried out using existing tools to specify the steps of behaviour of computer viruses 
(Figure 4.2). As shown in Table 6.2 and 6.3, these are the 283 virus samples which were 
analysed to validate the theory of attachment, i.e., to examine if these viruses have 
attached themselves to other files. 
Table ‎6.2: Test Viruses for Theory Validation-1. 
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Table ‎6.3: Test Viruses for Theory Validation-2. 
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The other experiment was to show that these steps of virus behaviour can be 
used to detect computer viruses by using the prototype of this research as explained in 
Chapter 5. A number of chosen viruses from those analysed before have been 
observed and tested by the prototype. In addition, a collection of viruses which are 
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unknown to the prototype has also been examined. The unknown ones have been 
chosen to test whether the prototype is able to detect previously unseen viruses which 
is one of the objectives of this research. 
 Despite the fact that the prototype of this research can analyse more than one 
process at the same time, the computer viruses have been tested separately. 
Therefore, the viruses have been tested one by one and this has been done by 
restoring the virtual machine each time a virus is tested. The reason for that is to 
ensure a clean operating system for each virus and not make them interfere with each 
other. The collection of the tested viruses is shown below in Table 6.4. 
Table ‎6.4: Test Viruses for Detection Experiment. 






6.2.3 System Performance and Usability 
In this experiment, two criteria have been tested which are system performance and 
usability. Under normal computer use, two actual computer desktops have been 
observed with the prototype of this research installed on them to carry out these two 
experiments. The two computers have full access to the Internet and have the normal 
popular desktop and Internet applications. There is also Antivirus software installed on 
these two desktops when testing the system performance and usability to observe the 
ability of this research’s prototype to work alongside other virus detections. 
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With the system performance, the speed of the operating system is observed 
while the prototype is running. In spite of the fact that there are several tools to 
observe the performance of the system, Microsoft Windows Operating systems have 
the well-known application, Windows Task Manager, which gives us the ability to 
monitor the system performance [97], as shown subsequently in Figure 6.1 and 6.2. 
Windows Task Manager can measure the CPU and Physical Memory (MB) usage. 
 In addition, Resource Monitor is a part of Windows Task Manager that 
monitors the resources of the system at the same time, such as CPU, memory, disk and 
network. As a result, the performance of the system will be observed using this 
application during the runtime monitoring of this prototype. This experiment is done 
to show how the system operates during the runtime monitoring. 
 
Figure ‎6.1: Resource Monitor. 
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Figure ‎6.2: Windows Task Manager. 
The other experiment is the usability of both computer desktops during the 
runtime monitoring. What is meant by usability here is using the applications of both 
operating systems at the same time as monitoring. In other words, can the applications 
of the operating system be used while the runtime monitoring is running?  
Several desktop applications running on two different Windows operating 
systems (Windows XP and 7), have been observed in this experiment such as, 
Microsoft Word and Microsoft Visio etc. In addition, the usability of applications which 
work with the Internet is also observed. Therefore, both Internet and desktop 
applications have been monitored to test their usability when the prototype of this 
research observes the system processes. Accessing and using Internet and desktop 
applications is significant to the end user because it will not be sufficient to protect the 
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operating system from computer viruses and freezing at the same time, resulting in 
the user not being able to access the applications during the monitoring.  
Therefore, both system performance and usability experiments were carried 
out to test and evaluate the speed response of the system and its ability to use both 
desktop and Internet applications. However, the results of the two experiments will be 
significant in this research due to the fact that the system should be accessible and 
useable by the end user of the OS. 
6.3 Summary 
In this chapter, several experiments have been detailed to show how theory validation 
of this research can be met. Three main experiments were carried out in this research, 
namely: virus detection, normal processes and system performance and usability. Each 
of them were itemised to show how the evaluation and results of this research can be 
accomplished. A total of 339 normal and virus samples were chosen to test the 
prototype of this research. 
 The first experiment was the normal processes experiment. In this experiment 
a collection of 50 normal processes samples were tested to show that the previously 
observed five steps to detect computer viruses will not provide a false positive and 
detect normal processes. Two computer desktops with two different operating 
systems were installed to test these normal processes with the prototype of this 
research. The most executed processes within the two operating systems were chosen 
as well as those similar to computer viruses. 
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 The second experiment was virus analysis and detection. In the virus analysis 
experiment a collection of 283 virus samples were analysed to observe their Win32 
and Native API calls and provide the steps of behaviour that computer viruses do. The 
virus analysis is done by using several tools as explained in Chapter 4. The virus 
detection experiment was done by using the prototype of this research to examine 
selected virus samples from the analysed one. In addition, previously unseen viruses 
by the prototype were also tested to show its ability to detect them. 
 The last experiment was to test both system performance and usability. Two 
computer desktops which have full access to the Internet and have the normal popular 
desktop and Internet applications were used in both experiments. The system 
performance was done to test the speed of the operating system with the CPU and 
physical memory usage while the runtime monitoring is running. The well-known 
Microsoft Application Windows Task Manager is used to test the performance of the 
system. The other experiment was the usability of the Internet and desktop 
applications while the prototype is running. 
The results of these experiments will be explained in detail in the next chapter. 
The next chapter will discuss the research results and evaluation. It will show the 
outcomes of this research including normal and virus samples.  
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Chapter 7  
Results: Analysis and Evaluation 
Objectives: 
 Discuss the results of both virus analysis and the prototype. 
 Evaluate the research that has been explored in this thesis. 
 Provide a discussion of the dataset selection and virus detection. 
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7.1 Introduction 
While Chapters 4 and 5 discussed issues related to the framework and implementation 
of this research and how the components of the architecture connect with each other, 
this chapter examines the overall results including virus detection, normal process 
results and finally the system’s performance and usability. It then evaluates this 
approach based on the research hypotheses and the evaluation criteria: 
 Detecting known and unknown viruses. 
 False positive production. 
 Running with an acceptable system performance.  
 The ability for users to interact with the system while the prototype is running. 
Carrying out the experiments was a long and arduous process. To guarantee a 
clean environment for the following test, analysing and testing a computer virus 
necessitates various re-installations of the host machine. To achieve this, the 
VirtualBox virtual machine (VM) was restored to a clean state each time the analysis 
and testing of a virus was completed. The virus free environment for each virus test 
was required to ensure that the virus would execute normally and not be affected by a 
previous infection of the virtual machine. 
This chapter is organised as follows. The results of the analysis of the computer 
viruses detailed in Section 4.3.2 are discussed in Section 7.2. Section 7.3 then discusses 
the results for this research prototype, including normal processes and the results for 
both known and unknown viruses. Section 7.4 examines whether the system was 
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running with acceptable performance, as well as the ability to use the system’s 
resources while the prototype is running. Next, an evaluation of this research is made 
in Section 7.5, followed by a discussion of the implications in Section 7.6. Finally, in 
Section 7.7, the limitations of the research are discussed and solutions offered. 
7.2  Analysis Results 
It can be argued that the results of the virus analysis may not be significant and that 
they need not be included in the overall results. However, without these results, the 
theoretical aims of this research would not be accomplished. In other words, these 
results are the foundation on which the theory of attaching a computer virus to 
another file or files is based. The results of the analysis of 283 viruses using existing 
tools, as explained in Chapter 4, are shown in Figure 7.1.  
 
Figure ‎7.1: Results of virus analysis. 
91% 
9% 
Virus Analysis Results 
Detected Not Detected
Chapter Seven: Results: Analysis and Evaluation 
161 | P a g e  
 
The results listed above indicate that the majority of the viruses in the various 
classes did indeed attach themselves to other new or old files. However, several 
viruses contradicted the theory of this research by not doing so. That is to say, the 
rules governing these malwares did not follow the five steps on which this research is 
based. Two possible explanations are proposed. The malware may have failed to find a 
suitable environment or victim file to attach itself to [23]. In other words, a virus needs 
help to spread, whether it is the system service of a file or some other type of support; 
if it does not find this assistance, it will not infect the system. Alternatively, the codes 
may not attach themselves to other files at all and therefore cannot be considered 
computer viruses according to the definitions adopted here [1, 16]. This means that 
they can be considered to be some other type of malware but not computer viruses. 
Such malware would not be targeted or detected by the present approach, as clarified 
in Chapter 1. 
7.3 Prototype Results 
This section is divided into two subsections, giving the results of normal processes and 
of virus detection, which together indicate whether the prototype has the ability to 
detect viruses without false negatives and whether it can distinguish between viruses 
and normal processes by not producing false positives. 
7.3.1 Normal Processes  
As explained earlier, the samples tested were 50 normal processes known to be the 
active during the runtime monitoring of the prototype. These were examined at 
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runtime by means of both Deviare API, as explained in Section 5.3.1, and Tempura, as 
detailed in Section 5.3.4. Both API and Native API calls were extracted at runtime and 
delivered to Tempura to examine them. With each process, its process ID, its name, 
the Native or API call issued and parameters associated with some of these calls were 
examined each time a call was issued.  
As mentioned in Chapter 5, the role of Tempura was to examine these 
processes to determine whether they followed the theory of attachment and issued 
calls related to the five categories with their rules. The testing of normal processes 
took approximately five days to complete and the results are shown in Table 7.1. The 
first and third columns list the names of the normal process samples which were 
tested, while the second and fourth columns state whether each process attached 
itself to another file or file. “Yes” would mean that the process did follow the theory 
by attaching itself to another file or files and was therefore detected by the prototype. 
Table ‎7.1: Test Results for Normal Processes. 
Process Name Detected Process Name Detected 
systeminfo.exe No systray.exe No 
alg.exe No clipsrv.exe No 
services.exe No msdtc.exe No 
imapi.exe No lsass.exe No 
cisvc.exe No svchost.exe No 
dmadmin.exe No mqsvc.exe No 
mqtgsvc.exe No dllhost.exe No 
netdde.exe No igfxsrvc.exe No 
firefox.exe No smlogsvc.exe No 
googledrivesync.exe No sessmgr.exe No 
locator.exe No regsvc.exe No 
scardsvr.exe No snmp.exe No 
atsvc.exe No mstask.exe No 
tapisrv.exe No explorer.exe No 
taskmgr.exe No hkcmd.exe No 
msiexec.exe No wmiapsrv.exe No 
taskman.exe No wuauclt.exe No 
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ctfmon.exe No spoolsv.exe No 
winlogon.exe No csrss.exe No 
smss.exe No iexplore.exe No 
winmsd.exe No msseces.exe No 
chrome.exe No tracert.exe No 
tasklist.exe No sort.exe No 
rsvp.exe No ping.exe No 
cipher.exe No compact.exe No 
In fact, the table shows that none of these normal processes attempted to 
attach itself to another file and that none of the issued calls related to all of the five 
categories with their rules. While some of these normal processes did issue calls from 
the five categories, none did so from all of the categories and in the order that a 
computer virus would follow, despite attempts to make the processes demonstrate 
various forms of behaviour by simulating as many typical user interactions with each 
normal process as possible. However, due to the fact that these normal processes 
have access to the Internet, they can be infected from outside. In other words, some 
viruses have the ability to detect running processes and then use them to serve the 
virus needs such as terminate or erase it [23]. Hence, if a virus detects such a process 
it will behave as a benign process and not like virus behaviour, including attachment 
to other files. These viruses will not be detected by our prototype because they do not 
act like viruses. 
Listing 7.1, for example, shows that the svchost.exe process issued Native and 
API calls from certain categories but that it did not do so in any way closely following 
the theory of this research, which would have made it appear to be a computer virus. 
The fact that the test was carried out on all of the normal processes and that none 
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was found to attach itself to another file means that Tempura reported no false 
positives. 
Listing ‎7.1: Snapshot of svchost.exe log file. 
State  18: Call="NtWriteFile"                                     * 
State  18: S=0 
State  18: ProcessName="svchost.exe" 
State  20: Call="NtClose" 
State  20: S=0 
State  20: ProcessName="svchost.exe" 
State  22: Call="GetFileType"                                     * 
State  22: S=0 
State  22: ProcessName="svchost.exe" 
State  22:  PID:1356 issued a call in cat2  
State  24: Call="NtReadFile" 
State  24: S=7 
State  24: ProcessName="svchost.exe" 
State  26: Call="NtReadFile" 
State  26: S=0 
State  26: ProcessName="svchost.exe" 
The snapshot above for the svchost.exe log file indicates that this normal 
process issued calls belonging to at different categories. For example, in state 18, it 
issued a Native API call "NtWriteFile" belonging to category four (Write and/or 
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Delete), but this is not significant, because in previous states it did not issue calls from 
categories one to three. However, in state 22, the process issued an API call 
"GetFileType" belonging to category two, which looked promising and might concern 
Tempura. In this case, Tempura will have waited to for further calls to see whether the 
five categories were completed. It can be seen that the process did not subsequently 
issue calls in the order normally followed by a virus when attaching itself to other files, 
so Tempura will have returned to the beginning to search for calls from the five 
categories in the order typical of a virus. 
Given that none of these processes attempted to attach itself to another file, 
the five categories derived from an analysis of viruses can be used to distinguish 
between normal and viral processes. In addition, the rules associated with each 
category have proved to be significant in differentiating benign from viral processes. 
For example, it is apparent from Listing 7.1 that processes sometimes issue Native and 
API calls from different categories, but that they do not follow the order which 
computer viruses do to spread through the operating system. In addition, while 
processes may sometimes follow this order, they appear not to read themselves, 
which viruses do, as explained in Section 4.3.2.  
To clarify the idea, Listing 7.2 shows a snapshot from another process, 
services.exe, which issued Native API calls from categories 2, 1 and 3 in states 760, 766 
and 770 respectively. The order of these calls exactly resembles those that would be 
made by a virus, but when the open file was received, Tempura examined the 
parameters and found that the opened file was not the same as the process which 
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issued the call. Therefore, Tempura decided that this process was not viral and started 
searching again, as shown in state 772. 
Listing ‎7.2: Snapshot of services.exe log file. 
State 760: Call="GetLongPathNameW"                                     * 
State 760: S=0 
State 760: ProcessName="services.exe" 
State 760:  PID:928 issued a call in cat2  
State 760: Call="GetLongPathNameW" 
State 760: S=1 
State 760: ProcessName="services.exe" 
State 766: Call="FindFirstFileW"                                               * 
State 766: S=7 
State 766: ProcessName="services.exe" 
State 766:  PID:928 issued a call in cat1  
State 766: Call="FindFirstFileW" 
State 766: S=1 
State 766: ProcessName="services.exe" 
State 770: Call="NtOpenFile" 
State 770: S=8 
State 770: ProcessName="services.exe" 
State 770: Call="NtOpenFile" 
State 770: S=1 
State 770: ProcessName="services.exe" 
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State 772: Call="NtQueryDirectoryFile"                                     * 
State 772: S=0 
State 772: ProcessName="services.exe" 
State 772: Call="NtQueryDirectoryFile" 
State 772: S=1 
State 772: ProcessName="services.exe" 
The test results show that none of the 50 normal process samples followed the 
five steps with the rules associated with these categories. Therefore, it can be said 
that the theory implemented in this research by Tempura has successfully 
distinguished between viral and non-viral processes to the extent that no false 
positives were returned. The following subsection assesses whether or not the 
prototype successfully detected both known and unknown viruses. 
7.3.2 Computer Viruses  
As mentioned earlier, each virus was tested separately by the prototype in order to 
ensure that the results were as clear as possible. In addition, before each virus was 
examined, the virtual machine was reset to a virus free state that had no virus except 
the one to be tested, to guarantee that there was no superimposition of one virus on 
another. Table 7.2 shows the viruses which were tested by the prototype to examine 
whether Tempura had the ability to detect an attempt at attachment. The known 
viruses were chosen from a list of 283 viruses, while the anonymous ones were 
selected from the virus repositories described in Chapter 6. 
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Table ‎7.2: Prototype Virus Test Results. 
Malware name Detected Malware name Detected 
Malware.Win32/Klez Yes Malware.Win32/Watcher Yes 
Malware.Win32/Zori Yes Malware.Win32/Rega Yes 
Malware.Win32/Borzella No Malware.Win32/Weakas Yes 
Malware.Win32/Eliles Yes Malware.Win32/Eyeveg Yes 
Malware.Win32/Feebs No Malware.Win32/Qizy Yes 
Table 7.2 shows that several viruses attempted to attach themselves to new or 
existing files and were thus recognised by the prototype. It also shows that the 
prototype was able to detect both known and unknown computer viruses. Two viruses 
do appear to have escaped or bypassed the prototype, resulting in false negatives. It is 
difficult to be certain that these results really were false negatives, however, for the 
following reasons. First, an undetected virus might not find the proper file that it 
needed to attach itself to. This justification can be accepted for both known and 
unknown viruses. A second explanation is that the malware in question might not be 
considered a virus at all, because it was not intended to attach itself to other files and 
was therefore of a type which the prototype was not designed to detect. This 
justification can be accepted only in the case of viruses unknown to the prototype. 
The final factor to consider here is that a computer virus can behave unexpectedly. 
For example, it may define its own API calls; that is to say, it may be able to construct 
its own modified kernel API driver, or it may detect that it runs in a VM and remains 
“idle”. Again, the prototype was not built to deal with such viruses. 
The following snapshots, in Listings 7.3 and 7.4, describe how the “Rega.exe” 
virus can be detected by the prototype. The first snapshot shows how Tempura will 
read the Native and API calls issued by this virus from Deviare API, while the second 
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shows how the final result can be achieved when the virus attempts to attach itself to 
another file and follows the five steps with their rules as described in Chapter 4. 
Listing ‎7.3: Snapshot of Rega.exe Assertion. 
!PROG: assert Name:Rega.exe:Id:3512:Call:GetFileAttributesW:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Rega.exe:Id:3512:Call:NtQueryAttributesFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Rega.exe:Id:3512:Call:NtQueryAttributesFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Rega.exe:Id:3512:Call:NtQueryAttributesFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Rega.exe:Id:3512:Call:FindClose:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Rega.exe:Id:3512:Call:FindFirstFileNameW:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Rega.exe:Id:3512:Call:NtQueryDirectoryFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Rega.exe:Id:3512:Call:NtQueryDirectoryFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Rega.exe:Id:3512:Call:NtReadFile:Inputs:Rega.exe:! 
!PROG: assert Name:Rega.exe:Id:3512:Call:SetFileAttributesW:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Rega.exe:Id:3512:Call:NtSetInformationFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Rega.exe:Id:3512:Call:WriteFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Rega.exe:Id:3512:Call:NtWriteFile:Inputs::! 
In Listing 7.4, it can be seen that “Rega.exe” issued calls from the first three 
categories as shown in states 77, 81 and 84; therefore this PE file is considered to be a 
candidate virus. In states 85 and 87 the virus issues calls from the last two categories 
by setting the file attributes and then writing itself to the new file. As described in 
Chapter 5, when a file follows the five steps with their rules and the S variable reaches 
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5 or 11, then it can be considered to be a virus. Hence, the prototype identified 
“Rega.exe” as a virus, because S=11, as shown in state 88. 
Listing ‎7.4: Snapshot of Rega.exe log file (after detection). 
State  77: i=77 
State  77: Call="GetFileAttributesW" 
State  77: S=0 
State  77: ProcessName="Rega.exe" 
State  77:  PID:3512 issued a call in cat2                                     * 
State  81: i=81 
State  81: Call="FindClose" 
State  81: S=7 
State  81: ProcessName="Rega.exe" 
State  81:  PID:3512 issued a call in cat1                                     * 
State  84: i=84 
State  84: Call="NtReadFile" 
State  84: S=8 
State  84: ProcessName="Rega.exe" 
State  84:  The file ( (Rega.exe) ) issued calls in the previous two categories  
State  84:  And a call issued in cat3                                              * 
State  84: _____Then_______(it’s a candidate virus)__________  
State  85: i=85 
State  85: Call="SetFileAttributesW" 
State  85: S=9 
Chapter Seven: Results: Analysis and Evaluation 
171 | P a g e  
 
State  85: ProcessName="Rega.exe" 
State  85:  A call issued in cat5                                                     * 
State  87: Call="WriteFile" 
State  87: S=12 
State  87: ProcessName="Rega.exe" 
State  87:  And a call issued in cat4                                             * 
State  88: i=88 
State  88: Call="NtWriteFile" 
State  88: S=11 
State  88: ProcessName="Rega.exe" 
State  88:  The file ( (Rega.exe) ) is a COMPUTER VIRUS        * 
 “Watcher.exe” is another example of how the prototype can detect viruses, as 
shown in Listing 7.5. Tempura reads the Native and API calls in the same way as 
“Rega.exe” in Listing 7.3. Here, it can be observed that S=5, which indicates that the 
PE file has issued calls related to all five steps and satisfies their rules, as shown in 
states 3, 5, 10, 12 and 13. Thus, the file has followed the theory of attachment and can 
be considered a virus, as shown in state 14. 
Listing ‎7.5: Snapshot of Watcher.exe log file (after detection). 
State   3: Call="NtQueryDirectoryFile" 
State   3: S=0 
State   3: ProcessName="Watcher.exe" 
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State   3:  PID:2800 issued a call in cat1                                       * 
State   5: i=5 
State   5: Call="GetBinaryTypeW" 
State   5: S=1 
State   5: ProcessName="Watcher.exe" 
State   5:  PID:2800 issued a call in cat2                                       * 
State  10: i=10 
State  10: Call="NtOpenFile" 
State  10: S=2 
State  10: ProcessName="Watcher.exe" 
State  10:  The file ( (Watcher.exe) ) issued calls in the previous two categories  
State  10:  And a call issued in cat3                                                * 
State  10: _____Then_______(it's a candidate virus)__________  
State  12: i=12 
State  12: Call="NtSetInformationFile" 
State  12: S=3 
State  12: ProcessName="Watcher.exe" 
State  12:  A call issued in cat5                                                        * 
State  13: i=13 
State  13: Call="WriteFileEx" 
State  13: S=6 
State  13: ProcessName="Watcher.exe" 
State  13:  And a call issued in cat4                                                 * 
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State  14: i=14 
State  14: Call="NtWriteFile" 
State  14: S=5 
State  14: ProcessName="Watcher.exe" 
State  14:  The file ( (Watcher.exe) ) is a COMPUTER VIRUS        * 
Other viruses tested by the prototype were also detected in the same way as 
“Rega.exe” and “Watcher.exe” as shown in Appendix A, while those viruses which 
remained undetected were not recognised by the prototype because they did not 
issue calls related to the five categories. 
7.4  System Performance and Usability 
The performance and usability of the system is assessed by testing the normal 
processes on two desktops, running the Microsoft Windows XP and 7 operating 
systems respectively. The two desktops were run as if by a normal user running some 
everyday programs. Figures 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 show that the performance of both 
desktops was normal under varied levels of CPU and memory usage. The very slow 
operation of the prototype caused a high consumption of system resources and there 
were some occasions when the computer had to be rebooted. There was an 
observation about which part of our prototype did cause the performance overhead. 
It was observed that when several tests are carried out, the system performance gets 
slower and slower. Therefore, the computer had to be rebooted after a number of 
tests were completed in order to run with a better performance. However, this is 
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acceptable, because the Window system can run with a very slow performance under 
normal conditions. 
 
Figure ‎7.2: Windows 7 Resource Monitor. 
 
Figure ‎7.3: Windows 7 Task Manager. 
Chapter Seven: Results: Analysis and Evaluation 
175 | P a g e  
 
Figure 7.4 shows the performance of the system on Windows XP while the 
prototype was running. It shows that the CPU usage was 41%, which is acceptable, 
whereas if it were to reach 100% the operating system would become very busy and 
freeze. However, the performance of Windows XP was poorer than that of Windows 
7, which can be attributed to the fact that the desktop running Windows 7 was a 
newer model with a better specification; for example, it had a newer processor. 
 
Figure ‎7.4: Windows XP Task Manager. 
The system resources and programs were available to the end-user during the 
runtime of the prototype. The user was able to use different desktop and Internet 
applications. A solution to the problem of slow running and the need to reboot will be 
discussed further at the end of the evaluation section. 
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7.5  Evaluation 
To evaluate the proposed research, a set of experiments were performed on real-
world viruses and benign executable processes. These experiments were outlined in 
Chapter 6 and their results explained in detail in the present chapter. The evaluation 
of this approach is based on these results with regard to the research hypotheses set 
out in Chapter 1 and is divided into two parts. The first question is whether or not our 
prototype consumed a large amount of memory, thus reducing system performance, 
while the second and more significant one is whether the prototype successfully 
detected known and unknown viruses. 
7.5.1 Performance and Memory Usage 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the number of virus signatures and the ever growing 
number of computer viruses mean that the storage of signatures required by 
traditional antivirus software will require increasing memory capacity in the near 
future. Searching through a signature database for matching viruses is time consuming 
for the end-user, who is sometimes unable to use the system and internet 
applications. Therefore, users require light and robust virus detection which uses little 
system memory, so that the user is able to continue using the system while searching 
for viruses. 
The amount of memory required for our detection prototype, including the 
installation of all the tools needed, namely Deviare API and its code, AnaTempura, 
Tempura and the Java pipe, is approximately 6 MB. By comparison, an antivirus 
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application such as MacAfee [98] requires at least 500 MB free drive space to run on 
Microsoft Windows, while Kaspersky Antivirus requires at least 352 MB just to store 
the virus signature database, as noted in Section 1.2. Kaspersky reports that it needs 
approximately 480 MB free space on the hard drive (depending on the size of the 
antivirus database). This means that the space needed will grow whenever the 
program is updated and newly identified signatures need to be stored in the database. 
 
Figure ‎7.5: Hard drive space needed by our current prototype and other AVs (MB). 
Figure 7.5 represents graphically the apparent strong superiority of our 
prototype over these two commercial antivirus products in terms of hard drive space 
required. It can be argued, however, that the number of signatures stored in the 
databases of such products is much greater than the number of viruses tested in this 
research. In response, a simple calculation can be done to ensure that the comparison 
is unbiased and valid. According to Yuan [99], there are thousands of API calls in 
Microsoft Windows. Therefore, it can be assumed that the maximum number of both 
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then be divided by the number of API calls used in our prototype which was 68. The 
result of this division is approximately 1471, which should then be multiplied by the 
two kilobytes needed to store the 68 API calls representing the virus behaviours, 
making approximately 3 MB. When this figure is added to the 6 MB required for 
installing all the tools with our prototype, it appears that a total of approximately 9 
MB free space is needed on the hard drive to store our whole prototype in a Windows 
operating system, as shown in Figure 7.6. 
 
Figure ‎7.6: Comparison of prototype with other AVs after calculation (MB). 
This 9 MB space is needed only if it is assumed that all the API calls will be used 
as virus behaviours. This and previous research have reported [45] that the 
functionality of some computer viruses is normally the same. As a result, there will be 
groups of computer viruses which have the same steps of behaviour and this means 
that the 9 MB space might be minimised. Consequently, it can be said that our 
prototype will use less space than traditional antivirus products even if all the API calls 
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prototype indicates that the first null hypothesis set out in Section 1.4 is rejected and 
thus the first alternative hypothesis H1 is accepted. 
H1: Computer viruses can be detected by their behaviours without consuming large 
hard drive space. 
The other factors which are considered significant to the end-user are system 
performance and usability. An experiment to measure these was conducted on an 
Intel(R) Core™ i3 CPU M 350 @2.27GHz, running 64-bit Windows 7. To evaluate 
performance and usability, our prototype was compared with the Microsoft Security 
Essentials Antivirus software [100]. 
The full scan took approximately 12 hours to complete, which may be 
considered a long time, due to poor system performance and usability, which will be 
detailed in the following sentences. During the full scan of Microsoft Security 
Essentials Antivirus the system’s CPU and memory usage were monitored, as shown in 
Figure 7.7. In addition, the system’s disk and network utilisation were observed using 
Resource Monitor, as shown in Figure 7.8. The CPU and memory usage varied, but it 
can be seen that they reached 60% and sometimes 90%. More than one factor 
affected CPU and memory usage, but the full scan played a major role in keeping the 
system busy for several reasons, one of which was the large signature database. 
Figure 7.8 shows that the network utilisation was normal but that disk activity 
was at its highest, reaching 100%. Monitoring all these system services demonstrates 
that during a full scan by an antivirus program, the system may be at its most active 
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and busiest. It can be said that while several factors influence system activity, a full 
antivirus scan represents one of the strongest influences. 
 
Figure ‎7.7: Windows Task Manager during Full Scan. 
After comparing the Microsoft Security Essentials Antivirus software with our 
prototype in terms of system performance and usability, as discussed in Section 7.4, it 
can be said that there are similarities between them and that our prototype has the 
slight advantage that it can be developed to enhance system performance and 
usability. The enhancement of our prototype would require a better design of the 
system, which is believed to be realisable. 
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Figure ‎7.8: Resource monitor during full scan. 
7.5.2 Detecting Known and Unknown Viruses 
This section discusses the testing of the second null hypothesis explained in Section 
1.4, to determine whether or not our prototype has successfully detected both known 
and unknown viruses. As noted above, signature-based antivirus software detects only 
previously seen viruses, because in order to have a virus signature in the database, the 
virus first needs to be analysed. Therefore, traditional antivirus software fails to detect 
unknown or formerly unseen viruses, leaving systems vulnerable to such viruses. By 
contrast, despite a number of false negatives among the results reported in Section 
7.3.2, our prototype has been shown to have the ability to detect both known and 
unknown viruses. 
Thus, while existing antivirus software succeeds in protecting operating 
systems from known computer viruses, it fails to deal with novel ones, making it likely 
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to produce a number of false negatives at any time, given the tens of thousands of 
new viruses which are said to appear every day and which will not be detected 
because they are unknown to the antivirus products. By contrast, our prototype has 
the proven ability to detect not only known viruses but also unknown ones, as long as 
they behave the same as previously analysed ones, giving it an advantage over 
traditional signature-based virus detection. In other words, some false negatives are 
produced by both our detection technique and traditional antivirus software, but the 
latter fails totally to detect previously unseen viruses, while our approach can detect 
them. 
The second null hypothesis is: 
H2: The number of false positives and false negatives when detecting known and 
unknown computer viruses by their behaviours using AnaTempura is the same as or 
lower than the number when detecting known and unknown computer viruses by 
their signatures. 
As our prototype has been found to be successful in detecting both previously 
seen and unseen viruses, while traditional antivirus products fail in the latter case, the 
second null hypothesis can be rejected. Therefore, the second alternative hypothesis 
is supported, because it can be said that the number of false positives and negatives 
when detecting known and unknown computer viruses by their behaviours using our 
approach is the same as or lower than the number when detecting known and 
unknown computer viruses by their signatures. 
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7.6  Discussion 
7.6.1 Dataset Selection 
A collection of 289 virus samples, and 50 normal processes that are running in 
Windows (XP) and Windows 7, were analysed and tested in this research. Because our 
approach targets Windows 32-bit computer viruses, those analysed and tested were 
selected from the Win32 category and from the two repositories explained in Chapter 
6. The purpose of these repositories, as their websites suggest, is to provide a 
collection of computer malwares in order to analyse them and protect operating 
systems from them. Therefore, the classification of these viruses is not very significant 
or accurate. In other words, a piece of malware may be wrongly categorised as a virus 
when it is in fact some other type of malware. Thus, some of the malware analysed 
here may not have been computer viruses and this supports our second justification of 
apparent false negatives returned by our prototype, as explained in Section 7.3.2. 
However, to ensure that the sample size reflects the total number of the 
population (computer viruses), a little calculation is needed [101]. A number of values 
are needed to complete the sample size equation: 
 The population Size 
 In this research, the population size is the number of computer viruses. However, 
it is not possible to count the exact number of computer viruses. According to 
Smith [101], It is common for the population size to be unknown or approximated. 
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 Confidence Interval 
 The confidence interval or margin of error is needed because it is believed that no 
sample will be perfect. Therefore, how much error to allow is needed. 
 Confidence Level 
The confidence level determines how the actual mean falls within the chosen 
confidence interval. The most common confidence intervals are 90% confident, 
95% confident, and 99% confident. 
 Standard Deviation 
The standard deviation means how much variance is allowed. Normally, the safe 
decision is to use (0.5). 
The confidence level corresponds to a Z-score which is a constant value needed for the 
sample size equation. The most common confidence levels of Z-score are as follows: 
 90% – Z Score = 1.645 
 95% – Z Score = 1.96 
 99% – Z Score = 2.326 
Next, Z-score, standard deviation, and confidence interval are needed to complete the 
following equation: 
Equation ‎7.1: Sample Size Equation. 
Necessary Sample Size = ((Z-score)² * ( StdDev * (1-StdDev))) / (margin of error)² 
The above equation is for an unknown population size or a very large 
population size [101]. Furthermore, we chose a 90% confidence level, .5 standard 
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deviation, and a margin of error (confidence interval) of +/- 5%, to be the values 
needed to complete the sample size equation. Therefore, the following calculation can 
be deduced: 
((1.645)² x (.5(.5))) / (.05)² 
(2.607025 x .25) / .0025 
.67650625 / .0025 
270.60 
At least 271 virus samples are needed. 
This means that the sample size needed in this research is 271 samples. 
However, a collection of 289 virus samples, and 50 normal processes were analysed 
and tested in this research. 
7.6.2 Virus Detection 
After examining the results of all the samples analysed and tested, two conclusions can 
be drawn about the theory of attaching a copy of a virus to another file or files. First, 
as no false positives occurred when the benign processes were tested, it can be said 
that the theory of attachment is unique to computer viruses and not to normal 
processes. It can be concluded that the theory of attachment is a characteristic that 
distinguishes between computer viruses and normal processes. The second conclusion 
is that while the performance and usability of the operating system may be reduced 
while the runtime detection is running, this is not an insurmountable obstacle, because 
our behaviour-based virus detection can be improved to enhance performance and 
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usability in order to meet the need of end-users to browse the system easily while 
detection occurs on the fly. 
In respect of the false negatives produced by both the analysed and tested 
viruses, three observations can be made, each having its own unique solution. First, if 
a candidate virus does not attach itself to another file, it can be considered to be some 
type of malware other than a virus, as the definition of a virus suggests. Secondly, a 
computer virus may be expected to do anything; for example, it may build its own 
kernel API driver and may issue other types of API and Native API calls, helping it to 
attach itself to other files and thus avoid detection. This would require a better 
understanding of the low level of the Windows operating system and better 
programming techniques, which are believed to be accomplishable. The third 
observation is that these viruses may attach themselves to other files, but our 
prototype lacks some of the functionality and is not implementable. The best solution 
to this problem is to complement our approach with other known approaches. It is 
assumed that the level of true positives will be sustained or increased by the 
combination, while the number of false negatives will be reduced.  
7.7  Limitations 
There are two main limitations to the proposed work, concerning other types of 
malware and the kernel level. 
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7.7.1 The Kernel Level 
The first limitation stems from the characteristics of the kernel level of Microsoft 
operating systems. It is not easy to program this low level because it is not an open 
source environment. The rootkit explained in Chapter 5 should give Tempura the 
Native API calls alongside their information. However, Deviare API can play the role of 
a rootkit because it can provide the Native API information coming from the kernel 
level after the call is accepted.  On the other hand, Deviare API will not be as accurate 
as the rootkit because the latter will be at the kernel level and no single Native API can 
avoid it. This problem amounts to a limitation because it may lead to false negatives. 
7.7.2 The Moment of Detection 
The second limitation stems from the moment of detection. It can be deduced that our 
prototype can only detect computer viruses after the file is infected. In other words, 
after it writes itself to another file. Therefore, two or more files need to be terminated 
and deleted namely, the original file and the infected ones. Instead, it is better to 
detect the original virus and deletes it before infecting another file or files. This 
problem is considered to be a limitation because it may lead to infect the system while 
the termination is done. This means that, the virus might infect another file before it is 
terminated. 
7.7.3 Solutions  
These two limitations should be addressed in future work, as detailed in the next 
chapter. As to the first limitation, addressing it will require a very deep knowledge of 
Chapter Seven: Results: Analysis and Evaluation 
188 | P a g e  
 
the low level programming of Microsoft operating systems, which can be accomplished 
with the help of low level tools that are being developed to improve the understanding 
of restricted operating systems. The second limitation can be done by looking ahead 
for API calls, i.e., it will require a very deep knowledge of API calls and how they can be 
predicted. However, Tempura has the ability and can be programmed to read the API 
call in advance. Therefore, the virus can be terminated before it completes the 
comprehensive attempt of attachment. 
7.8  Summary  
This chapter has discussed in detail the results of the present research concerning both 
analysed viruses and those tested by our prototype, as well as the benign processes 
tested by our prototype. These results show that our approach gave no false positives 
when the normal processes were tested, but that there were a number of false 
negatives in the case of both analysed and tested viruses. The reasons for these false 
negatives were discussed in detail.  
The prototype was evaluated and compared with existing antivirus products in 
terms of system performance and usability and of the accurate detection of both 
known and unknown viruses. The comparison results were discussed in the evaluation 
section, as was dataset selection. Finally the limitations of the current work were 
examined and solutions suggested. 
These suggestions represent recommendations for future work to study how to 
analyse more examples of computer malware and combine their behaviours with 
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those of the viruses presented in this research. It is anticipated that the combination 
would be able to detect both malware programs attaching themselves to files in local 
operating system and those which spread across networks. The other proposed line of 
future work would be to gain a deep knowledge of low level programming to provide 
accurate information at the kernel level. 
The next chapter will present the overall conclusions of this research before 
discussing in detail the future proposed to solve the limitations identified here. 
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Chapter 8  
Conclusion and Future Work 
Objectives: 
 Provide a summary of this research. 
 Highlight the original contributions to knowledge. 
 Revisit the success criteria of this research. 
 Highlight the limitations of this research and present the potential 
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8.1 Thesis Summary 
In this thesis, a general framework that enables specifying, implementing, and 
validating a behaviour-based virus detection system is developed. Furthermore, from 
this framework, two architectures emerge, one for the virus analysis that assists in 
identifying what sort of actions normal and viral programs carry out and how to 
distinguish between them. API calls, which are used to represent the behaviour of a 
virus, are extracted using existing tools. In addition, from the analysis architecture, the 
following five categories with their rules represent virus steps in a behaviour: 
 Find to infect 
 Get information 
 Read and/or copy 
 Write and/or delete 
 Set information. 
The other architecture is the detection one that illustrates how computer 
viruses can be monitored and detected. Moreover, a parallel execution tool is provided 
in order to run user and kernel level detection at the same time. 
A run-time prototype that simultaneously receives Win32 and Native API calls 
from both user and kernel levels is developed. Nektra's Deviare API is used to intercept 
Win32 API calls and deliver them to Tempura at the user level. On the other hand, a 
‘good’ rootkit is also utilised to intercept Native API calls at the kernel levels and 
transfer them to Tempura. A Java pipe is built to send the information of both calls to 
Tempura. Finally, Tempura has the ability to provide a final result about a collection of 
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normal and viral processes based on the five categories with their rules which were 
previously observed. 
A collection of 283 viruses is used in the computer virus analysis part of this 
research. However, there are a number of false negatives that do not follow the theory 
of attachment that computer viruses normally carry out. In addition, a number of 
justifications are provided to vindicate why these false negatives are produced. On the 
other hand, the prototype’s results show that there are no false positives produced by 
any of the 50 normal processes that are tested by the prototype. In addition, more 
computer viruses (known and unknown) are tested by the prototype and it has been 
shown that the prototype in this study has the ability to detect both known and 
unknown viruses despite the false negative production by some viruses. 
An attempt to find a unique characteristic that exists in all computer viruses has 
been addressed in this research. This characteristic should be able to detect both 
known and unknown viruses that belong to various categories of computer viruses. 
Both signature and behaviour-based virus detections are two on-going research areas 
which have their own problems that require more consideration. In this research,  
behaviour-based virus detection is based on the theory of a virus attaching itself to 
another computer file, or files, that is believed to be unique to computer viruses as 
their definition suggests (see Section 2.3) and not prevalently produced by normal 
processes. This characteristic was initially formalised using ITL and then programmed 
with Tempura in order for it to be implemented. As a result, the approach detects any 
attempt of a process to attach itself to another file or files. 
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8.2 Contributions 
This thesis develops a framework that uses a behaviour-based virus detection system 
that aims to detect both known and unknown viruses. The contribution of the thesis is 
as follows: 
 A general framework for behaviour-based virus detection system, as shown 
in Chapter 4. 
 One architecture for virus analysis that extracts Win32 and Native API calls 
of both normal and viral processes in order to understand virus behaviours, 
as shown in Chapter 4. 
 Second architecture for virus detection that uses these calls from both user 
and kernel levels in order to provide a better detection system and minimise 
the rates of false negatives and false positives (see Chapter 5). 
 A parallel runtime implementation which has the ability to be plugged-in 
with two tools, namely Nektra's Deviare API (user level), and the kernel 
rootkit (kernel level), as discussed in Chapter 4. 
 Five categories that represent a unique characteristic (the theory of 
attachment) which leads to detecting both known and unknown viruses that 
belong to various categories of computer viruses, as present in Chapter 4. 
 Four different orders of API calls that a virus normally carries out in order to 
attach itself to another file (see Chapter 4 and 5). 
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 A prototype for virus detection that is able to examine more than one 
process at a time at both levels. This prototype was discussed in Chapter 5. 
8.3 Success Criteria Revisited 
The success criteria, which have been formulated in order to measure the success of 
this research, are provided in Chapter 1. These success criteria are revisited in this 
section in order examine whether they have been met. 
 Detecting known and unknown viruses. 
This is one of the most significant criterion in this research. This criterion will measure 
the success of the proposed approach. Due to the fact that one of the reasons why 
behaviour-based virus detection techniques were introduced is to detect unknown 
viruses, the approach in this research needs to do this. The prototype’s results detailed 
in the previous chapter (see Chapter 7) demonstrate that our prototype is able to 
detect both known and unknown viruses. This conclusion is drawn due to the 10 
specimens (including known and anonymous viruses) examined by the prototype in 
this study in Section 7.3.2. However, there were a number of false negatives in the 
case of both analysed and tested viruses. The reasons for these false negatives were 
discussed in detail in Chapter 7. 
 False positive production. 
Section 7.3.1 provides the results for the 50 benign processes which were 
tested by our prototype. As illustrated in Table 7.1, none of these normal 
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processes attempts to attach itself to another file or files. As a result, it can 
be said that no false positives were produced by our prototype. This result 
can lead to a conclusion in which the characteristic of attachment is unique 
to computer viruses and can be used to distinguish between viral and 
normal processes. 
 Running with an acceptable system performance.  
In this research, a system monitor application called Windows Task Manager 
is used to measure the performance of the two Windows operating systems 
(Windows XP and 7) which are used for the analysis and testing of sample 
processes. As demonstrated in Section 7.4, the two operating systems show 
a normal performance in which the CPU and memory usage were not too 
busy, despite the few occasions where the computer had to be rebooted. 
This is considered to be acceptable, since an operating system can run with a 
very slow performance under normal conditions 
 The ability for users to interact with the operating system while the 
prototype is running. 
The final criterion is considered to be significant due to the fact that the end-
user needs to enjoy utilising the system without difficulty during the runtime 
of the prototype. Furthermore, it has been argued in Chapter 7 that users 
require light and robust virus detection which uses little system memory, so 
that the user is able to continue using the system while searching for viruses. 
As demonstrated in Section 7.4, the system resources and programs were 
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available to the end-user during the runtime of the prototype. Moreover, 
despite some difficulties such as, the problem of slow running and 
sometimes the need to reboot the system, different desktop and Internet 
applications can be used by the end-user during the runtime detection. 
8.4 Limitations 
The following points are the limitations of the proposed research. Most of the 
limitations are, in fact, practical limitations that refer to the implementation of this 
research or the nature of computer viruses. 
 It has been demonstrated that the programming of the Windows kernel 
level is a very hard task which requires very extensive knowledge of the low 
level programming of Microsoft operating systems. Therefore, the Deviare 
API tool plays the role of the kernel rootkit (discussed in Chapter 5) in which 
Deviare API can intercept the Native API calls coming from the kernel. This is 
considered to be a limitation due to the fact that the rootkit is at the kernel 
level and no single Native API can avoid it, however, Deviare API might be 
avoided. 
 It has been shown that the theory of attachment is unique to computer 
viruses. On the other hand, the moment of detecting the attempt of a 
computer virus to attach itself to a file should be before the attempt is 
carried out. In addition, the prototype detection of this research can only 
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detect a computer virus after it writes itself to another file. Therefore, this 
late detection is considered to be one of the limitations of the research. 
8.5 Future Work 
The literature review in this thesis demonstrates that the area of computer virus 
detection is a challenging area due to the fact that it is a never-ending fight between 
attackers and defenders. Behaviour-based virus detection techniques are especially 
interesting because they overcome the problems associated with traditional signature-
based detection. As suggested by [1, 9], the nature of computer viruses leads virus 
researchers to seek alternative solutions. Therefore, future research for any virus 
detection approach is needed in order to enhance it.   
Furthermore, the following points are some proposals for future research: 
 Analysing other types of computer malware to examine how they act within 
the operating system and networks. This task is likely to require a research 
team to solve it as it requires much analysis of many types of malware to 
determine their behaviour. 
 A deep knowledge of the low level programming of Microsoft operating 
systems that would help us to build the rootkit and develop it to be a part of 
the OS as a device driver.  This rootkit should have the ability to provide 
Native API calls at the kernel level, thus resulting in our system being more 
reliable. 
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 A deep knowledge of API calls and how they can be intercepted in advance. 
This task will give our approach the ability to detect the attempt of 
attachment before the target file is infected. 
 As explained in Chapter 2, the problems associated with the heuristic-based 
virus detection can be solved by using the behaviour-based virus detection. 
Therefore, one the future research will be to investigate the use of our 
research findings to solve these problems. 
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1. Analysis result 
The results of the analysis of 283 viruses using existing tools, as explained in Chapter 4, 
are shown in Tables A.1 and A.2. The names of the viruses analysed are listed in the 
first and third columns, while the second and fourth columns list the results of testing 
the theory of attachment (five steps for a virus to attach itself to another file). These 
results indicate whether or not each virus attempted to attach itself by following the 
five categories. Thus, “Yes” means that the virus or malware issued Native or API calls 
related to the five categories with their rules, while “No” means that it did not. 
Table A.1: Results of virus analysis-1. 
Process Name Attachment Process Name Attachment 
Malware.Win32/Alcra Yes Malware.Win32/Bropia Yes 
Malware.Win32/Allaple Yes Malware.Win32/BugBear Yes 
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Malware.Win32/Areses Yes Malware.Win32/Chir Yes 
Malware.Win32/Bagle Yes Malware.Win32/Cabanas No 
Malware.Win32/Evaman Yes Malware.Win32/Mugly Yes 
Malware.Win32/Gibe Yes Malware.Win32/Poebot Yes 
Malware.Win32/Tutiam Yes Malware.Win32/VB.CA Yes 
Malware.Win32/Rbot No Malware.Win32/Mytob Yes 
Malware.Win32/Rontokbro Yes Malware.Win32/Sober Yes 
Malware.Win32/Locksky Yes Malware.Win32/Elkern No 
Malware.Win32/Korgo Yes Malware.Win32/Flopcopy Yes 
Malware.Win32/Zafi Yes Malware.Win32/Vanbot Yes 
Malware.Win32/Vote No Malware.Win32/Stration Yes 
Malware.Win32/Sobig Yes Malware.Win32/Sohanad Yes 
Malware.Win32/Ska Yes Malware.Win32/Skudex Yes 
Malware.Win32/Redesi Yes Malware.Win32/Paukor Yes 
Malware.Win32/Neveg Yes Malware.Win32/Netsky Yes 
Malware.Win32/Myparty Yes Malware.Win32/Moonlight Yes 
Malware.Win32/Minusi Yes Malware.Win32/Mapson Yes 
Malware.Win32/Lovgate Yes Malware.Win32/Looked Yes 
Malware.Win32/Lioten Yes Malware.Win32/Holar Yes 
Malware.Win32/Hocgaly Yes Malware.Win32/Higuy Yes 
Malware.Win32/Gnuman Yes Malware.Win32/Frethem Yes 
Malware.Win32/Fix2100 Yes Malware.Win32/ExploreZip Yes 
Malware.Win32/Gain Yes Malware.Win32/Lirva Yes 
Malware.Win32/Blaster Yes Malware.Win32/Hybris Yes 
Malware.Win32/Antiman Yes Malware.Win32/Cloner Yes 
Malware.Win32/Cervivec Yes Malware.Win32/Tenga Yes 
Malware.Win32/Badtrans No Malware.Win32/Doomjuice Yes 
Malware.Win32/Hai Yes Malware.Win32/Funner Yes 
Malware.Win32/Reatle Yes Malware.Win32/Rinbot Yes 
Malware.Win32/Polip No Malware.Win32/Puce Yes 
Malware.Win32/Parite Yes Malware.Win32/Qaz Yes 
Malware.Win32/Nachi Yes Malware.Win32/Mywife Yes 
Malware.Win32/Magistr Yes Malware.Win32/Maslan Yes 
Malware.Win32/Klez Yes Malware.Win32/Kipis Yes 
Malware.Win32/Kidala Yes Malware.Win32/Gurong Yes 
Malware.Win32/Funlove Yes Malware.Win32/Padobot Yes 
Malware.Win32/Bozori Yes Malware.Win32/Bofra Yes 
Malware.Win32/Sality Yes Malware.Win32/Anzae Yes 
Malware.Win32/Golten Yes Malware.Win32/Myfip Yes 
Malware.Win32/Philis Yes Malware.Win32/Theals No 
Malware.Win32/Tirbot Yes Malware.Win32/Savage Yes 
Malware.Win32/Autex Yes Malware.Win32/Backterra No 
Malware.Win32/Deborm Yes Malware.Win32/Dedler Yes 
Malware.Win32/Cone Yes Malware.Win32/Chimo Yes 
Malware.Win32/Fanbot Yes Malware.Win32/Floppy Yes 
Malware.Win32/Heretic Yes Malware.Win32/Hotlix Yes 
Malware.Win32/Zusha Yes Malware.Win32/Jupir Yes 
Malware.Win32/Kelvir Yes Malware.Win32/Kindal Yes 
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Malware.Win32/MTX-m Yes Malware.Win32/MyLife Yes 
Malware.Win32/Snapper Yes Malware.Win32/Zindos Yes 
Malware.Win32/Annil Yes Malware.Win32/Antiqfx Yes 
Malware.Win32/Onamu Yes Malware.Win32/PrettyPark Yes 
Malware.Win32/Xddtray Yes Malware.Win32/Maddis Yes 
Malware.Win32/Apsiv No Malware.Win32/Benjamin Yes 
Malware.Win32/Choke Yes Malware.Win32/Dabber Yes 
Malware.Win32/Dipnet Yes Malware.Win32/Donk Yes 
Malware.Win32/Gregcenter Yes Malware.Win32/Imbiat Yes 
Malware.Win32/HLLP.DeTroie Yes Malware.Win32/Kelino Yes 
Malware.Win32/Logpole Yes Malware.Win32/Loxar Yes 
Malware.Win32/Mellon Yes Malware.Win32/Misodene Yes 
Malware.Win32/Neklace Yes Malware.Win32/Pepex Yes 
Malware.Win32/RAHack Yes Malware.Win32/Randin Yes 
Malware.Win32/Rirc Yes Malware.Win32/Stator Yes 
Malware.Win32/Tumbi Yes Malware.Win32/Datom Yes 
Malware.Win32/Tzet No Malware.Win32/Zar Yes 
Malware.Win32/Unfunner Yes Malware.Win32/Yanz Yes 
Malware.Win32/Upering Yes Malware.Win32/Wozer Yes 
Malware.Win32/Vavico Yes Malware.Win32/Warpigs No 
Malware.Win32/Visilin Yes Malware.Win32/Wallz Yes 
 
 
Table A.2: Results of virus analysis-2. 
Process Name Attachment Process Name Attachment 
Malware.Win32/Codbot Yes Malware.Win32/Eliles Yes 
Malware.Win32/Detnat Yes Malware.Win32/Eyeveg Yes 
Malware.Win32/Darby Yes Malware.Win32/Feebs Yes 
Malware.Win32/Dumaru Yes Malware.Win32/Forbot Yes 
Malware.Win32/Fizzer Yes Malware.Win32/Fujacks Yes 
Malware.Win32/Mydoom Yes Malware.Win32/Wukill Yes 
Malware.Win32/Spybot Yes Malware.Win32/Sdbot Yes 
Malware.Win32/Oddbob Yes Malware.Win32/Agobot Yes 
Malware.Win32/Mocbot Yes Malware.Win32/Mimail Yes 
Malware.Win32/Bobax Yes Malware.Win32/Zotob Yes 
Malware.Win32/Aimbot Yes Malware.Win32/Yaha Yes 
Malware.Win32/Wootbot Yes Malware.Win32/Virut Yes 
Malware.Win32/Pesin Yes Malware.Win32/Small No 
Malware.Win32/Sircam No Malware.Win32/Sixem Yes 
Malware.Win32/Ritdoor Yes Malware.Win32/Reper Yes 
Malware.Win32/Oror Yes Malware.Win32/Outa Yes 
Malware.Win32/Mytobor Yes Malware.Win32/Mypics Yes 
Malware.Win32/Monikey Yes Malware.Win32/Mobler Yes 
Malware.Win32/Maldal Yes Malware.Win32/Melissa Yes 
Malware.Win32/Lolol Yes Malware.Win32/Satir Yes 
Malware.Win32/Gokar Yes Malware.Win32/Hantaner Yes 
Malware.Win32/Goner Yes Malware.Win32/Heidi Yes 
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Malware.Win32/Fbound Yes Malware.Win32/Banwarum Yes 
Malware.Win32/Beast Yes Malware.Win32/Antiax Yes 
Malware.Win32/Blebla Yes Malware.Win32/Apost Yes 
Malware.Win32/Ircbot Yes Malware.Win32/Appflet Yes 
Malware.Win32/Torvil Yes Malware.Win32/Traxg Yes 
Malware.Win32/Valla Yes Malware.Win32/Qeds No 
Malware.Win32/Womble Yes Malware.Win32/Serflog Yes 
Malware.Win32/Flukan No Malware.Win32/Fatcat Yes 
Malware.Win32/Sasser Yes Malware.Win32/Plexus Yes 
Malware.Win32/Rants Yes Malware.Win32/Opaserv Yes 
Malware.Win32/Nugache Yes Malware.Win32/Nimda Yes 
Malware.Win32/Mabutu Yes Malware.Win32/Luder Yes 
Malware.Win32/Lovelorn Yes Malware.Win32/Kriz Yes 
Malware.Win32/Jeefo Yes Malware.Win32/Kebede Yes 
Malware.Win32/Inforyou Yes Malware.Win32/Ganda Yes 
Malware.Win32/Nanspy Yes Malware.Win32/Cissi Yes 
Malware.Win32/Bagz Yes Malware.Win32/Atak Yes 
Malware.Win32/Delf Yes Malware.Win32/Braid Yes 
Malware.Win32/Opanki No Malware.Win32/Aliz No 
Malware.Win32/Tenrobot Yes Malware.Win32/Swen Yes 
Malware.Win32/Pinom Yes Malware.Win32/Assasin Yes 
Malware.Win32/Deloder Yes Malware.Win32/Capside Yes 
Malware.Win32/Derdero Yes Malware.Win32/Doep Yes 
Malware.Win32/Bube Yes Malware.Win32/Drefir No 
Malware.Win32/Guap Yes Malware.Win32/Harwig Yes 
Malware.Win32/HPS Yes Malware.Win32/Tibick Yes 
Malware.Win32/Kalel Yes Malware.Win32/Kassbot Yes 
Malware.Win32/Aplore Yes Malware.Win32/Licu Yes 
Malware.Win32/Raleka No Malware.Win32/Randex Yes 
Malware.Win32/Ahker Yes Malware.Win32/Anap Yes 
Malware.Win32/Cuebot Yes Malware.Win32/Deadcode Yes 
Malware.Win32/Primat Yes Malware.Win32/Protoride No 
Malware.Win32/Mofei Yes Malware.Win32/Antinny Yes 
Malware.Win32/Bereb Yes Malware.Win32/Bilay Yes 
Malware.Win32/Darker Yes Malware.Win32/Buchon Yes 
Malware.Win32/Faisal No Malware.Win32/Francette No 
Malware.Win32/Jared Yes Malware.Win32/ Jitux Yes 
Malware.Win32/Krepper No Malware.Win32/Lacrow Yes 
Malware.Win32/LyndEgg Yes Malware.Win32/Magold Yes 
Malware.Win32/Mona Yes Malware.Win32/Navidad Yes 
Malware.Win32/PMX Yes Malware.Win32/Qizy Yes 
Malware.Win32/Reur Yes Malware.Win32/Salga Yes 
Malware.Win32/Tanked Yes Malware.Win32/Titog Yes 
Malware.Win32/Allocup Yes Malware.Win32/Amus Yes 
Malware.Win32/Envid Yes Malware.Win32/Shuck Yes 
Malware.Win32/Looksky Yes Malware.Win32/Smibag No 
Malware.Win32/Semapi Yes Malware.Win32/Smeagol Yes 
Malware.Win32/Seppuku No Malware.Win32/Silva Yes 
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2. Prototypes’s results 
As explained in Chapter 6 and 7, the prototype’s results are divided into two parts, 
namely, normal processes’ results and computer viruses’ results. However, due to the 
big size of the log files of both normal and viral processes, selected ones will be 
provided here. Firstly, the normal processes results will be examined. 
 Normal Processes 
Example 1: 
This example considers both chrome.exe and firefox.exe normal processes which were 
examined at the same time. As shown in the below snippet, It can be seen that both 
processes issue a ReadFile API calls which represent category three in this research but 
never issue calls from the previous categories. Moreover, firefox.exe issues Win32 and 
Native API calls from the third (ReadFile), fourth (NtSetInformationFile), and fifth 
(WriteFile) categories respectively. These sequences of API calls resemble the ones 
which are normally issued by computer viruses but as can be seen from the log file 
below, the whole order is not complete and then this process is considered to be a 
normal process. 
Listing A.1: Snapshot of firefox.exe and chrome.exe log file. 
State 1596: Call="CloseHandle" 
State 1596: S=0 
Malware.Win32/Shodabot Yes   
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State 1596: ProcessName="chrome.exe" 
State 1596: Call="CloseHandle" 
State 1596: S=0 
State 1596: ProcessName="chrome.exe" 
State 1598: Call="NtSetInformationFile" 
State 1598: S=0 
State 1598: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
State 1598: Call="NtSetInformationFile" 
State 1598: S=0 
State 1598: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
State 1600: Call="NtClose" 
State 1600: S=0 
State 1600: ProcessName="chrome.exe" 
State 1600: Call="NtClose" 
State 1600: S=0 
State 1600: ProcessName="chrome.exe" 
State 1602: Call="ReadFile"                                                     * 
State 1602: S=0 
State 1602: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
State 1602: Call="ReadFile"                                                      * 
State 1602: S=0 
State 1602: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
State 1604: Call="NtReadFile" 
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State 1604: S=0 
State 1604: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
State 1604: Call="NtReadFile" 
State 1604: S=0 
State 1604: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
State 1606: Call="NtSetInformationFile" 
State 1606: S=0 
State 1606: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
State 1606: Call="NtSetInformationFile" 
State 1606: S=0 
State 1606: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
State 1608: Call="ReadFile"                                                       * 
State 1608: S=0 
State 1608: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
State 1608: Call="ReadFile" 
State 1608: S=0 
State 1608: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
State 1610: Call="NtReadFile" 
State 1610: S=0 
State 1610: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
State 1610: Call="NtReadFile" 
State 1610: S=0 
State 1610: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
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State 1612: Call="NtSetInformationFile"                                     * 
State 1612: S=0 
State 1612: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
State 1612: Call="NtSetInformationFile" 
State 1612: S=0 
State 1612: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
State 1614: Call="WriteFile"                                                          * 
State 1614: S=0 
State 1614: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
State 1614: Call="WriteFile" 
State 1614: S=0 
State 1614: ProcessName="firefox.exe" 
Example 2: 
In this example the benign processes cisvc.exe and lsass.exe are also tested. Snapshots 
of the log files of both processes are provided below in Listing A.2. It can be observed 
that both processes issue calls from different categories but on the other hand they do 
not complete the whole attempt of attaching themselves to other files (the five 
categories with their rules) that viruses usually carry out. As shown below, cisvc.exe 
issue calls from category one and two but never follow the theory of attachment and 
issues calls from all the five categories. Hence, this process will not be considered as a 
viral process. 
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Listing A.2: Snapshot of lsass.exe and cisvc.exe log file. 
State 122: Call="NtWriteFile" 
State 122: S=0 
State 122: ProcessName="lsass.exe" 
State 122: Call="NtWriteFile" 
State 122: S=0 
State 122: ProcessName="lsass.exe" 
State 124: Call="NtReadFile" 
State 124: S=0 
State 124: ProcessName="lsass.exe" 
State 124: Call="NtReadFile" 
State 124: S=0 
State 124: ProcessName="lsass.exe" 
State 394: Call="NtQueryDirectoryFile" 
State 394: S=0 
State 394: ProcessName="cisvc.exe" 
State 394:  PID:760 issued a call in cat1                                                      * 
State 394: Call="NtQueryDirectoryFile" 
State 394: S=0 
State 394: ProcessName="cisvc.exe" 
State 1834: Call="GetFileSize" 
State 1834: S=1 
State 1834: ProcessName="cisvc.exe" 
Appendix 
216 | P a g e  
 
State 1834:  PID:760 issued a call in cat2                                                      * 
State 1834: Call="GetFileSize" 
State 1834: S=0 
State 1834: ProcessName="cisvc.exe"  
 Computer Viruses 
Example 1: 
In this example the computer virus Weakas.exe will be tested. This sample is a 
Windows 32 computer virus. As shown in the snapshot below, this virus has attached 
itself to another file by following the order of (Cat2 Cat1 Cat3 Cat4 Cat5). As 
a result, this virus has been detected by our prototype. In addition, the order that 
Weakas.exe virus follows in order to infect another file is shown in Figure A.1. 
Listing A.3: Snapshot of Weakas.exe log file (after detection). 
 State  15: Call="GetFileAttributesW" 
State  15: S=0 
State  15: ProcessName="Weakas.exe" 
State  15:  PID:2132 issued a call in cat2                                                       * 
State  16: Call="NtQueryAttributesFile" 
State  16: S=7 
State  19: Call="NtQueryDirectoryFile" 
State  19: S=7 
State  19: ProcessName="Weakas.exe" 
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State  19:  PID:2132 issued a call in cat1                                                       * 
State  20: Call="ReadFile" 
State  20: S=8 
State  20: ProcessName="Weakas.exe" 
State  20:  The file ( (Weakas.exe) ) issued calls in the previous two categories  
State  20:  And a call issued in cat3                                                              * 
State  20: _____Then_______(it's a candidate virus)__________  
State  22: Call="NtWriteFile" 
State  22: S=9 
State  22: ProcessName="Weakas.exe" 
State  22:  A call issued in cat4                                                                   * 
State  24: Call="NtSetInformationFile" 
State  24: S=10 
State  24: ProcessName="Weakas.exe" 
State  24:  And a call issued in cat5                                                            * 
State  25: Call="ReadFile" 
State  25: S=11 
State  25: ProcessName="Weakas.exe" 
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Example 2: 
In this example the viral process Eliles.exe will be tracked. This malware is a computer 
worm that is considered to be a computer virus because it attaches itself to another 
file prior to spread itself across the network. This malware follows the same order 
which Weakas.exe virus follows (Cat2 Cat1 Cat3 Cat4 Cat5) as shown in 
Figure A.1. The first snapshot (Listing A.4) shows how Tempura will read the Native and 
Win32 API calls issued by this virus from Deviare API. Secondly, how the final result can 
be achieved when the virus attempts to infect another file and follows the five steps 
with their rules, will be shown in the second snapshot (Listing A.5). 
S





Figure A.1: The order Weakas and Eliles follow to attach themselves to another file. 
 
Appendix 
219 | P a g e  
 
Listing A.4: Snapshot of Eliles.exe Assertion. 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:GetFileAttributesW:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:GetCompressedFileSizeW:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:NtQueryAttributesFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:NtQueryInformationFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:FindFirstFileW:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:FindClose:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:NtQueryDirectoryFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:NtQueryDirectoryFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:NtQueryDirectoryFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:ReadFile:Inputs:Eliles.exe:! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:NtReadFile:Inputs:Eliles.exe:! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:WriteFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:NtWriteFile:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:SetFileAttributesW:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:SetFileShortNameW:Inputs::! 
!PROG: assert Name:Eliles.exe:Id:3422:Call:NtSetInformationFile:Inputs::! 
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Listing A.5: Snapshot of Eliles.exe log file (after detection). 
State  54: Call="GetFileAttributesW" 
State  54: S=0 
State  54: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
State  54:  PID:3422 issued a call in cat2                                                       * 
State  55: Call="GetCompressedFileSizeW" 
State  55: S=7 
State  55: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
State  56: Call="NtQueryInformationFile" 
State  56: S=7 
State  56: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
State  57: Call="NtQueryInformationFile" 
State  57: S=7 
State  57: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
State  58: Call="FindFirstFileW" 
State  58: S=7 
State  58: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
State  58:  PID:3422 issued a call in cat1                                                       * 
State  59: Call="FindClose" 
State  59: S=8 
State  59: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
State  60: Call="NtQueryDirectoryFile" 
State  60: S=8 
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State  60: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
State  61: Call="NtQueryDirectoryFile" 
State  61: S=8 
State  61: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
State  62: Call="NtQueryDirectoryFile" 
State  62: S=8 
State  62: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
State  63: Call="ReadFile" 
State  63: S=8 
State  63: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
State  63:  The file ( (Eliles.exe) ) issued calls in the previous two categories  
State  63:  And a call issued in cat3                                                       * 
State  63: _____Then_______(it's a candidate virus)__________  
State  64: Call="NtReadFile" 
State  64: S=9 
State  64: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
State  65: Call="WriteFileEx" 
State  65: S=9 
State  65: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
State  65:  A call issued in cat4                                                              * 
State  66: Call="NtWriteFile" 
State  66: S=10 
State  66: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
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State  67: Call="SetFileAttributesW" 
State  67: S=10 
State  67: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
State  67:  And a call issued in cat5                                                       * 
State  68: Call="SetFileShortNameW" 
State  68: S=11 
State  68: ProcessName="Eliles.exe" 
State  68:  The file ( (Eliles.exe) ) is a COMPUTER VIRUS                  * 
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Appendix B 
API Intercepting Source Code 
Appendix B is the C# source code that is used by Deviare API tool to intercept Win32 
and Native API calls. It can be seen that only 68 calls are intercepted in this code as 
shown in Listing B.2. The assertion points which contain the process name, Id, the call, 
and the parameters associated with this call, will go through several steps each time a 
call is issued. Firstly, Deviare API needs to extract both calls with their parameters as 
assertion points in order to be read by Tempura, as shown in Listing B.1. Then, the Java 
pipe needs to be able to read these assertion points and then delivers them to 
Tempura. Finally, Tempura should be able to read and examine them. 
Listing B.1: C# Assertion Points. 
//Assertion Points 
               Console.WriteLine("!PROG: assert 
Name:{0}:Id:{1}:Call:{2}:Inputs:{3}:!", P_name, P_ID, Call, hfile); 
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    public partial class Form1 : Form 
    { 
        private NktSpyMgr _spyMgr; 
        private NktProcess _process; 
        private NktTools _tool; 
        private StreamWriter _writer; 
 
 
        public Form1() 
        { 
            int res; 
            _spyMgr = new NktSpyMgr(); 
            _tool = new NktTools(); 
            res = _spyMgr.Initialize(); 
            _spyMgr.OnFunctionCalled += new 
DNktSpyMgrEvents_OnFunctionCalledEventHandler(OnFunctionCalled); 





            InitializeComponent(); 
        } 
 
        private void Form1_Load(object sender, EventArgs e) 
        { 
            // Hooking Process 
 
            //  First Category -Find to infect-  
 
            NktHook hook3 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!FindFirstStreamW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook4 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!FindFirstFileTransactedW", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook5 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!FindFirstStreamTransactedW", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook6 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!FindClose", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook7 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!FindNextFileW", (int)(0)); 
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            NktHook hook8 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!FindFirstFileNameW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook9 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!FindNextFileNameW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook10 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!FindFirstFileNameTransactedW", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook11 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!FindNextStreamW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook12 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!FindFirstFileExW", (int)(0)); 




            //Second Category -Get information-  
 
            NktHook hook13 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetFileAttributesExW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook14 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetFileAttributesTransactedW", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook15 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetFileAttributesW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook16 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetFileInformationByHandle", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook17 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetFileBandwidthReservation", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook18 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetCompressedFileSizeTransactedW", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook19 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetFileInformationByHandleEx", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook20 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetCompressedFileSizeW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook21 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetBinaryTypeW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook22 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetFileSizeEx", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook23 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetFileSize", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook24 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetFileType", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook25 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetTempFileNameW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook26 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetFinalPathNameByHandleW", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook27 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetLongPathNameTransactedW", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook28 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetFullPathNameTransactedW", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook29 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetFullPathNameW", (int)(0)); 
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            NktHook hook30 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!GetLongPathNameW", (int)(0)); 




            //Third Category -Read and/or copy-  
 
            NktHook hook2 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!ReadFile", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook222 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!ReadFileEx", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!CreateFileW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook32 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!OpenFile", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook33 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!OpenFileByld", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook34 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!ReOpenFile", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook35 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!CreateHardLinkTransactedW", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook36 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!CreateHardLinkW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook37 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!CreateSymbolicLinkTransactedW", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook38 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!CreateSymbolicLinkW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook39 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!CopyFileExW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook40 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!CopyFileW", (int)(0)); 




            //Fourth Category -Write and/or delete-  
 
            NktHook hook42 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!ReplaceFileW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook43 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!WriteFile", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook434 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!WriteFileEx", (int)(0)); 
 
            NktHook hook44 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!DeleteFileTransactedW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook45 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!CloseHandle", (int)(0)); 




            //Fifth Category -Set information-  
 
            NktHook hook47 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!SetFileInformationByHandle", 
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(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook48 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!SetFileValidData", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook49 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!SetFileBandwidthReservation", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook50 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!SetFileShortNameW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook51 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!SetFileAttributesTransactedW", 
(int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook52 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!SetFileApisToOEM", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook53 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!SetFileAttributesW", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook54 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("kernel32.dll!SetFileApisToANSI", (int)(0)); 
 
            NktHook hook56 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("ntdll.dll!NtQueryDirectoryFile", (int)(0)); 
 
            NktHook hook57 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("ntdll.dll!NtQueryAttributesFile", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook58 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("ntdll.dll!NtQueryInformationFile", (int)(0)); 
 
            NktHook hook59 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("ntdll.dll!NtOpenFile", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook60 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("ntdll.dll!NtReadFile", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook61 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("ntdll.dll!NtCreateFile", (int)(0)); 
 
            NktHook hook62 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("ntdll.dll!NtWriteFile", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook63 = 
_spyMgr.CreateHook("ntdll.dll!NtDeleteFile", (int)(0)); 
            NktHook hook64 = _spyMgr.CreateHook("ntdll.dll!NtClose", 
(int)(0)); 
 




            INktProcessesEnum enumProcs = _spyMgr.Processes(); 
            foreach (INktProcess proc in enumProcs) 
            { 
                try 
                { 
                    if (proc.Name.ToLower() == "chrome.exe" || 
proc.Name.ToLower() == "firefox.exe") 
                    { 
                        //Attaching proces for all the categories 
 
 
                        hook3.Attach(proc,true); 
                        hook4.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook5.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook6.Attach(proc, true); 
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                        hook7.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook8.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook9.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook10.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook11.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook12.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook121.Attach(proc, true); 
 
 
                        hook13.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook14.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook15.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook16.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook17.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook18.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook19.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook20.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook21.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook22.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook23.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook24.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook25.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook26.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook27.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook28.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook29.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook30.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook31.Attach(proc, true); 
 
 
                        hook.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook2.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook222.Attach(proc, true); 
 
                        hook32.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook33.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook34.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook35.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook36.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook37.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook38.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook39.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook40.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook41.Attach(proc, true); 
 
 
                        hook42.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook43.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook434.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook44.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook45.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook46.Attach(proc, true); 
 
 
                        hook47.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook48.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook49.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook50.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook51.Attach(proc, true); 
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                        hook52.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook53.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook54.Attach(proc, true); 
 
                        hook56.Attach(proc, true); 
 
                        hook57.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook58.Attach(proc, true); 
                         
                        hook59.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook60.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook62.Attach(proc, true); 
                         
                        hook62.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook63.Attach(proc, true); 
                        hook64.Attach(proc, true); 
 
                        hook65.Attach(proc, true); 
 
 
                    } 
                } 
                catch (Exception) 
                { 
                } 
            } 
 
            hook3.Hook(true); 
            hook4.Hook(true); 
            hook5.Hook(true); 
            hook6.Hook(true); 
            hook7.Hook(true); 
            hook8.Hook(true); 
            hook9.Hook(true); 
            hook10.Hook(true); 
            hook11.Hook(true); 
            hook12.Hook(true); 
            hook121.Hook(true); 
 
            hook13.Hook(true); 
            hook14.Hook(true); 
            hook15.Hook(true); 
            hook16.Hook(true); 
            hook17.Hook(true); 
            hook18.Hook(true); 
            hook19.Hook(true); 
            hook20.Hook(true); 
            hook21.Hook(true); 
            hook22.Hook(true); 
            hook23.Hook(true); 
            hook24.Hook(true); 
            hook25.Hook(true); 
            hook26.Hook(true); 
            hook27.Hook(true); 
            hook28.Hook(true); 
            hook29.Hook(true); 
            hook30.Hook(true); 
            hook31.Hook(true); 
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            hook.Hook(true); 
            hook2.Hook(true); 
            hook222.Hook(true); 
            hook32.Hook(true); 
            hook33.Hook(true); 
            hook34.Hook(true); 
            hook35.Hook(true); 
            hook36.Hook(true); 
            hook37.Hook(true); 
            hook38.Hook(true); 
            hook39.Hook(true); 
            hook40.Hook(true); 
            hook41.Hook(true); 
 
 
            hook42.Hook(true); 
            hook43.Hook(true); 
            hook434.Hook(true); 
            hook44.Hook(true); 
            hook45.Hook(true); 
            hook46.Hook(true); 
 
            hook47.Hook(true); 
            hook48.Hook(true); 
            hook49.Hook(true); 
            hook50.Hook(true); 
            hook51.Hook(true); 
            hook52.Hook(true); 
            hook53.Hook(true); 
            hook54.Hook(true); 
 
            hook56.Hook(true); 
             
            hook57.Hook(true); 
            hook58.Hook(true); 
 
            hook59.Hook(true); 
            hook60.Hook(true); 
            hook61.Hook(true); 
 
            hook62.Hook(true); 
            hook63.Hook(true); 
            hook64.Hook(true); 
 
            hook65.Hook(true); 
   
        } 
 
        private bool GetProcess(string proccessName) 
        { 
            NktProcessesEnum enumProcess = _spyMgr.Processes(); 
            NktProcess tempProcess = enumProcess.First(); 
            while (tempProcess != null) 
            { 
                if (tempProcess.Name.Equals(proccessName, 
StringComparison.InvariantCultureIgnoreCase) && 
tempProcess.PlatformBits > 0 && tempProcess.PlatformBits <= 
IntPtr.Size * 8) 
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                { 
                    _process = tempProcess; 
                    return true; 
                } 
                tempProcess = enumProcess.Next(); 
            } 
 
            _process = null; 
            return false; 
        } 
 
        private void OnFunctionCalled(NktHook hook, NktProcess 
process, NktHookCallInfo hookCallInfo) 
        { 
            if (hookCallInfo.IsPreCall) 
            { 
                string strCreateFile; 
                string strCreateFilea; 
                INktParamsEnum paramsEnum = hookCallInfo.Params(); 
 
                string function = ""; 
                function = hook.FunctionName; 
                int r = function.LastIndexOf('!'); 
                function = function.Substring(r + 1); 
 
                strCreateFilea = " \n" + process.Name + "     " + 
process.Id.ToString() + "   " + function + "    "; 
                strCreateFile = ""; 
 
                 
 
                if (hook.FunctionName == "kernel32.dll!CreateFileW") 
                { 
                    /* 
                     //lpFileName 
                     INktParam param = paramsEnum.First(); 
                     strCreateFile += param.ReadString() + "\", "; 
 
 
                     //dwDesiredAccess 
                     param = paramsEnum.Next(); 
                     if ((param.LongVal & 0x80000000) == 0x80000000) 
                         strCreateFile += "GENERIC_READ "; 
                     else if ((param.LongVal & 0x40000000) == 
0x40000000) 
                         strCreateFile += "GENERIC_WRITE "; 
                     else if ((param.LongVal & 0x20000000) == 
0x20000000) 
                         strCreateFile += "GENERIC_EXECUTE "; 
                     else if ((param.LongVal & 0x10000000) == 
0x10000000) 
                         strCreateFile += "GENERIC_ALL "; 
                     else 
                         strCreateFile += "0"; 
                     strCreateFile += ", "; 
 
                     //dwShareMode 
                     param = paramsEnum.Next(); 
                     if ((param.LongVal & 0x00000001) == 0x00000001) 
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                         strCreateFile += "FILE_SHARE_READ "; 
                     else if ((param.LongVal & 0x00000002) == 
0x00000002) 
                         strCreateFile += "FILE_SHARE_WRITE "; 
                     else if ((param.LongVal & 0x00000004) == 
0x00000004) 
                         strCreateFile += "FILE_SHARE_DELETE "; 
                     else 
                         strCreateFile += "0"; 
                     strCreateFile += ", "; 
 
                     //lpSecurityAttributes 
                     param = paramsEnum.Next(); 
                     if (param.PointerVal != IntPtr.Zero) 
                     { 
                         strCreateFile += "SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES("; 
 
                         INktParamsEnum paramsEnumStruct = 
param.Evaluate().Fields(); 
                         INktParam paramStruct = 
paramsEnumStruct.First(); 
 
                         strCreateFile += 
paramStruct.LongVal.ToString(); 
                         strCreateFile += ", "; 
 
                         paramStruct = paramsEnumStruct.Next(); 
                         strCreateFile += 
paramStruct.PointerVal.ToString(); 
                         strCreateFile += ", "; 
 
                         paramStruct = paramsEnumStruct.Next(); 
                         strCreateFile += 
paramStruct.LongVal.ToString(); 
                         strCreateFile += ")"; 
                     } 
                     else 
                         strCreateFile += "0"; 
                     strCreateFile += ", "; 
 
                     //dwCreationDisposition 
                     param = paramsEnum.Next(); 
                     if (param.LongVal == 1) 
                         strCreateFile += "CREATE_NEW "; 
                     else if (param.LongVal == 2) 
                         strCreateFile += "CREATE_ALWAYS "; 
                     else if (param.LongVal == 3) 
                         strCreateFile += "OPEN_EXISTING "; 
                     else if (param.LongVal == 4) 
                         strCreateFile += "OPEN_ALWAYS "; 
                     else if (param.LongVal == 5) 
                         strCreateFile += "TRUNCATE_EXISTING "; 
                     else 
                         strCreateFile += "0"; 
                     strCreateFile += ", "; 
 
                     //dwFlagsAndAttributes 
                     strCreateFile += param.LongVal; 
                     strCreateFile += ", "; 
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                     //hTemplateFile 
                     strCreateFile += param.LongLongVal; 
                     strCreateFile += ");\r\n"; 
                     */ 
                } 
 
                else if (hook.FunctionName == "kernel32.dll!ReadFile" 
|| hook.FunctionName == "kernel32.dll!ReadFileEx" 
                    || hook.FunctionName == "ntdll.dll!NtReadFile") 
                { 
                    IntPtr h = paramsEnum.GetAt(0).SSizeTVal; 
                    string s = ""; 
                    if (h != IntPtr.Zero) 
                    { 
                        try 
                        { 
                            s = _tool.GetFileNameFromHandle(h, 
process); 
                        } 
                        catch (Exception e) 
                        { 
                            throw (e);  
                        } 
                    } 
 
                    int i = s.LastIndexOf('\\'); 
                    s = s.Substring(i + 1); 
 
                    strCreateFile += s; 
                    strCreateFilea += s; 
                } 
 
                Output(strCreateFilea); 
                Output1(process.Name, process.Id.ToString(), 
function, strCreateFile); 
            } 
 
        } 
 
        public delegate void OutputDelegate(string P_name, string 
P_ID, string Call, string hfile ); 
        private void Output1(string P_name, string P_ID, string Call, 
string hfile) 
        { 
            if (InvokeRequired) 
                BeginInvoke(new OutputDelegate(Output1), P_name,P_ID, 
Call, hfile); 
            else 
            { 
                     //Assertion Points 
                Console.WriteLine("!PROG: assert 
Name:{0}:Id:{1}:Call:{2}:Inputs:{3}:!", P_name, P_ID, Call, hfile); 
 
            } 
             
        } 
 
        private void Output(string strOutput) 
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        { 
 
            lock (_writer) 
            { 
                _writer.WriteLine(strOutput); 




        } 
                   
        } 
    } 
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Appendix C 
Tempura Source Code 
Appendix C is the Tempura code which is the testing code that decides whether a 
process is a benign or viral process. The code shown in Listing C.1, is the one that 
makes it possible to read the four parameters coming from Deviare API through the 
Java pipe. When a call is received, Tempura will examine the four parameters to see 
whether the five categories are issued by a certain process or not. In addition, the 
orders shown in Figure 5.5 need also to be taken into account. 
Listing C.1: The four parameters. 
define get_var(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) =  
{ 
    exists T : { 
        get2(T) and 
        if Pnamer(T)=X0 then {Y0=Pnamel(T)} 
  and 
        if Pidr(T)=X1 then {Y1=Pidl(T)} 
  and 
        if Callr(T)=X2 then {Y2=Calll(T)} 
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  and 
        if Filenamer(T)=X3 then {Y3=Filenamel(T)} } 
The following Figure shows that the “External” interface of Tempura will 
indicate whether both the TestHook.exe that intercepts Win32 and Native API calls, 
and the Java pipe which delivers these calls to Tempura, are successfully initialised and 
ready to be used by Tempura. If yes, this means that Tempura is able to receive both 
calls at the same time. In addition, the role of Tempura will now start and it can tell 
whether a process attempts to attach itself to another file or not. 
 
Figure C.1: Tempura Integration. 
The following listing is the full Tempura code which is used in this research to 
examine both Win32 and Native API calls at runtime. 
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Listing C.2: Tempura Source code. 
/*  
 * Behavioural virus detection system Implementation 
 * Sulaiman Al amro 
 * 15/03/2012 





 * We model this system with the following Lists: 
 * Cat1 : Find to infect category 
 * Cat2 : Get information category 
 * Cat3 : Read and/or copy category 
 * Cat4 : Write and/or delete category 
 and 






 /* The following Functions has been used: 
 * StartInit : To initialise every list  
 * SysTestMonitoring : is the main of our program 
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/*------------------------Find to infect category-----------------------------*/ 
  
define cat1        = ["FindFirstStreamW", 
                      "FindFirstFileTransactedW", 
                      "FindFirstStreamTransactedW", 
                      "FindClose", 
                      "FindNextFileW", 
                      "FindFirstFileNameW", 
                      "FindNextFileNameW", 
                      "FindFirstFileNameTransactedW", 
                      "FindNextStreamW", 
                      "FindFirstFileExW", 
                      "FindFirstFileW", 
                      "NtQueryDirectoryFile"]. 
        
/*-------------------------Get information category---------------------------*/ 
 
define cat2        = ["GetFileAttributesExW", 
                      "GetFileAttributesTransactedW", 
                      "GetFileAttributesW", 
                      "GetFileInformationByHandle", 
                      "GetFileBandwidthReservation", 
                      "GetCompressedFileSizeTransactedW", 
                      "GetFileInformationByHandleEx", 
                      "GetCompressedFileSizeW", 
                      "GetBinaryTypeW", 
                      "GetFileSizeEx", 
                      "GetFileSize", 
                      "GetFileType", 
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                      "GetTempFileNameW", 
                      "GetFinalPathNameByHandleW", 
                      "GetLongPathNameTransactedW", 
                      "GetFullPathNameTransactedW", 
                      "GetFullPathNameW", 
                      "GetLongPathNameW", 
                      "GetShortPathNameW", 
                      "NtQueryAttributesFile", 
                      "NtQueryInformationFile"]. 
        
/*-----------------------Read and/or copy category------------------------------*/ 
 
define cat3   = ["ReadFile",  
                           "ReadFileEx", 
                           "OpenFile", 
                           "OpenFileByld", 
                           "ReOpenFile", 
                           "NtOpenFile", 
                           "NtReadFile"]. 
 
define cat3A        = ["CreateHardLinkTransactedW", 
                       "CreateHardLinkW", 
                       "CreateSymbolicLinkTransactedW", 
                       "CreateSymbolicLinkW", 
                       "CreateFileW", 
                       "CopyFileExW", 
                       "CopyFileW", 
                       "CopyFileTransactedW", 
                       "NtCreateFile"]. 
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/*-----------------------Write and/or delete category---------------------------*/ 
 
define cat4        = ["WriteFile", 
   "WriteFileEx", 
  "ReplaceFileW", 
  "NtWriteFile"]. 
 
define cat4A        =["DeleteFileW", 
                      "DeleteFileTransactedW", 
                      "CloseHandle", 
                      "NtDeleteFile", 
                      "NtClose"]. 
 
/*----------------------------------Set Information category--------------------*/ 
 
define cat5        = ["SetFileInformationByHandle", 
                      "SetFileValidData", 
                      "SetFileBandwidthReservation", 
                      "SetFileShortNameW", 
                      "SetFileAttributesTransactedW",  
                      "SetFileApisToOEM", 
                      "SetFileAttributesW", 
                      "SetFileApisToANSI", 
                      "NtSetInformationFile"].  
 
define extend_list(L,d) = { 
    list(next L, |L|+1) and 
    forall i<|L|+1: if i<|L| then L[i]:=L[i] else L[i]:=d 
}. 
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/* csc TestHook Main1 0 */ 
set print_states = true. 
define get_var(X0,X1,X2,X3,Y0,Y1,Y2,Y3) =  
{ 
    exists T : { 
        get2(T) and 
        if Pnamer(T)=X0 then {Y0=Pnamel(T)} 
  and 
        if Pidr(T)=X1 then {Y1=Pidl(T)} 
  and 
        if Callr(T)=X2 then {Y2=Calll(T)} 
  and 
        if Filenamer(T)=X3 then {Y3=Filenamel(T)}     
         
    } 
}.     
/*---------------------------------------------------------------------------*/ 
/* run */ define SysTestMonitoring() = { 
 
 




 define    CheckApiCalls(N,S,ProcessName, ProcessId, Call,Inputs)= 
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 exists  J : { 
           skip and output(Call) and output(S) and 
   output(ProcessName) and 
 if N ~= ProcessName then { S:=S } 
             else { 
             if S=0 and (exists i<|cat1|: 
    cat1[i]=Call) 
             then {   
                S:=1  
and  
             format(" PID:%s issued a call in cat1 \n", ProcessId)  
    } 
and 
 if S=0 and (exists i<|cat2|: 
    cat2[i]=Call) 
    then { 
     S:=7   
and 
                  format(" PID:%s issued a call in cat2 \n", ProcessId) 
        } 
and 
   
  if S=0 and not( (exists i<|cat1|: cat1[i]=Call) or (exists i<|cat2|: cat2[i]=Call))  
  then { 
                              S:= 0 
  } 
  and    
 if S=1 and (exists i<|cat1|: 
     cat1[i]=Call) 
 then {   
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                 S:=1  
 } 
and 
    if S=1 and (exists i<|cat2|: 
    cat2[i]=Call) 
 then { 
     S:=2  
and    
                 format(" PID:%s issued a call in cat2 \n", ProcessId)  
                 } 
and 
  if S=1 and not( (exists i<|cat1|: cat1[i]=Call) or (exists i<|cat2|: cat2[i]=Call))  
  then { 
   
                                          S:= 0 
 } 
 and 
 if S=2 and (exists i<|cat2|: 
    cat2[i]=Call) 
 then { 
      S:=2   
       } 
    and 
 if S=2 and (exists i<|cat3|: 
     cat3[i]=Call) 
 then { 
     if (ProcessName=Inputs) 
   then { 
       S:=3   
and  
Appendix 
244 | P a g e  
 
             format(" The file ( (%s) ) issued calls in the previous two categories \n", 
ProcessName)  
and 
             format(" And a call issued in cat3 \n")  
and 
             format("_____Then_______(it’s a candidate virus)__________ \n\n")  
 
   } 
               else { 
                                                       S:= 2  
             } 
 } 
and 
  if S=2 and not( (exists i<|cat2|: cat2[i]=Call) or (exists i<|cat3|: cat3[i]=Call))  
  then { 
                                           S:= 0 
  } 
and 
 if S=3 and (exists i<|cat3|: 
     cat3[i]=Call) 
 then { 
                                S:=3  
  } 
and 
 if S=3 and (exists i<|cat4|: 
     cat4[i]=Call) 
 then { 
         S:=4   
and  
               format(" A call issued in cat4 \n") 
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   } 
and  
 if S=4 and (exists i<|cat4|: 
    cat4[i]=Call) 
  then { 
                                S:=4 
  } 
and 
 if S=4 and (exists i<|cat5|: 
     cat5[i]=Call) 
 then {  
         S:=5   
and  
               format(" And a call issued in cat5 \n") 
   }    
 and 
  if S=4 and not( (exists i<|cat4|: cat4[i]=Call) or (exists i<|cat5|: cat5[i]=Call))  
  then { 
                                               S:= 0 
  }   
and 
 if S=3 and (exists i<|cat5|: 
     cat5[i]=Call) 
        then {      
                       S:=6 
 and  
               format(" A call issued in cat5 \n") 
    } 
 and 
  if S=3 and not((exists i<|cat3|: cat3[i]=Call) or (exists i<|cat4|: cat4[i]=Call) 
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or (exists i<|cat5|: cat5[i]=Call))  
  then { 
                                                S:= 0 
  }        
and   
 if S=6 and (exists i<|cat5|: 
     cat5[i]=Call) 
 then {      
                         S:=6 
 } 
 and 
 if S=6 and (exists i<|cat4|: 
     cat4[i]=Call) 
 then {    
                                                               S:=5   
 and     
              format(" And a call issued in cat4 \n") 
  }    
 and 
 if S=6 and not( (exists i<|cat4|: cat4[i]=Call) or (exists i<|cat5|: cat5[i]=Call))  
  then { 
                                                   S:= 0  
  } 
and 
 if (S=5) 
 then { 
                           S:=5  
and 
             format(" The file ( (%s) ) is a COMPUTER VIRUS \n", ProcessName)  
 }  
Appendix 
247 | P a g e  
 
and 
 if S=7 and (exists i<|cat2|: 
     cat2[i]=Call) 
 then {   
                             S:=7 
  } 
and 
 if S=7 and (exists i<|cat1|: 
     cat1[i]=Call) 
 then { 
                 S:=8 
 and 
               format(" PID:%s issued a call in cat2 \n", ProcessId) 
    } 
and 
  if S=7 and not( (exists i<|cat1|: cat1[i]=Call) or (exists i<|cat2|: cat2[i]=Call))  
  then { 
                                                       S:= 0 
  } 
and 
 if S=8 and (exists i<|cat1|: 
     cat1[i]=Call) 
   then { 
    
                   S:=8   
        } 
 and 
 if S=8 and (exists i<|cat3|: 
     cat3[i]=Call) 
 then { 
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   if (ProcessName=Inputs) 
 then { 
               S:=9 
 and  
             format(" The file ( (%s) ) issued calls in the previous two categories \n", 
ProcessName) 
and      
             format(" And a call issued in cat3 \n")  
and 
             format("_____Then_______(its a candiate virus)__________ \n\n")  
  } 
 else {  
                                                   S:=8 
 } 
  }  
and 
 if S=8 and not( (exists i<|cat1|: cat1[i]=Call) or (exists i<|cat3|: cat3[i]=Call))  
 then { 
                                                    S:= 0 
  } 
and  
 if S=9 and (exists i<|cat3|: 
              cat3[i]=Call) 
 then {     
               S:=9 
    }   
and 
   
 if S=9 and (exists i<|cat4|: 
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             cat4[i]=Call) 
 then {     
            S:=10 
 and  
             format(" A call issued in cat4 \n") 
    } 
and  
 if S=10 and (exists i<|cat4|: 
              cat4[i]=Call) 
 then {     
             S:=10    
  } 
and 
 if S=10 and (exists i<|cat5|: 
             cat5[i]=Call) 
 then {      
             S:=11 
 and  
               format(" And a call issued in cat5 \n") 
 } 
and 
 if S=10 and not( (exists i<|cat4|: cat4[i]=Call) or (exists i<|cat5|: cat5[i]=Call))  
  then { 
                                                 S:= 0 
  } 
and    
 if S=9 and (exists i<|cat5|: 
            cat5[i]=Call) 
  then {     
                        S:=12 
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and   
             format(" A call issued in cat5 \n") 
 } 
 and 
  if S=9 and not((exists i<|cat3|: cat3[i]=Call) or (exists i<|cat4|: cat4[i]=Call) 
or (exists i<|cat5|: cat5[i]=Call))  
  then { 
                                            S:= 0 
  } 
 and  
 if S=12 and (exists i<|cat5|: 
      cat5[i]=Call) 
 then {     
                   S:=12  
  }    
and  
 if S=12 and (exists i<|cat4|: 
      cat4[i]=Call) 
 then {   
                                                        S:=11 
and     
              format(" And a call issued in cat4 \n") 
 } 
 and 
 if S=12 and not( (exists i<|cat4|: cat4[i]=Call) or (exists i<|cat5|: cat5[i]=Call))  
  then { 
                                            S:= 0 
  }       
and 
 if (S=11) 
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 then {   
                   S:=11 
and 
         format(" The file ( (%s) ) is a COMPUTER VIRUS \n", ProcessName)  
 } 
  } 
  } 
} 
and 
/*--&&&&&&&&......... run of the System.......&&&&&&--------------------*/ 
 H=[] and K=0 and I =0 and 
 { 
 { 
             I gets I+1} and always {if I=3000 then Done=true else Done=false } and 
len(3000)  
and 
      list(Sa,2) and stable(struct(Sa)) and forall i<|Sa|: {Sa[i]=i} and output(Sa) and 
      list(Na,2) and stable(struct(Na)) and Na[0] = "chrome.exe" and stable(Na[0]) and 
Na[1] = "firefox.exe" and stable(Na[1]) and 
        
       while(not Done) do { 
   { 
         {   
  get_var("Name","Id","Call","Inputs", Name,Id,Call,Inputs)  
and  
   stable{Name} and 
   stable{Call} and 
   stable{Id}   and 
   stable{Inputs} and  
   (forall i< |Na| : {CheckApiCalls(Na[i], Sa[i], Name,Id,Call, Inputs)}) 
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   };{skip and (forall i<|Na| : {Na[i]:=Na[i] and Sa[i]:=Sa[i]})} 
   }    
} 
} 
  { 
  empty and PrintCatandApiFile()  
  }   
} 
}. 
set print_states=true. 
 
